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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON 
BUKU PROPERTIES, LLC, an Idaho 
limited liability company, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
RAOEL H. CLARK and JANET C. 
CLARK, husband and wife; ANGUS 
JERRY PETERSON and BETTY JEAN 
PETERSON, husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV- (~e og ~ q~ J 
VERIFIED COMPLAINT 
Fee Category: A.I. 
Fee: $88.00 
PlaintiffBuku Properties, LLC ("Buku"), by and through its counsel of record, 
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C., as and for a cause of action against the above-
named Defendants alleges and states as follows: 
I. 
PARTIES, JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
1. Plaintiff Buku is an Idaho limited liability company with its principal place of 
business located in Jefferson County, Idaho. 
, ,./ 
2. Raoel H. Clark and Janet C. Clark, husband and wife (hereinafter "Clarks) are 
residents of the State of Texas who own property in Jefferson County, Idaho. 
3. Angus Jerry Peterson and Betty Jean Peterson, husband and wife (hereinafter 
"Petersons") are residents of the State of Idaho who own property in Jefferson 
County, Idaho. 
4. Pursuant to Idaho Code § 5-514( c), the State of Idaho has jurisdiction over the 
Defendants on the basis that they live in and/or own real property in the State of 
Idaho. 
5. Based upon the amount in controversy, jurisdiction is properly before the District 
Court of the Seventh Judicial District in and for Jefferson County. 
6. Pursuant to Idaho Code § 5-401 and 5-404, venue is proper in Jefferson County, 
Idaho, because the real property that is the subject of the Purchase and Sale 
Agreements at issue is located in Jefferson County. 
II. 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
7. PlaintiffBuku realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 
1 through 6 as though fully set forth herein and further alleges as follows: 
8. On or about August 30,2007, Plaintiff entered into a Purchase and Sale 
Agreement with Defendants Clarks ("Clark Agreement"), attached hereto as 
"Exhibit A," for the purchase of approximately 80.17 acres of property located in 
Jefferson County, Idaho owned by Defendants Clarks. The purchase price for 
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\~ 
Defendants Clarks' property was established in the Clark Agreement as 
$1,044,075.18. (Exhibit A, , 2). 
9. The Clark Agreement required that Plaintiff provide $25,000.00 in earnest money 
upon execution of the Clark Agreement and that all such earnest money was 
refundable until closing. (Exhibit A, , 2(a)). 
10. Plaintiff tendered the $25,000.00 in earnest money to Defendants Clarks on or 
about August 30,2007. 
11. The Clark Agreement further established that Plaintiffs obligation to purchase the 
property was subject to a four month due diligence inspection period and 
Plaintiffs satisfaction with the condition of the property. (Exhibit A, , 3). 
12. On or about August 30,2007, Plaintiff also entered into a Purchase and Sale 
Agreement with Defendants Petersons ("Peterson Agreement"), attached hereto as 
"Exhibit B," for the purchase of approximately 73 acres adjacent to Defendants 
Clarks' property. The purchase price for the property, as established in the 
Peterson Agreement, was $980,000.00. (Exhibit B, , 2). 
13. The Peterson Agreement established that Plaintiff provide $327,000.00 in earnest 
money upon execution ofthe contract and that all but $10,000.00 of the earnest 
money was fully refundable until closing. (Exhibit B, , 2(a)). 
14. Plaintiff tendered the $327,000.00 in earnest money to Defendants Petersons on or 
about August 30,2007. 
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15. The Peterson Agreement established that Plaintiff s obligation to purchase the 
property was subject to a four month due diligence inspection period and 
Plaintiffs satisfaction with the condition of the property. (Exhibit B, ~ 3). 
16. At the time the parties entered into each respective Purchase and Sale Agreement, 
both Defendants Petersons' and Clarks' property was zoned Residential-1 ("R-1"), 
which would allow a minimum density of one acre lots. 
17. At the time of entering into the respective Purchase and Sale Agreements, all 
parties mutually understood that the sale of both properties was contingent upon 
Plaintiff being able to develop the property with the density of development 
accorded to a R-1 zone. 
18. Between August 30,2007 and December 18,2007, the Jefferson County Planning 
and Zoning Commission began plans to change the zoning categorization of 
Defendants Clarks' and Petersons' property to Residential-5 ("R-5"), which would 
allow a minimum density of five acre lots. 
19. Upon performing its due diligence investigation concerning the properties, 
Plaintiff discovered the Jefferson County Planning and Zoning Commission's 
plans to change the zoning categorization of Defendants , properties. 
20. The appraiser and bank providing Plaintiff with financing for the purchase of 
Defendants' properties became concerned about financing the purchase of the 
properties upon notice of the potential change in zoning of the properties. (See 
Letter from Jeromy L. Hart, Bank of Commerce, attached hereto as "Exhibit C"). 
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21. On December 18,2007, Plaintiff sent a memorandum to Defendants Clarks, 
attached hereto as "Exhibit D," and Defendants Petersons, attached hereto as 
"Exhibit E," giving notice of its objection to the condition of the properties due to 
the potential of the properties being zoned R-5. The memorandum also contained 
an offer to extend the closing date to provide Defendants with an opportunity to 
cure. 
22. Defendants responded to the memorandum via a letter from their counsel rejecting 
the offer to extend the closing date in order to cure, attached hereto as "Exhibit F." 
23. Defendants' rejection of Plaintiff s offer to allow time to cure effected a 
tennination of both the Clark Agreement and the Peterson Agreement. 
24. Upon tennination of the Clark Agreement and Peterson Agreement, Plaintiff was 
entitled to return of its earnest money provided to Defendants. (Exhibit A, ~ 2(a); 
Exhibit B, ~ 2(a)). 
25. On June 17,2008, demand was made upon Defendants for the return of Plaintiff's 
earnest money in the amount of$342,000.00. Defendants did not and have not 
satisfied the demand. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
REFUND OF EARNEST MONEY UNDER CONTRACT 
26. PlaintiffBuku realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 
1 through 25 as though fully set forth herein and further allege as follows: 
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27. Plaintiff and Defendants entered into Purchase and Sale Agreements for the sale of 
the Defendants Clarks' property and for Defendants Petersons' property, the terms 
of which are set forth more particularly herein, above. 
28. As per the Clark Agreement, Plaintiff paid Defendants Clarks $25,000.00 in 
earnest money. 
29. Under the terms of the Clark Agreement, the $25,000.00 earnest money was fully 
refundable before closing. 
30. As per the Peterson Agreement, Plaintiff paid Defendants Petersons $327,000.00 
in earnest money. 
31. The Peterson Agreement provided that all but $10,000.00 of the earnest money 
under the agreement was refundable before closing. 
32. Closing never occurred under either the Clark Agreement or the Peterson 
Agreement. 
33. Under the terms of the Clark and Peterson Agreements, Plaintiff is entitled to a full 
refund of the $25,000.00 in earnest money it paid to Defendants Clarks and a 
refund of $317,000.00 in earnest money it paid to Defendants Petersons, for a total 
refund of $342,000.00. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
CONVERSION 
34. PlaintiffBuku realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 
1 through 33 as though fully set forth herein and further alleges as follows: 
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35. Defendants took and exercised dominion over the Plaintiffs' property, the funds 
provided to Defendants Clarks as earnest money and the funds provided to 
Defendants Petersons as earnest money. 
36. Upon demand by Plaintiff for return of the earnest money prior to closing, 
Defendants were no longer entitled to hold and exercise dominion and control over 
Plaintiff's property. 
37. Defendants failed to return the funds constituting Plaintiff's property upon 
Plaintiff's demand. 
38. Defendants continue to hold and exercise dominion and control over Plaintiffs 
property. 
39. Based on the Defendants' actions, Plaintiff has been deprived of possession of its 
property. 
40. As a result of Defendants , actions, Plaintiffs have been damaged in an amount to 
be determined at the trial of this matter. 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
41. Plaintiff Buku realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 
1 through 40 as though fully set forth herein and further allege as follows: 
42. Plaintiff conferred benefits upon Defendants by paying Defendants earnest money 
under the Purchase and Sale Agreements in the amount of $25,000.00 to 
Defendants Clarks and $327,000.00 to Defendants Petersons. 




43. The Defendants have appreciated the benefits conferred upon them by continuing 
to possess the funds. 
44. Equity requires Defendants to compensate Plaintiff for the value of such benefits 
in an amount to be proven at the trial of this matter. 
PREJUDGMENT INTEREST 
45. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 
through 44 as though fully set forth herein and further alleges as follows: 
46. Plaintiff is owed $317,000.00 from Petersons and $25,000.00 from Clarks, which 
represents the total earnest money refundable under the Purchase and Sale 
Agreements. 
47. Pursuant to Idaho Code § 28-22-104, Plaintiffs are entitled to an award of 
prejudgment interest as of December 19,2007, the date of termination of both 
Agreements, through October 17,2008, in the amount of$31,578.42 from 
Petersons and $2,490.42 from Clarks. Prejudgment interest continues to accrue at 
the rate of 12% per annum or $104.22 per day against Petersons and $8.22 per day 
against Clarks. 
ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS 
48. PlaintiffBuku realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 
1 through 47 as though fully set forth herein and further alleges as follows: 
49. Pursuant to Defendants' actions in this matter, Plaintiff has been required to retain 
the services of Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C., to obtain a refund of the 
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earnest money funds to which it is entitled under the Clark and Peterson 
Agreements. 
50. Pursuant to the Peterson Agreement and the Clark Agreement, Plaintiff is entitled 
to its reasonable attorneys' fees and costs. If this matter is concluded by default, 
the amount of$3,000.00 represents reasonable attorneys fees, and a greater amount 
if this matter is not concluded by default. 
51. Pursuant to Idaho Code and the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure § 12-120(3) and 
12-121, Plaintiff is entitled to an award of its attorneys fees in this matter at an 
amount to be determined upon judgment. If this matter is concluded by default, 
the amount of$3,000.00 represents reasonable attorneys fees, and a greater amount 
if this matter is not concluded by default. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for Judgment against the above-named Defendants 
as follows: 
a. F or a money judgment in the principal amount of $31 7,000.00 against 
Petersons and $25,000.00 against Clarks based on Plaintiffs' claim for 
refund of earnest money under contract or in any additional amount to be 
determined at the trial of this matter; 
b. For an award of prejudgment interest in an amount to be determined upon 
judgment; 
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c. For an award of reasonable attorneys fees in the amount of$3,000.00 if this 
matter is concluded by default, and a greater amount should be awarded if 
this matter is contested; 
d. F or an award of costs incurred in the prosecution of this matter; and 
e. F or such other and further relief as the Court deems just and equitable in the 
premIses. 
Dated this ~ay of November, 2008. 
DeAnne Casperson V 
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C. 
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STATE OF IDAHO ) 
)ss. 
County of Bonneville ) 
Jaramie Magera, manager and registered agent for PlaintiffBuku Properties, LLC, 
being first duly sworn, deposes and says: he is the manager and registered agent for Plaintiff 
in the above-entitled action; that he has read the above and foregoing VERIFIED 
COMPLAINT, knows the contents thereof and that he believes the facts therein stated to be 
true. ~ 
~-- Dated: aI-/5-Ct3 
Jaramie Mag/ 
SUBSCRIBED and sworn to before me this 
, -l,,''-
\ c:::> day of October, 2008. 
(seal) 
Notary Public for Idaho _ 
R 'd' ',' \ (' ~' '--x-b eSI mg at: d\ oj, (\Q_\r\. (" - - 0..) ... 4-!~ 
Commission Expires: H - \ -::+ - -;:} (> \ ~ 
G:IWPDATAICAH\14918ICompiaint.wpd:bei 
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Charles A. Homer, Esq. (ISB No. 1630) 
DeAnne Casperson, Esq. (ISB No. 6698) 
HOLDEN KIDWELL HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C. 
P.O. Box 50130 
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
Telephone: (208) 523-0620 
Facsimile: (208) 523-9518 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON 
BUKU PROPERTIES, LLC, an Idaho 
limited liability company, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
RAOEL H. CLARK and JANET C. 
CLARK, husband and wife; ANGUS 
JERRY PETERSON and BETTY JEAN 
PETERSON, husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
NOTICE: 
Case No. CV- d f)Ok/ q '-i I 
SUMMONS 
YOU HAVE BEEN SUED BY THE ABOVE NAMED PLAINTIFF. 
THE COURT MAY ENTER JUDGMENT AGAINST YOU 
WITHOUT FURTHER NOTICE UNLESS YOU RESPOND WITHIN 
TWENTY (20) DAYS. READ THE INFORMATION BELOW. 
TO: DEFENDANT JANET C. CLARK 
You are hereby notified that in order to defend this lawsuit, an appropriate written 
response must be filed with the above designated court within twenty (20) days after 
service of this Summons on you. If you fail to respond, the court may enter judgment 
against you as demanded by Plaintiff in the Complaint. 
A copy of the Complaint is served with this Summons. If you wish to seek the 
advice or representation by an attorney in this matter, you should do so promptly so that 
your written response, if any, may be filed in time and other legal rights protected. 
An appropriate written response requires compliance with Rule lO(a)(1) and other 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and shall also include: 
1. The title and number of this case. 
2. If your response is an Answer to the Complaint, it must contain admissions 
or denials of the separate allegations of the Complaint and other defenses you may claim. 
3. Your signature, mailing address and telephone number, or the signature, 
mailing address and telephone number of your attorney. 
4. Proof of mailing or delivery of a copy of your response to Plaintiffs 
attorney, as designated above. 
To determine whether you must pay a filing fee with your response, contact the 
clerk of the above named court. 
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
By: Depu:!L I'lL <;<;r;';~:;:Ir.:'t:t%:. .... Dated: __ -,1-,-1-;-1_1-,-7-..,..-/....::;[_) "-C ____ _ 
.::..>' ,.' "".';':;:> ,::~~:::. 
G:IWPDATAICAHl14918ISummons JCc'WPd:be)j~? 
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Charles A. Homer, Esq. (ISB No. 1630) 
DeAnne Casperson, Esq. (ISB No. 6698) 
HOLDEN KIDWELL HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C. 
P.O. Box 50130 
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
Telephone: (208) 523-0620 
Facsimile: (208) 523-9518 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
~: ,.:;' 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON 
BUKU PROPERTIES, LLC, an Idaho 
limited liability company, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
RAOEL H. CLARK and JANET C. 
CLARK, husband and wife; ANGUS 
JERRY PETERSON and BETTY JEAN 
PETERSON, husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
NOTICE: 
Case No. CV- c9.()07S.-' q Lit 
SUMMONS 
YOU HAVE BEEN SUED BY THE ABOVE NAMED PLAINTIFF. 
THE COURT MAY ENTER JUDGMENT AGAINST YOU 
WITHOUT FURTHER NOTICE UNLESS YOU RESPOND WITHIN 
TWENTY (20) DAYS. READ THE INFORMATION BELOW. 
TO: DEFENDANT RAOEL H. CLARK 
You are hereby notified that in order to defend this lawsuit, an appropriate written 
response must be filed with the above designated court within twenty (20) days after 
service of this Summons on you. If you fail to respond, the court may enter judgment 
against you as demanded by Plaintiff in the Complaint. 
- " . "', :':':~ 
A copy of the Complaint is served with this Summons. If you wish to seek the 
advice or representation by an attorney in this matter, you should do so promptly so that 
your written response, if any, may be filed in time and other legal rights protected. 
An appropriate written response requires compliance with Rule lO(a)(l) and other 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and shall also include: 
1. The title and number of this case. 
2. If your response is an Answer to the Complaint, it must contain admissions 
or denials of the separate allegations of the Complaint and other defenses you may claim. 
3 . Your signature, mailing address and telephone number, or the signature, 
mailing address and telephone number of your attorney. 
4. Proof of mailing or delivery of a copy of your response to Plaintiffs 
attorney, as designated above. 
To determine whether you must pay a filing fee with your response, contact the 
clerk of the above named court. 
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
By: 
Deputy 
G:IWPDATAICAHlI49I SlSummons RHC.wpd:bel 
2 - SUMMONS 
Charles A. Homer, Esq. (ISB No. 1630) 
DeAnne Casperson, Esq. (ISB No. 6698) 
HOLDEN KIDWELL HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C. 
P.O. Box 50130 
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
Telephone: (208) 523-0620 
Facsimile: (208) 523-9518 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON 
BUKU PROPERTIES, LLC, an Idaho 
limited liability company, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
RAOEL H. CLARK and JANET C. 
CLARK, husband and wife; ANGUS 
JERRY PETERSON and BETTY JEAN 
PETERSON, husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
NOTICE: 
Case No. CV- cJ. 0 oe .,. qL-/ ( 
SUMMONS 
YOU HAVE BEEN SUED BY THE ABOVE NAMED PLAINTIFF. 
THE COURT MAY ENTER JUDGMENT AGAINST YOU 
WITHOUT FURTHER NOTICE UNLESS YOU RESPOND WITHIN 
TWENTY (20) DAYS. READ THE INFORMATION BELOW. 
TO: DEFENDANT ANGUS JERRY PETERSON 
You are hereby notified that in order to defend this lawsuit, an appropriate written 
response must be filed with the above designated court within twenty (20) days after 
service of this Summons on you. If you fail to respond, the court may enter judgment 
against you as demanded by Plaintiff in the Complaint. 
A copy of the Complaint is served with this Summons. If you wish to seek the 
advice or representation by an attorney in this matter, you should do so promptly so that 
your written response, if any, may be filed in time and other legal rights protected. 
An appropriate written response requires compliance with Rule lO(a)(1) and other 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and shall also include: 
1. The title and number of this case. 
2. If your response is an Answer to the Complaint, it must contain admissions 
or denials of the separate allegations of the Complaint and other defenses you may claim. 
3 . Your signature, mailing address and telephone number, or the signature, 
mailing address and telephone number of your attorney. 
4. Proof of mailing or delivery of a copy of your response to Plaintiffs 
attorney, as designated above. 
To determine whether you must pay a filing fee with your response, contact the 
clerk of the above named court. 
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
By: -11. CL,,~~i;,,~\8 ~:l ~!!t;~;, .. ~.~.~.~.·.~.~::::;~~.,:.; ..... 
Deputy:~.:)~~;::~'.::~.>····· . ';~: 
.:;.:: 
I /' ,A"./ /1 ./Jr' " v' /\ Dated: _....:.....:... +I---L.,.! +/ __ ~_.' ____ _ 
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2 - SUMMONS 
Charles A. Homer, Esq. (ISB No. 1630) 
DeAnne Casperson, Esq. (ISB No. 6698) 
HOLDEN KlDWELL HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C. 
P.O. Box 50130 
1000 Rivenvalk Drive, Suite 200 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
Telephone: (208) 523-0620 
Facsimile: (208) 523-9518 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON 
BUKU PROPERTIES, LLC, an Idaho 
limited liability company, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
RAOEL H. CLARK and JANET C. 
CLARK, husband and wife; ANGUS 
JERRY PETERSON and BETTY JEAN 





YOU HAVE BEEN SUED BY THE ABOVE NAMED PLAINTIFF. 
THE COURT MAY ENTER JUDGMENT AGAINST YOU 
WITHOUT FURTHER NOTICE UNLESS YOU RESPOND WITHIN 
TWENTY (20) DAYS. READ THE INFORMATION BELOW. 
TO: DEFENDANT BETTY JEAN PETERSON 
You are hereby notified that in order to defend this lawsuit, an appropriate written 
response must be filed with the above designated court within twenty (20) days after 
service of this Summons on you. If you fail to respond, the court may enter judgment 
against you as demanded by Plaintiff in the Complaint. 
A copy of the Complaint is served with this Summons. If you wish to seek the 
advice or representation by an attorney in this matter, you should do so promptly so that 
your written response, if any, may be filed in time and other legal rights protected. 
An appropriate written response requires compliance with Rule 10(a)(1) and other 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and shall also include: 
1. The title and number of this case. 
2. If your response is an Answer to the Complaint, it must contain admissions 
or denials of the separate allegations of the Complaint and other defenses you may claim. 
3. Your signature, mailing address and telephone number, or the signature, 
mailing address and telephone number of your attorney. 
4. Proof of mailing or delivery of a copy of your response to Plaintiffs 
attorney, as designated above. 
To determine whether you must pay a filing fee with your response, contact the 
clerk of the above named court. 
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
By: Dated:--:...::....ll +---,-1 f+--J O_g _ 
t Deputy 
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2 - SUMMONS 
Charles A. f,lomer, Esq. (ISB No. 1630) 
DeAnne Casperson, Esq. (ISB No. 6698) 
HOLDEN KIDWELL HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.c. 
P.O. Box 50130 
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
Telephone: (208) 523-0620 
Facsimile: (208) 523-9518 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON 
BUKU PROPERTIES, LLC, an Idaho 
limited liability company, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
RAOEL H. CLARK and JANET C. 
CLARK, husband and wife; ANGUS 
JERRY PETERSON and BETTY JEAN 
PETERSON, husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-2008-941 
ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF 
ACCEPTANCE OF SERVICE 
COMES NOW Robin D. Dunn of Dunn Law Offices, PLLC, on behalf of the 
Peterson, in the above entitled proceeding, and hereby acknowledges receipt of service of 
a copy of the Summons and Complaint issued in the above entitled proceeding pursuant 
to Rule 4( d)( 6) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and in lieu of any other service 
under such rules. 
Dated this 'If day of November, 2008. 
Robin D. Dunn 
Dunn Law Offices, PLLC 
Attorney for Defendants 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
)ss. 
'~\.. 
On the 11 day of November, 2008, before me, the undersigned, a notary public 
in and for said State, personally appeared Robin D. Dunn, known or identified to me to be 
the person whose name is subscribed to the within instrument and acknowledged to me 
that he executed the same. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official 
seal, the day and year in this certificate first above written. 
(seal) 
Notary Public for Idaho 
Residing at: CluJ r~vlf(e 
My Commission Expires: ...;.f..>..;I3i"",' i
4
,' I_iy+', ___ _ 
2 - ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF ACCEPTANCE OF SERVICE 
DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC. 
Robin D. Dunn, Esq., Prosecutor ISB #2903 
Amelia A. Sheets, Esq., Deputy ISB #5899 
477 Pleasant Country Lane 
P. O. Box 277 
Rigby, ID 83442 
(208) 745-9202 (t) 
(208) 745-8160 (f) 
Attorneys for Defendants / Counter-Plaintiffs 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON 
BUKU PROPERTIES, LLC an Idaho 









RAOEL H. CLARK and JANET C. ) 
CLARK, husband and wife; ANGUS ) 
JERRY PETERSON and BETTY JEAN ) 





RAOEL H. CLARK and JANET C. 
CLARK, husband and wife; ANGUS 
JERRY PETERSON and BETTY JEAN 
PETERSON, husband and wife, 
Counter-Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
BUKU PROPERTIES, LLC an Idaho 
Limited liability company; and 

















Case No. CV-08-941 
ANSWER 
Fee Category: 1.7 
Fee: $58.00 
COUNTERCLAIM 
COMES NOW, defendants Raoe! H. Clark and Janet C. Clark, hereinafter referred to 
as "CLARK"; and Angus Jerry Peterson and Betty Jean Peterson, hereinafter referred to as 
PAGE-l-
-, 
"PETERSON" an answer that Verified Complaint on file herein as follows: 
I 
These answering defendants deny each and every allegation of the Verified 
Complaint on file herein unless specifically admitted hereafter. 
II 
These answering defendants allege that the Complaint on file herein fails to grant a 
cause of action for which relief may be granted by the above-entitled Court pursuant to the 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 12(b )(6). 
III 
These answering defendants allege and answer each and every numerical paragraph 















14. Admit that the defendants Peterson received the sum of $327,000.00 and deny the 
balance thereof. 
15. Deny. 
16. These answering parties have no opinion and lack information to sufficiently 
answer and therefore deny the same. 
17. Deny. 
18. These answering parties have no opinion and lack information to sufficiently 
answer and therefore deny the same. 
19. These answering parties have no opinion and lack information to sufficiently 
answer and therefore deny the same. 
20. These answering parties are without information as to the plaintiff's actions and 
therefore deny the same. 
21. Plaintiff had correspondence with defendants Clark and defendants Peterson and 
said defendants, therefore, denies the balance of said correspondence and/ or allegations. 
22. Deny that the memorandum rejected the offer to extend the closing date, but 
admit correspondence was received and deny the balance of said paragraph. 
23. Deny. 
24. Deny. 
25. Admit that the defendants have made various demands but indicate the demands 
are without merit, basis or legal foundation and, therefore, deny the same. 
26. These answering defendants re-allege the prior answers contained in paragraphs 
1 through 25. 
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27. These answering defendants admit that the contracts labeled Exhibit A and 
Exhibit B describe the relationship between the parties; and, further allege that additional 
conversations, actions, documents and the like further were had subsequent to the various 
written contracts between the parties. 
28. Admit that defendants Clark received a sum of money, but deny the balance of 
said paragraph. 
29. Deny. 
30. Admit that the defendants Peterson received a sum of money, but deny the 
balance of said paragraph. 
31. Deny. 
32. Admit that the plaintiff failed to institute the closing, no fault of either defendant, 
and that the plaintiff breached the contracts herein. 
33. Deny. 
34. These answering defendants re-allege the prior answers contained in paragraphs 







41. These answering defendants re-allege the prior answers contained in paragraphs 





45. These answering defendants re-allege the prior answers contained in paragraphs 
1 through 44. 
46. Deny. 
47. Deny. 
48. These answering defendants re-allege the prior answers contained in paragraphs 
1 through 47. 
49. Admit that the plaintiff has, for no appropriate reason, obtained an attorney and 
denies the balance of said paragraph. 
50. Deny. 
51. Deny. 
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Specific performance, on the contracts, should be granted to both sets of defendants 
herein. 
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
The plaintiff's cause of action is without merit, not timely instituted and would 
constitute the defense of laches. 
THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
The plaintiff's Verified Complaint on file herein is barred by the doctrine of estoppel. 
FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
The plaintiff's cause of action is inappropriate based upon the legal theory of 
PAGE-S-
detrimental reliance. 
FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
The plaintiff, through no fault of the defendants, has breached the contract on file 
herein and has caused irreparable harm and damage to the defendants. 
SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
The defendants have incurred additional time, labor, expense, costs and the like and 
should be awarded a sum for said additional items as is appropriate and to be proved at trial 
herein. 
SEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
The defendants are ready, able and willing to perform on the contracts for sale of real 
property. 
EIGHTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
The defendants have been forced to hire a law firm to defend the Verified Complaint 
on file herein and are deserving of attorney fees pursuant to statute, rule and case law in the 
State of Idaho. 
COUNTERCLAIM 
JURSIDICTION AND VENUE 
A. The counterclaim instituted by counter-plaintiffs herein involves real property 
located in Jefferson County, Idaho. 
B. The real property located in Jefferson County, Idaho and the sum in controversy 
exceed the sum of $10,000.00 and confers jurisdiction upon the above-entitled 
Court by virtue of being real property and exceeding jurisdictional limits to confer 
PAGE-6-
jurisdiction on the above-entitled Court. 
C. Venue is appropriate in Jefferson County, Idaho as the property in question, the 
counter-defendant and the cause of action all arose in Jefferson County, Idaho. 
PARTIES 
D. Counter-plaintiffs, Raoel H. Clark and Janet C. Clark, are husband and wife, and 
own real property, the subject of a real estate agreement with said real property 
being located in Jefferson County, Idaho. Currently, said counter-plaintiffs are 
residents of Texas. 
E. Counter-plaintiffs, Angus Jerry Peterson and Betty Jean Peterson, are husband 
and wife, and own real property located in Jefferson County, Idaho which is the 
subject of a real estate agreement between counter-plaintiffs and counter-
defendants. Furthermore, said counter-plaintiffs now reside in Bonneville 
County, Idaho. 
F. Buku Properties, LLC entered into a real estate agreement with both counter-
plaintiffs herein. It is alleged and believed that Buku Properties, LLC is a 
licensed limited liability company doing business in the State of Idaho and more 
particularly, in the instant case, within Jefferson County, Idaho. Buku Properties, 
LLC has failed to completely act on its own accord in all transactions indicated in 
the plaintiff's Verified Complaint, the defendant's Answer and Counterclaim on 
file herein. 
G. Jaramie Magera is an individual residing in Jefferson County, Idaho. He has 
acted outside the scope and authority of Buku Properties, LLC and, has in fact, 
by his actions and guarantees, led counter-plaintiffs to believe he is acting in his 
PAGE-7-
individual capacity outside of the limited liability company. Further Jaramie 
Magera has ratified the actions of Buku Properties, LLC as its manager and also 
made express representations outside of actions of the limited liability company 
subjecting him to liability as an individual. 
CAUSE OF ACTION 
COUNT I 
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE 
H. Counter-plaintiffs re-allege paragraphs A-G as though fully set forth herein. 
I. Counter-plaintiffs both entered into binding real estate sale contracts which are 
attached to the complaint of the plaintiff which is on file in the above-labeled 
matter. 
J. Both the Clarks, Petersons and counter-defendants understood and agreed to the 
terms of the contracts. 
K The contracts were clear and unambiguous; and, prepared by the plaintiffs. 
L. The contracts described all of the necessary terms and conditions of an 
enforceable agreement. 
M. The counter-plaintiffs have always remained ready, able and willing to perform 
on the contracts. The counter-plaintiffs have not frustrated the contracts in any 
manner. 
N. The counter-defendants should be required to perform on the contracts entered 
into by the parties. 
O. The counter-defendants have exhibited control and domain over the real 
properties owned by the counter-plaintiffs. 
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P. The court should order the counter-defendants to perform on the written 
contracts drafted by the counter-defendants. 
COUNT II 
BREACH OF CONTRACT 
Q. Counter-plaintiffs re-allege paragraphs A-P as though fully set forth herein. 
R. Written contracts for the sale of real property were prepared for both sets of 
counter-plaintiffs. 
S. The written contracts are clear and unambiguous and require counter-defendants 
to purchase real property owned by the counter-plaintiffs. 
T. Counter-defendants refuse to complete the written contracts with the counter-
plaintiffs and pay the agreed upon price for the subject real property. 
U. Counter-defendants have breached the written contracts with counter-plaintiffs. 
V. Counter-plaintiffs have been damaged in sums to be presented at trial. 
COUNT III 
UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
W. Counter-plaintiffs re-allege paragraphs A-Vas though fully set forth herein. 
X. The counter-defendants have failed to honor the written contracts with counter-
plaintiffs and have breached the same. 
Y. The counter-defendants have gained an unfair advantage upon the counter-
plaintiffs. 
Z. The counter-plaintiffs have relied upon the representations of the counter-
defendants to their detriment. The representations made by the counter-
PAGE-9-
defendants were written, or if unwritten, were intentional, material and 
fraudulent. 
AA. The counter-defendants have been unduly enriched to the detriment of the 
counter-plaintiffs. 
BB. The counter-plaintiffs have been damaged in a sum to be proven at hearings 
or trial herein. 
COUNT IV 
ESTOPPEL 
Cc. Counter-plaintiffs re-allege paragraphs A-BB as though fully set forth herein. 
DD. (1) The counter-defendants made false representations or concealment of 
material facts made with actual or constructive knowledge of truth; (2) The 
counter-plaintiffs asserting estoppel did not and could not have discovered the 
truth; (3) The counter-defendants had an intent that misrepresentations or 
concealment be relied upon; and (4) The counter-plaintiff asserting estoppel 
relied on the misrepresentation or concealment to their prejudice. 
EE. Alternatively, quasi-estoppel is alleged in that no concealment or 
misrepresentation of existing facts on one side and no ignorance or reliance on 
the other is necessary ingredient. 
FF. The doctrine of quasi estoppel applies when it would be unconscionable to 
allow counter-defendnts to assert a right which is inconsistent with their prior 
position. 
GG. The counter-plaintiffs have been damaged in a sum to be proven at hearings 
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or trial of this matter. 
HH. The counter-plaintiffs have been prejudiced and have changed their position 
as result of representations of the counter-defendants and suffered detriment as 
result thereof. 
COUNT V 
PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL/DETRIMENTAL RELIANCE 
II. Counter-plaintiffs re-allege paragraphs A-HH as though fully set forth herein. 
JJ. (1) The counter-plaintiffs detriment suffered in reliance was substantial in an 
economic sense, (2) The counter-plaintiffs have substantial loss to promisee 
acting in reliance which was or should have been foreseeable by promisor 
(counter-defendants), and (3) Counter plaintiffs have acted reasonably in 
justifiable reliance on promise as made by the counter-defendants. 
KK. The counter-plaintiffs were damaged thereby in a sum to be proven at 
hearings or at the trial of this matter. 
COUNT VI 
CONSUMER PROTECTION VIOLATIONS 
LL. Counter-plaintiffs re-allege paragraphs A-KK as though fully set forth herein. 
MM. The counter-defendants used unconscionable methods and acts to induce the 
counter-plaintiffs to sell and continue to keep their real property open for sale to 
the counter-defendants. 
NN. The counter-plaintiffs were damaged by the unconscionable methods and 
PAGE-ll-
practices of the counter-defendants. 
00. The acts complained of by the counter-defendants were knowingly made and 
the conduct or pattern of the counter-defendants would outrage and offend the 
public conscience. 
PP. Damages should be awarded, along with fees and costs, consistent with the 
Consumer Protection Act. 
COUNT VII 
ATTORNEY FEES 
QQ. Counter-plaintiffs re-allege paragraphs A-PP as though fully set forth herein. 
RR. Attorney fees and costs should be awarded to the counter-plaintiffs based 
upon statute, rule and case law. Most notably, I.e. Sections, 12-120, 12-121; Rule 
54; Contract and Case law should guarantee an award to the counter-plaintiffs. 
JURY TRIAL 
The defendants/counter-plaintiffs request a jury trial on all issues that can be set 
forth before a jury. 
WHEREFORE, defendants, having fully answered the Verified Complaint on file 
herein, requests as follows: 
1. That the Verified Complaint be dismissed with prejudice; 
2. That the Court determine a reasonable sum as and for attorney fees and court 
costs to the defendants for defending the Verified Complaint herein; and, 
3. For all further just relief. 
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WHEREFORE, counter-plaintiffs pray for relief on the Counterclaim as follows: 
1. For specific performance; 
2. For an award of damages and costs on any breach of contract or unjust 
enrichment claims; 
3. For various findings consistent with the various counts set forth in their 
Counterclaim above with an award of damages; 
4. For reasonable attorney fees pursuant to statute, rule and case law; 
5. For costs of Court and other costs reasonably necessary to obtain title reports, 
conduct business and/or as contained in the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure; 
6. For both pre- and post-judgment interest; and 
7. For all further relief which is proper in the premises. 
C11h DATED this __ day of December, 2008. 
RobinD. DunKEsq. 
DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
'(rl 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the __ day of December, 2008, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing was delivered to the following person(s) by: 
__ Hand Delivery 
-X Postage-prepaid mail 
Facsimile Transmission 
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Charles A. Homer, Esq. 
P.O. Box 50130 
Idaho Falls ID, 83405 
Robin D. Dunn, Esq. 
DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
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DEC-ZS-OS 04:39PM FROM-HOLDEN KIDWELL HAHN & CRAPO 
Charles A. Homer, Esq. (lSB No. 1630) 
DeAnne Casperson, Esq. (ISB No. 6698) 
HOLDEN KIDWELL HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C. 
P.O. Box 50130 
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
Telephone: (208) 523-0620 
Facsimile: (208) 523-9518 
Anorneys for Plaintiff 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON 
BUKU PROPERTIES, LLC, an Idaho 
limited liability company, 
Plaintifj~ 
v. 
RAOEL H. CLARK and JANET C. 
CLARK, husband and wife; ANGUS 
JERRY PETERSON and BETTY JEAN 
PETERSON, husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
RAOEL H. CLARK and JANET C. 
CLARK, husband and wife; ANGUS 
JERRY PETERSON and BETTY JEAN 
PETERSON, husband and wife, 
Counter-Plaintiffs, 
v. 
BUKU PROPERTIES, LLC, an Idaho 
limited liability company, 
Counter-Defendants. 
Case No. CV-08-941 
ANSWER TO COUNTERCLAIM 
BY BUKU PROPERTIES, LLC 
DEC-29-08 04:40PM FROM-HOLDEN KIDWELL HAHN & CRAPO 208-523-95 T-768 P 004/011 F-945 
CO:MES NOW, Counter-Defendant Buku Propenies, LLC, (hereinafter referred to as 
'IBuku Propelties"), by and through its counsel of record Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, 
P.L.L.c., and hereby answers the Counterclaim ofCounter-Plaimiffs Raoel H. Clark, Janet 
C. Clark, Angus Jerry Peterson and Betty Jean Peterson (collectively "Counter-Plaintiffs") 
as follows: 
FIRST DEFENSE 
Counter-Plaintiffs fail to state a cause of action against Buku Properties upon which 
relief may be granted. 
SECOND DEFENSE 
Buku Properties denies each and every allegation contained in Counter-Plaintiffs' 
Counterclaim not specifically admitted herein. 
THIRD DEFENSE 
1. In response to paragraph A of the Counterclaim, Buku Properties admits the 
allegations. 
2. In response to paragraph B of the COllnterclaim, Buku Properties admits the 
allegations. 
3. In response to paragraph C of the Counterclaim, Buku Properties admits the 
allegations. 
4. In response to paragraph D of the Counterclaim, Buku Properties admits the 
allegations. 
2 - ANSWER TO COUNTERCLAIM BY BUKU PR.OPER.TIES, LLC 
DEC-29-08 04:40PM FROM-HOLDEN KIDWELL HAHN & CRAPO 20B-S23-9S T-76B P.OOS/Oll F-94S 
5. In response to paragraph E of the Counterclaim, Buku Properties admits the first 
sentence. Buku Properties is without sufficient infonnation and knowledge to 
admit or deny the remaining allegations, and therefore, denies the same. 
6. In response to paragraph F of the COUllterclaim, Buku Properties admits that Buku 
Propenies entered into real estate agreements with Cotmrer-Plaintiffs and that 
Buku Properties is a licensed limited liability company doing business in the State 
ofIdaho and within Jefferson County, Idaho. Buku Properties denies the 
remainder of the allegations of paragraph F of the Counterclaim. 
7. In response to paragraph G of the Counterclaim, Buku Properties admits that Mr. 
Magera is an individual residing in Jefferson County, Idaho, but denies the 
remainder of the allegations of paragraph G of the Counterclaim. 
8. In response to paragraph H oftlle Counterclaim, Buku Properties incorporates its 
admissions, denials, and responses to paragraphs A through G of the Counterclaim. 
9. In response to paragraph I of the Counterclaim, Bulcu Properties admits that it 
entered into real estate contracts with Counter-Plaintiffs, copies of which were 
attached to the Complaint. Buku Properties denies the remaining allegations of 
paragraph I of the Counterclaim. 
10. In response to paragraph J of the Counterclaim, Buku Properties admits it 
underSTOod and agreed to the terms of the contracts. Buku Properties is without 
3 • ANSWER TO COUNTERCLAIM BY BUKU PROPERTIES, LLC 
DEC-29-0B 04:40PM FROM-HOLDEN KIDWELL HAHN & CRAPO 208-523-9518 T-768 POOS/Oll F-945 
sufficient infomlation and lmowledge to admit or deny the remaining allegations 
of paragraph J and, therefore, denies the same. 
1 I. In response to paragraph K of tile Counterclaim, Buku Propenies asserts the 
contracts speak for themselves and, therefore, no affirmative denial or admjssion is 
required. 
12. In response to paragraph L of the Counterclaim, Buku Properties assens the 
contracts speak for Ulemselves and, therefore, no affirmative denial or admission is 
required. 
J 3, In response to paragraphs M through P of the Counterclaim, Buku Properties 
denies the allegations. 
14. In response to paragraph Q of the Counterclaim, Bukll Properties incorporates its 
admissions, denials, and responses to paragraphs A tln'ough P of the COtUlterclaim. 
15. In response to paragraph R of the Counterclaim, Bukll Properties admits the 
allegations. 
16. In response to paragraph S of the Counterclaim, Buku Properties assert the 
contracts speak for themselves and, therefore, no affinnative denial or admission is 
required. 
17. In response to paragraph T of the Counterclaim, Buleu Properties denies the 
allegations. 
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18. In response to paragraph U of the Counterclaim, Buku Propenies denies the 
allegations. 
19. In response to paragraph V of the Counterclaim, Buku Properties denies the 
allegations. 
20. In response to paragraph W of the Counterclaim, Buku Properties incorporates its 
admissions, denials) and responses to paragraphs A through V of the Counterclaim. 
21. In response to paragraphs X through BB of the Counterclaim, Buku Properties 
denies the allegations. 
22. In response to paragraph CC ofthe Counterclaim, Buku Propenies incorporates its 
admissions, denials, and responses to paragraphs A through BB of the 
Counterclaim. 
23. In response to paragraphs DD through HI-! of the Counterclaim, Buku Properties 
denies the allegations. 
24. In response to paragraph II of the COlUlterclaim, Buku Properties incorporates its 
admissions, denials, and responses to paragraphs A through HH of the 
Counterclaim. 
25. In response to paragraphs 11 and KK of the Counterclaim, Buku Properties denies 
the allegations. 
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26. In response to paragraph LL of the Counterclaim, Buleu Properties incorporates its 
admissions, denials, and responses to paragraphs A through KK of the 
Counterclaim. 
27. In response to paragraphs l\1M through PP of the Counterclaim, Buku Properties 
denies the allegations. 
28. In response to paragraph QQ of the Counterclaim, Buleu Properties incorporates its 
admissions, denials, and responses to paragraphs A through PP of the 
Counterclaim. 
29. In response to paragraphs RR of the Counterclaim, Buku Properties denies the 
aIle gations. 
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
30. Buku Properties asserts tilat Counter-Plaintiffs have failed to plead andlor properly 
serve its Counterclaim on all parries alleged to be subject to Counter-Plaintif:fs 
Counterclaim. 
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
31. Buku Properties assert that some or all of Counter-Plaintiffs' claims are barred by 
Idaho Code § 30-6-304. 
THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
32. Buku Properties assert that Counter-Plaintiffs' action is barred due to failure of 
condition precedent. 
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FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
33. Buku Properties assert that Counter-Plaintiffs' action is barred due to Coumer-
Plaintiffs' failure to cure the defect in tile property. 
FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
34. Buku Properties assert that Counter-Plaintiffs' action is barred due to Counter-
Plaintiff's breach of the contract. 
SIX AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
35. Buku Properties assert ti1at Counter-Plaintiffs have failed to mitigate their alleged 
damages. 
SEVENTH AFFTRMATJYE .DEFENSE 
36. Buku Properties assert that Counter-Plaintiffs breached an implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing by retaining the earnest monies. 
EIGHTH AFFIRMATIVE DRF:ENSE 
37. Buku Properries assert that Counter-Plaintiffs' damages, if any, are the result of 
their own actions or inactions, or the actions or inactions of others for whom Buku 
Properties is not responsible. 
NINTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
38. Buku Properties has considered and believes there may be additional defenses to 
the Counter-Plaintiffs' Counterclaim, however, do not have sufficient information 
at this time to assert additional defenses pursuant to Rule 11 of the Idaho Rul.es of 
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Civil Procedure. Buku Propenies does not intend to wajve any additional defenses 
and specifically reserves the right to assert additional defenses as discovery in this 
matter proceeds. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, Buku Propenies prays for Judgment against the above-named 
Counter-Plaintiffs as follows: 
a. That the Counterclaim in this matter be dismissed with prejudice; 
h. For judgment to include an award of reasonable costs and attorney's fees; 
and 
c. For stIch other and further relief as the Court deemsjl1st, proper and 
equitable in the premises. 
DATED this z.tl,~ay of December, 2008. 
DeAnne Casperson 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
r hereby certify that I served a copy of the following described pleadil1g or document on 
the attorneys listed below by hand delivering, by mailing or by facsimile, with the COlTect postage 
thereon, on this ~q,'i'(fay of December, 2008. 
DOCUMENT SERVED: ANSWER TO COIJNTERCLAIM BY BUKU 
PROPERTIES, LLC 
ATTORNEYS AND/OR INDIVIDUALS SERVED: 
Ro bin D. Dunn 
477 Pleasant Cotmtry Lane 
P.O. Box 277 
Rigby, ID 83442 
(i·.\wr'I)ATA\Ci\I·~ loI~ 18IPldp,lAn,,,,.r <0 COllntDrcl.im. wpd 
( vrFirst Class Mail 
( ) Hand Delivery 
(0 Facsimile 
( ) Overnight Mail 
DeAnne Casperson 
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HOLDEN KIDWELL HAl-IN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C. 
P.O. Box 50130 
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
Telephone: (208) 523-0620 
Facsimile: (208) 523-9518 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTII JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON 
BUKU PROPERTIES, LLC, an Idaho 
limited liability company, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
RAOEL H. CLARK. and JANET C. 
CLARK, husband and wife; ANGUS 
JERRY PETERSON and BETTY JEAN 
PETERSON, husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
RAOEL H. CLARK and JANET C. 
CLARK, husband and wife; ANGUS 
JERRY PETERSON and BETTY JEAN 
PETERSON, husband and wife, 
Counter-Plaintiffs, 
v. 
BUKU PROPERTIES, LLC, an Idaho 
limited liability company, 
Counter-Defendants. 
Case No. CV-08-941 
NOTICE OF SERVICE 
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PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the Plaintiff, Buku Properties, LLC, pursuant to the 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, are this i tfday of April, 2009, forwarding a copy of 
Plaintiffs First Set of Discovery Requests to Defendants Raoel H. Clark and Janet C. Clark, 
by service upon their counsel, Robin D. Dunn, Esq. 
Please also be advised that Plaintiff S COIIDsel is retaining the original discovery 
requests. 
Date: '-I [ f <.£ I 0'1 
DeAnne Casperson 
HOLDEN, KID\VELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this J.:t"day of April, 2009, I served a copy of the following 
described pleading or document on the attorneys listed below by hand delivering, by mailing 
or by facsimile, with the correct postage thereon, a true and correct copy thereof. 
DOCUMENT SERVED: 
ATTORNEYS SERVED: 
Robin D. Dunn 
477 Pleasant Country Lane 
P.O. Box 277 
Rigby, ID 83442 
CJ:\WJ'P/l.T"'\CAH\1~91~\PldB'lDi.c.Fj<>l Sol- Clarla.NOT.wl'd;bel 
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NOTICE OF SERVICE 
( vfi.irst Class Mail 
( ) Hand Delivery 
( ) Facsimile 
( ) Overnight Mail 
DeAnne Casperson, Esq. 
APR-15-0S 11 :48AM FROM-HOLDEN KIDWELL HAHN & CRAPO 
Charles A. Homer, Esq. (ISB No. 1630) 
DeAnne Casperson, Esq. (ISB No. 6698) 
HOLDEN KIDVlELL HAl-IN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C. 
P.O. Box 50130 
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
Telephone: (208) 523-0620 
Facsimile: (208) 523-9518 
Anomeys for Plaintiff 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON 
BUKU PROPERTIES, LLC, an Idaho 
limited liability company, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
RAOEL H. CLARK and JANET C. 
CLARK, husband and wife; ANGUS 
JERRY PETERSON and BETTY JEAN 
PETERSON, husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
RAOEL H. CLARK and JANET C. 
CLARK, husband and wife; ANGUS 
JERRY PETERSON and BETTY JEAN 
PETERSON, husband and wife, 
Counter-Plaintiffs, 
v. 
BUKU PROPERTIES, LtC, an Idaho 
limited liability company, 
Counter-Defendants. 
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PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the Plaintiff, Buku Properties, LLC, pursuant to the 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, are this 1 ttiay of April, 2009, forwarding a copy of 
Plaintiffs First Set of Discovery Requests to Defendants Angus Jerry Peterson and Betty 
Jean Peterson, by service upon their counsel, Robin D. Dunn, Esq. 
Please also be advised that Plaintiffs counsel is retaining the original discovery 
requests. 
Date: ~L4 {D1 
I 
DeAnne Casperson 
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
r hereby certify that on this \47ay of April, 2009, I served a copy of the following 
described pleading or document on the attorneys listed below by hand delivering, by mailing 
or by facsimile, with the correct postage thereon, a true and correct copy thereof. 
DOCUMENT SERVED: 
ATTORNEYS SERVED: 
Robin D. Dunn 
477 Pleasant Country Lane 
P.O. Box 277 
Rigby, ID 83442 
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NOTICE OF SERVICE 
( vf'first Class Mail 
( ) Hand Delivery 
( ) Facsimile 
( ) Overnight Mail 
DeAnne Casperson!ESq: 
DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC. 
Robin D. Dunn, Esq., ISB #2903 
Amelia A. Sheets, Esq., ISB #5899 
PO Box 277 
477 Pleasant county Lane 
Rigby ID 83442-0276 
Telephone: (208) 745-9202 
Facsimile: (208) 745-8160 
rdunn@dunnIawoffices.com 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON 
BUKU PROPERTIES, LLC an Idaho 
Limited liability company, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RAOEL H. CLARK and JANET C. 
CLARK, husband and wife; ANGUS 
JERRY PETERSON and BETTY JEAN 
















RAOEL H. CLARK and JANET C. ) 
CLARK, husband and wife; ANGUS ) 
JERRY PETERSON and BETTY JEAN ) 
PETERSON, husband and wife, ) 
Counter-Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
BUKU PROPERTIES, LLC an Idaho 
Limited liability company; and 













Case No. CV-08-941 
NOTICE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY J.rY that the following document st.c.-ved, by postage pre-paid 
mailing, to plaintiff's attorney, DeAnne Casperson, Esq., P.O. Box 50130, Idaho Falls, Idaho 
83405 together with a copy of this notice, on the j yi-f day of ... Tu f\.;Y' , 2009: 
1) Defendants Peterson Answers to Plaintiffs First Set of Discovery Requests. 
/ ",---"---"'\ .. --" --_._----, ..... //. "\ 
,/ ) // i) )C:l---- --
,~0"??~\x / 
v .. ~--
Robin D. Dunn, Esq. 
DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
Charles A. Homer, Esq. (ISB No. 1630) 
DeAnne Casperson, Esq. (ISB No. 6698) 
HOLDEN KIDWELL HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.c. 
P.O. Box 50130 
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
Telephone: (208) 523-0620 
Facsimile: (208) 523-9518 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON 
BUKU PROPERTIES, LLC, an Idaho 
limited liability company, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
RAOEL H. CLARK and JANET C. 
CLARK, husband and wife; ANGUS 
JERRY PETERSON and BETTY JEAN 
PETERSON, husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
RAOEL H. CLARK and JANET C. 
CLARK, husband and wife; ANGUS 
JERRY PETERSON and BETTY JEAN 
PETERSON, husband and wife, 
Counter-Plaintiffs, 
v. 
BUKU PROPERTIES, LLC, an Idaho 
limited liability company, 
Counter-Defendants. 
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Case No. CV-08-941 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Plaintiff Buku Properties, LLC, by and through its counsel of record, Charles A. 
Homer and DeAnne Casperson, of Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C., move the 
Court pursuant to Rule 56(a) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure for Summary Judgment 
granting to Plaintiff the relief requested in Plaintiff s Verified Complaint and Answer to 
Counter-claims filed herein. This Motion is based upon the Affidavit of DeAnne Casperson, 
Affidavit of Jaramie Magera, and is also supported by the Memorandum in Support of 
Motion for Summary Judgment, filed simultaneous with this Motion. 
DATED this <S"fJ'day of October, 2009. 
14ab~~ ~~= 
DeAnne Casperson, Esq. 
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this S~y of October, 2009, I served a copy of the following 
described pleading or document on the attorneys listed below by hand delivering, by mailing 
or by facsimile, with the correct postage thereon, a true and correct copy thereof. 
DOCUMENT SERVED: 
ATTORNEYS SERVED: 
Robin D. Dunn 
477 Pleasant Country Lane 
P.O. Box 277 
Rigby, ID 83442 
G:IWPDATAICAHlI49181PIdgsISummary Judgment, MOT.wpd:bel 
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MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
( v{First Class Mail 
( J!:"and Delivery 
( ) Facsimile 
( ) Overnight Mail 
DeAnne Casperson,uEsq. 
Charles A. Homer, Esq. (ISB No. 1630) .?/7,>~ 
~ i, . ., .. :,'-~ DeAnne Casperson, Esq. (ISB No. 6698) 
HOLDEN KIDWELL HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C. 
P.O. Box 50130 
.. 1 _. ~."" 
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
Telephone: (208) 523-0620 
Facsimile: (208) 523-9518 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON 
BUKU PROPERTIES, LLC, an Idaho 
limited liability company, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
RAOEL H. CLARK and JANET C. 
CLARK, husband and wife; ANGUS 
JERRY PETERSON and BETTY JEAN 
PETERSON, husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
RAOEL H. CLARK and JANET C. 
CLARK, husband and wife; ANGUS 
JERRY PETERSON and BETTY JEAN 
PETERSON, husband and wife, 
Counter-Plaintiffs, 
v. 
BUKU PROPERTIES, LLC, an Idaho 
limited liability company, 
Counter-Defendants. 
Case No. CV-08-941 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 




This memorandum is filed in support ofPlaintiffBuku Properties, LLC's Motion for 
Summary Judgment, which seeks judgment as a matter oflaw as to Plaintiffs' allegations in 
their Verified Complaint and as to Defendants' Counterclaims. 
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff Buku Properties, LLC (hereinafter "Plaintiff' or "Buku"), through its 
Verified Complaint (hereinafter "Complaint") filed November 6, 2008, brought suit for the 
return of earnest money deposits on the terminated sale of property located in Jefferson 
County owned by Defendants Raoel H, Clark and Janet C. Clark (hereinafter "Clarks") and 
Angus Jerry Peterson and Betty Jean Peterson (hereinafter "Petersons"). 
This action arises out of two purchase and sale agreements. On August 30, 2007, 
Plaintiff entered into a Purchase and Sale Agreement with Defendants Clarks ("Clark 
Agreement") for the purchase of approximately 80.17 acres of property located in Jefferson 
County, Idaho, owned by the Clarks (hereinafter the "Clark Property"). (Affidavit of J aramie 
Magera ("Magera Aff."), ~ 4, Ex. A). Pursuant to the Clark Agreement, the purchase price 
for the property was established as $1,044,075.18. (Magera Aff., ~ 5, Ex. At The Clark 
Agreement established that Buku' s obligation to purchase the property was subject to a four 
month due diligence inspection period and Buku's satisfaction with the condition of the 
property and any requirements for Buku' s purposes. (Magera Aff., ~ 6, Ex. A). Subsequent 
to Buku and Clarks executing the Clark Agreement, Buku and Clarks entered into 
2 - MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
negotiations regarding Buku providing an earnest money deposit to Clarks. (Magera Aff., 
~ 7, Ex. A). Buku and Clarks orally agreed that Buku would provide to Clarks an earnest 
money deposit in the amount of $25,000 and that such earnest money would be fully 
refundable until closing. (Magera Aff., ~ 8, Ex. A). On or about October 15,2007, Buku 
tendered to Clarks earnest money in the amount of$25,000. (Magera Aff., ~ 9, Ex. A). On 
or about October 23, 2007, Buku and Clarks amended the Clark Agreement to reflect the oral 
agreement between the parties regarding the earnest money tendered to Clarks by Buku. 
(Magera Aff., ~ 10, Ex. A) 
On or about August 30, 2007, Plaintiff also entered into a Purchase and Sale 
Agreement with Defendants Petersons for the purchase of approximately 73 acres adjacent 
to Defendant Clarks' property (hereinafter the "Peterson Property"). (Magera Aff., ~ 11, Ex. 
ill. The purchase price for the property, as established in the Peterson Agreement, was 
$980,000.00. (Magera Aff., ~ 10, Ex. B). The Peterson Agreement established that Plaintiff 
provide $327,00.00 in earnest money upon execution of the contract and that all but 
$10,000.00 of the earnest money was fully refundable until closing. (MageraAff., ~ 11, Ex. 
ill. Plaintiff tendered $327,000.00 in earnest money to Defendants Petersons on or about 
August 30, 2007. (Magera Aff., ~ 12, Ex. B). The Peterson Agreement established that 
Plaintiffs obligation to purchase the property was subject to a four month due diligence 
inspection period and Plaintiff s satisfaction with the condition of the property. (MageraAff., 
~ 13). 
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At the time both parties entered into each respective Purchase and Sale Agreement, 
both the Clark Property and the Peterson Property were zoned Residential-1 ("R-1 ft), which 
would allow a minimum density of one acre lots. (Magera Aff., ~ 14). Further, all parties 
understood at the time of entering into the Purchase and Sale Agreements that the sale of 
both properties was contingent upon Plaintiff being able to develop the properties with the 
density of development accorded to an R-l zone. (Magera Aff., ~~ 15-16). 
Between August 30, 2007 and December 18,2007, the Jefferson County Planning and 
Zoning Commission! began plans to change the zoning categorization of the Clark Property 
and Peterson Property to Residential-5 ("R-5"), which would allow a minimum density of 
five acre lots. (Magera Aff., ~ 16, Ex. C). The development as contemplated by the parties 
could not occur unless Jefferson County" grandfathered" the development to exempt it from 
the zoning ordinances. (Magera Aff., ~ 18). Upon performing its due diligence investigation 
concerning the properties, Plaintiff discovered Jefferson County Planning and Zoning 
Commission's plans to change the zoning categorization of the two properties. (Magera Aff., 
~ 18). Defendants also knew ofthe problem because both Plaintiff and Defendants attended 
the County Zoning meetings. (Magera Aff., ~ 18). The appraiser and bank providing 
Plaintiffwith financing for the purchase of the properties became concerned about financing 
the purchase of the properties upon notice of the potential change in zoning the of the 
properties because the value of the properties was significantly less if the zoning was 
!Counsel for the Clarks and Petersons is also counsel for Jefferson County. (Magera 
Aff., ~ 17, Ex. C). 
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made demand upon Defendants for return of the earnest money, at which time Defendants 
were no longer entitled to exercise dominion and control over Plaintiff's property. 
Defendants have failed to return the funds upon Plaintiff's demand, and continue to hold and 
exercise dominion and control over Plaintiff's funds. Thus, pursuant to Idaho case law, 
Defendants have wrongfully converted Plaintiff's funds, and Plaintiffs are entitled to 
damages arising from Defendants' actions. 
E. Defendants have been unjustly enriched by keeping Plaintiff's earnest money 
deposit. 
Defendants have been unjustly enriched by keeping Plaintiff's earnest money deposit. 
"The elements of unjust enrichment are that (1) a benefit is conferred on the defendant[s] by 
the Plaintiff, (2) the Defendant[ s] appreciate[] the benefit; and (3) it would be inequitable for 
the defendant to accept the benefit without payment ofthe value of the benefit." Teton Peaks 
Investment Co., LLC v. Ohme, 146 Idaho 394, 195 P.3d 1207, 1211 (2008). Here, Plaintiff 
deposited with Defendants a total sum of$352,000.00 as earnest money, of which Plaintiff 
is entitled to a return of $342,000.00 pursuant to the Agreements. The $342,000.00 in 
earnest money which Defendants continue to hold is a benefit conferred on Defendants' by 
Plaintiff, and Defendants have appreciated that benefit in continuing to possess those funds. 
Further, it is inequitable for Defendants to retain the funds, as Defendants have provided 
nothing in exchange to Plaintiff for the funds. Defendants could have extended closing and 
cured the zoning defect. Instead, Defendants refused to cure, cancelling the Agreements and 
wrongfully retained the earnest monies. Thus, Defendants have been unjustly enriched. 
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changed. The bank would not agree to fund the purchase with the zoning change. (Magera 
Aff., ~ 19, Ex. D). 
On December 18, 2007, Plaintiff sent a memorandum to Defendants Clarks and 
Petersons giving notice of its objection to the condition of the properties due to the potential 
of the properties being zoned R-5. (MageraAff., ~ 20, Ex. E and Ex. F). The memorandum 
also contained an offer to extend the closing date to provide Defendants with an opportunity 
to cure the unacceptable condition. (Magera Aff., ~ 20, Ex. E and Ex. F). Defendants 
responded to the memorandum via a letter from their counsel rejecting the offer to extend the 
closing date in order to cure, thereby terminating the Clark and Peterson Agreement. (Magera 
Afr., ~ 21, Ex. G). Plaintiff made demand upon Defendants for the return of Plaintiff s 
earnest money in the amount of$342,000.00 on June 17,2008. (Magera Aff., ~ 22, Ex. H). 
Defendants did not and have not satisfied the demand. (Magera Aff., ~ 23). 
III. ARGUMENT 
A. Summary Judgment Standard 
Pursuant to Rule 56( c) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court should grant 
summary judgment based on the pleadings and affidavits where "there [are] no genuine 
issues as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw." 
I.R.C.P. 56(c); see also Idaho Building Contractors Assoc. v. City o/Coeur d'Alene, 126 
Idaho 740, 742,890 P.2d 326,328 (1995). The Court will construe all disputed facts in favor 
of the non-moving party as well as all reasonable inferences. Hayward v. Jacks Pharmacy, 
Inc., 141 Idaho 622, 625, 115 P.3d 713, 716 (2005). 
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B. Plaintiff is entitled to a refund of its earnest money deposits pursuant to the 
Clark and Peterson Agreements based upon the plain and unambiguous 
language of the contract. 
"If the language of a contract is unambiguous, then its meaning and legal effect must 
be determined from its words." Cristo Viene Pentecostal Church v. Paz, 144 Idaho 304, 308, 
160 P.3d 743, 747 (2007). In the case at hand, the Clark Agreement and the Peterson 
Agreement are unambiguous and neither party has asserted otherwise. Therefore, it must be 
enforced according to its terms. 
Plaintiff has complied with all provisions of the Clark and Peterson Agreements so 
as to entitle it to a refund of the earnest money it deposited pursuant to both Agreements. 
Paragraph 2(a) of the Clark Agreement specifically states that "all of such earnest Money 
shall be refundable until closing." (See MageraAff., Ex. A). Paragraph 2(a) of the Peterson 
Agreement likewise states "$10,000.00 of the earnest money shall be non-refundable, the 
balance fully refundable until closing." (See Magera Aff., Ex. B). Furthermore, pursuant to 
paragraph 3 of each ofthe Agreements, Plaintiffhad four months to perform its due diligence 
inspections on the properties as follows: 
Prior to closing, it is Buyer's obligation to make sure that they are fully 
satisfied with the condition of the property, also any requirements, 
environmental requirements, and all of the requirements that the Buyer needs 
to make for its due diligence purposes. Buyer will have four months to 
perform the due diligence inspections to satisfy Buyer's interests and concerns 
regarding the purchase. Thus, closing will be on or before December 21, 
2007. 
(See Magera Aff., Ex. A and Ex. B, ~ 3). 
In addition, paragraph 25 of the Peterson Agreement states: 
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Buyer and Seller agree that Buyer intends to develop the property sold under 
this agreement. Seller's property cannot be developed without an adjacent 
property known as the Clark property. Buyer and Seller agree that the 
purchase and sale herein are contingent upon Clark selling to Buyer. If Clark 
does not sell to Buyer, then Buyer has no obligation to close with Seller, and 
the earnest money will be returned to Buyer. ... 
(Magera Aff., Ex. B). Paragraph 25 of the Clark Agreement contains similar language, 
making sale of the Clark Property contingent upon sale of the Peterson Property to Plaintiff. 
(See Magera Aff., Ex. A). 
During the due diligence period, Plaintiff discovered that Jefferson County was 
planning to change the zoning of both the Clark Property and Peterson Property from R-l, 
in which the minimum allowable lot size is one acre, to R-5, in which the minimum 
allowable lot size is five acres. (Magera Aff., ~ 16-17; Ex. C). Because the purchase price 
for the properties was based upon the value of the properties as being zoned R -1, this 
potential change created serious problems for Plaintiff. (Magera Aff., ~~ 15, 19). More 
specifically, the bank providing Plaintiff with financing for the purchase informed Plaintiff 
that the zoning had to remain R -1 in order for the Bank of Commerce to fund the loan. (See 
Magera Aff., ~ 19, Ex. D). 
Plaintiff notified both the Clarks and the Petersons of its issue with the rezoning of 
the property on December 18, 2007, via a memorandum. The memorandum to the Petersons 
stated: 
Buku Properties, LLC, and A. Jerry Peterson agree that with the recent county 
zone change, both parties need additional time to review the contract. Because 
of the County Commissioner's recent proposed county-wide zone change, 
resulting in this property potentially being zoned R-5. The appraiser and the 
bank dealing with Buku Properties, LLC have legitimate concerns with 
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financing. We agree to move our closing date back from December 21, 2007, 
to March 1,2008. We will continue to talk and cooperate with each other. 
(Magera Aff., Ex. F). The memorandum to the Clarks contained identical language. (See 
Magera Aff., Ex. E). 
In a letter from their counsel dated December 19,2007, Petersons and Clarks refused 
to cure the zoning defect and rejected Plaintiffs offer to extend the closing date for the 
Agreements. (See Magera Aff., Ex. G). Such letter terminated the Clark and Peterson 
Agreements, as a result of their refusal to cure the concerns, and entitled Plaintiff to the 
return of the earnest money deposited for each Agreement. 
There is no question of fact that Plaintiff complied with all terms of the Agreements. 
Plaintiff provided Clarks and Petersons with notice of the zoning defect during the 
contractual due diligence period, and offered Clarks and Petersons the opportunity to 
potentially cure the defect by providing for the extension of the closing dates of the 
Agreements. Clarks and Petersons' refusal to cure and rejection of Plaintiff s offer to extend 
the closing dates was a termination of the Agreements. Because of the termination, closing 
never occured. As such, pursuant to paragraph 2(a) of each of the respective Agreements, 
Plaintiff is entitled to the return of the earnest money it deposited for the purchase of the 
Clark and Peterson Properties in the amounts of $25,000.00 and $317,000.00, respectively. 
Based on the plain language of the Agreements, and Defendants' failure to cure, 
Plaintiff is entitled to a refund of its earnest monies, as well as summary judgment against 
Defendants on their specific performance and breach of contract claims. 
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c. Even if Defendants' failure to cure did not terminate the Agreements, the 
doctrine of frustration terminated the Agreements. 
Plaintiff was not obligated to close on the properties because the zoning change 
frustrated the purpose of the Agreements. "The frustration principle operates in a proper 
situation to excuse a promisor's duty of performance if some supervening event has 
destroyed the value of the counter-performance bargained for by the promisor, even though 
the counter-performance is still literally possible." Twin Harbors Lumber Co., 92 Idaho 343, 
348,442 P.2d 753, 758 (1968). 
Defendants were well aware that the value of the properties was substantially reduced 
by the zoning problems In fact, Plaintiff could not obtain financing based on the zoning 
change. Consequently, although the Agreements were literally possible, the purpose and 
value were destroyed. Consequently, Plaintiff is entitled to a refund of its earnest monies and 
summary judgment on Defendants' specific performance and breach of contract claims, even 
if the Agreements had not been terminated by Defendants' failure to cure. 
D. Defendants have wrongfully converted Plaintifrs earnest money deposit. 
Generally, conversion is defined as a distinct act of dominion wrongfully asserted over 
another's personal property in denial of or inconsistent with rights therein. See Luzar v. 
Western Sur. Co., 107 Idaho 693,696,692 P.2d 337,340 (1984). A right of action accrues 
in favor of the owner of property as soon as the property is wrongfully taken from his 
possession or wrongfully converted. See Davidson v. Davidson. 68 Idaho 58,63,188 P.2d 
329, 332 (1947). Defendants currently exercise dominion and control over Plaintiffs 
propeny, i.e., the earnest money funds provided to Defendants Clark and Peterson. Plaintiff 
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selling, leasing, renting, collecting debts arising out of the sale or lease of goods or services 
or distributing goods or services, either to or from locations within the state of Idaho, or 
directly or indirectly affecting the people of this state." None of the actions outlined in that 
definition apply to Plaintiffbecause Plaintiffwas not selling or leasing any goods or services. 
Plaintiff was always the buyer in the transactions at issue. Therefore, Defendants have no 
cause of action against Plaintiff. 
H. Plaintiff is entitled to attorneys' fees. 
Plaintiff is entitled to a recovery of attorneys' fees pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure and Idaho Code §§ 12-120(3), as well as paragraph 23 of the Clark and Peterson 
Agreements. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff complied with all terms and conditions of the Clark and Peterson 
Agreements. Because the earnest money deposited by Plaintiff for the purchase of the Clark 
and Peterson Properties was fully refundable until closing, and because such closing did not 
occur because a condition found during due diligence was not cured, Plaintiff is entitled to 
the return of the earnest money. Defendants have converted Plaintiffs funds and have been 
unjustly enriched by wrongfully retaining Plaintiffs funds. Defendants have no viable 
causes of action against Plaintiff and they should be dismissed. 
DATED this S~ay of October, 2009. 
laz£l,",..v~ 
DeAnne Casperson, sq. 
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C. 
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l 
P.3d 1277, 1279 (2002). Plaintiff assumes that Defendants' al1eged reliance was reliance 
was on completion of the sale of the property pursuant to the Agreements. However, 
Defendants' reliance was unreasonable. The Agreements themselves set out that there was 
a possibility that the sales would not ultimately close. This is evident from the term 
providing for the return of earnest money funds prior to closing, as well as from the term 
providing for a four month due diligence period. Thus, because Defendants' reliance was 
unreasonable, Defendant cannot satisfY the necessary elements for promissory 
estoppel! detrimental reliance. 
G, Plaintiff did not engage in consumer protection violations. 
Defendants allege that Plaintiff has violated the Idaho Consumer Protection Act. 
However, the Consumer Protection Act does not apply to the Agreements. More specifically, 
Defendants assert that "[t]he counter-defendants used unconscionable methods and acts to 
induce the counter-plaintiffs to sell and continue to keep their real property open for sale to 
the counter-defendants." This allegation apparently refers to Idaho Code § 48-603C which 
states: 
(1) Any unconscionable method, act or practice in the conduct of any trade or 
commerce violates the provisions of this chapter whether it occurs before, 
during, or after the conduct of the trade or commerce. 
Idaho Code § 48-603C makes reference to "the conduct of any trade or commerce," and thus, 
for the statute to be applicable as against Plaintiff, Plaintiff would have had to engaged in 
trade or commerce. Idaho Code § 48-602(2) defines "trade" and "commerce" for the 
purposes of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act to mean "the advertising, offering for sale, 
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F. Defendants cannot satisfy the elements of equitable estoppel or promissory 
estoppel/detrimental reliance. 
Defendants assert the doctrines of estoppel and promissory estoppel/detrimental 
reliance in their counter-claim. However, neither ofthese doctrines apply as against Plaintiff. 
Although Defendants refer to "estoppel" in Count IV of their counter-claim, based upon 
Defendants' allegations, it appears that Defendants are asserting equitable estoppel. The 
elements of equitable estoppel are (1) a false representation or concealment of a material fact 
with actual or constructive knowledge of the truth, (2) the party asserting estoppel did not 
know or could not discover the truth, (3) the false representation or concealment was made 
with the intent that it be relied upon, and (4) the person to whom the representation was made 
or from whom the facts were concealed relied and acted upon the representation or 
concealment to his prejudice. See Winn v. Campbell, 145 Idaho 727, 732, 184 P.3d 852,857 
(2008). Plaintiffis unsure as to what alleged false representation or concealment of material 
fact Defendants are asserting, and, for that matter, how that alleged false representation or 
concealment of material fact affects the remainder of the elements of estoppel. However, 
Plaintiff engaged in no false representations or concealment of material fact regarding the 
Agreements. Therefore, Defendants cannot satisfY the necessary elements for equitable 
estoppel. 
Additionally, Defendants assert promissory estoppel/detrimental reliance. Promissory 
estoppel requires that (1) one party's reliance on a promise creates a substantial economic 
detriment, (2) the reliance was or should have been foreseeable, and (3) the reliance was 
reasonable andjustified. See Gillespie v. Mountain Park Estates, LLC, 138 Idaho 27,29,56 
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Counter-Defendants. 
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STATE OF IDAHO ) 
)ss 
County of Jefferson ) 
laramie Magera, being first duly sworn on oath deposes and states as follows: 
1. I am over 18 years of age and I make this Affidavit based on my own personal 
knowledge. I understand that in making this Affidavit, I am providing sworn 
testimony under oath, which may be provided to the Court in this case and under 
penalty of perjury. 
2. I reside in Jefferson County, Idaho. 
3. I am the manager of Buku Properties, LLC (hereinafter "Buku"), an Idaho limited 
liability company, with its principal place of business located in Jefferson County, 
Idaho. 
4. On or about August 30, 2007, Buku entered into a Purchase and Sale Agreement 
with Raoel H. Clark and Janet C. Clark (hereinafter the "Clark Agreement"), for 
the purchase of approximately 80.17 acres of property located in Jefferson County, 
Idaho owned by Raoel H. Clark and Janet C. Clark (hereinafter "Clarks") 
5. The purchase price for the Clarks' property was established in the Clark 
Agreement as $1,044,075.18. 
6. The Clark Agreement established that Buku's obligation to purchase the property 
was subject to a four month due diligence inspection period and Buku's 
2-AFFIDAVITOF JARAMIEMAGERAINSUPPORTOFPLAINTIFF'SMOTIONFORSUMMARY JUDGMENT 
satisfaction with the condition of the property and any requirements for Buku's 
purposes. 
7. Subsequent to Buku and Clarks executing the Clark Agreement, Buku and Clarks 
entered into negotiations regarding Buku providing an earnest money deposit to 
Clarks. 
8. Buku and Clarks orally agreed that Buku would provide to Clarks an earnest 
money deposit in the amount of$25,000 and that such earnest money would be 
fully refundable until closing. 
9. On or about October 15,2007, Buku tendered to Clarks earnest money in the 
amount of$25,000. 
10. On or about October 23,2007, Buku and Clarks amended the Clark Agreement to 
reflect the oral agreement between the parties regarding the earnest money 
tendered to Clarks by Buku. A true and correct copy of the Clark Agreement with 
such amendment is attached hereto as Exhibit A. 
11. On or about August 30, 2007, Buku also entered into a Purchase and Sale 
Agreement with Angus Jerry Peterson and Betty Jean Peterson (hereinafter 
"Petersons"), a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit B, 
(hereinafter "Peterson Agreement") for the purchase of approximately 73 acres 
adjacent to the Clark property. 
12. The purchase price for the Peterson property, as established in the Peterson 
Agreement, was $980,000.00. 
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13. The Peterson Agreement established that Buku provide $327,000.00 in earnest 
money upon execution of the contract and that all but $10,000.00 of the earnest 
money was fully refundable until closing. 
14. Buku tendered the $327,000.00 in earnest money to Petersons on or about August 
30,2007. 
15. The Peterson Agreement established that Plaintiffs obligation to purchase the 
property was subject to a four month due diligence inspection period and Buku's 
satisfaction with the condition of the property and any requirements necessary for 
Buku's purposes. 
16. At the time the parties entered into each respective Purchase and Sale Agreement, 
both the Peterson property and the Clark property were zoned Residential-l ("R-
1 "), which would allow a minimum density of one acre lots. 
17. Buku intended to purchase the properties for a residential development. Buku's 
development plan was based on being able to sell lots of at least as small as one 
acre. Buku obtained a financial commitment for the purchase of the properties 
from the Bank of Commerce based on its development plan of approximately one-
acre lots. 
18. At the time of entering into the respective Purchase and Sale Agreements, all 
parties mutually understood that the purchase of both properties was subject to 
Buku being able to develop the property with the density of development accorded 
to a R-l zone, i.e., one-acre lots. 
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19. Between August 30,2007 and December 18,2007, the Jefferson County Planning 
and Zoning Commission began plans to change the zoning categorization of the 
Clark property and the Peterson property to Residential-5 ("R-5"), which would 
allow a minimum density of five acre lots. A true and correct copy of a newspaper 
article is attached as Exhibit C that describes the County's proposed zone changes, 
which included the two properties. 
20. Upon performing its due diligence investigation concerning the properties, 
Plaintiff discovered the Jefferson County Planning and Zoning Commission's 
plans to change the zoning categorization of the Clark and Peterson properties. 
The development could not go forward as planned unless Jefferson County 
"grandfathered" the development to exempt it from the zoning ordinances. Both 
the Clarks and Peterson's were aware of the problem because we all attended the 
zoning meetings. 
21. The appraiser and bank providing Buku with financing for the purchase of the 
Clark and Peterson properties became concerned about financing the purchase of 
the properties upon notice of the potential change in zoning of the properties. In 
mid December 2007, I had a telephone conference with Jeromy Hart from the 
Bank of Commerce. He informed me the Bank of Commerce would not fund the 
loan if the zoning was changed because the value of the properties would be 
substantially less. In early January 2008, Mr. Hart confirmed the Bank's position 
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in a letter to me. (See Letter from J eromy L. Hart, Bank of Commerce, a true and 
correct copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit D). 
22. On December 18,2007, Buku sent a memorandum to Clarks, attached hereto as 
Exhibit E, and Petersons, attached hereto as Exhibit F, giving notice of its 
objection to the conditIon of the properties due to the potential of the properties 
being zoned R-5. Because Buku'sdue diligence period was nearly at an end, the 
zoning issue for the properties had to be resolved before Buku was willing to 
proceed to closing. The memorandum also contained an offer to extend the 
closing date to provide Clark and Peterson with sufficient time to cure the defect 
identified by Buku during its due diligence period. 
23. On December 19, 2007, Clark and Peterson responded to the memorandum via a 
letter from their counsel rejecting the offer to extend the closing date in order to 
cure, a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit G. 
24. Buku continued to try and resolve the matter, but considered the Agreements 
terminated as a result ofthe Clarks and Peterson's refusal to cure the zoning defect 
as identified by Buku during its due diligence period. 
25. The parties could not come to new agreements for the purchase of the properties. 
Buku sent a letter to the Clarks and Peterson's counsel demanding the return of its 
earnest money in the amount of$342,000.00 on June 17,2008, a true and correct 
copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit H. Neither Clarks nor Petersons have 
satisfied Buku's demand. 
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DATED this 2 dav of October, 2009. - . 
J aramie Mageraj 
Manager of BM'ku Properties, LLC 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
)ss. 
County of Jefferson ) 
On the d-~ day of October, 2009, before me the undersigned, a notary public in and 
for said State, personally appeared laramie Magera, known or identified to me to be the 
manager in the limited liability company of Buku Properties, LLC, and the manager who 
subscribed said limited liability company name to the foregoing instrument, and 
acknowledged to me that such manager executed the same in said limited liability company 
name. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official seal 
the day and year in this certificate first above written. 
NotaryP~ 
Residing at 9~ P?~.f /D 
My Commission Expires: b 7/ c2..{) /UI-.f 
I 
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ATTORNEYS SERVED: 
Robin D. Dunn 
477 Pleasant Country Lane 
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:lS of the dat~ of rhis iIlgreem<lnt 3.!ld will be tr!.:e <lnci co:-:ect .1S ~)f the tie;sir,~~ date 
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(~) Sl.'llcr arc indivjdual:: or ::o;-pofate b:..::;iilt';;' Qrganiz;ttj()n~; \.,ho {lWl, Lhe (X'0'Je:1'r' tha~ is 
being :~:wsferred, ' . -
(b) Seller has good and ~;j;ke~<lblc mle to all 0:' the ;e,;.l :md personal pmpcN)" c-.eine ~,()ld 
hereunder. The real and personal ;:c,:;r,,':rty will be frf.:e ane ciear of all mortg<lges, hens. "if;d 
encumbrances at the time of closing $: Sdlc.r C;:Ul ddivcr to Buyer good and marketable tille. 
(e) All Il::i,e"s and proper6::s tbi: ate being c:,:,,-;vcy~d u:1der '1::;\ :u::re¢ment are owned by 
Seiler .. ina will be f:-ee 311d clear of all mong<lges, ami encumbr::nc:7s aT the Ii me of dosing 
(d) Seller "'ill p;l~' and satisfy uU mo!'tgages, a(7C!;;fn~~;)ts.l~lSe or Clthe:: rcsporu."ibihlies 10 
which ir is a part) ilt the tim;: of c~o$ing to aiiow the prop..:rty to be .co:weyed f;;:)n'l!he Selhn t{J 
Buyer. 
(a} Buyer is an mdividuat (;1' business organl:::::J:iof; LInder the l;t",s (,f the Sti31e of Idaho. 
Vrlt1l full power /f'",d authority tl) :;;m.e~· i:,:D .. nd perti;:;:r, its obilgat!OIls ur3:;r :111$ Z~0:r;'t;';;'~:::1~. 
(b) The executl:1l;, delivery and ?e~fc:-rr4..'v,:~ 0: lh,; .. p::-:rrten! by Buyer have been duly 
authorized by its members, m3nagC:-$ or dlf.:ctorS. 
(c) There is no action. ~rbi,::-~lion, sua, notice, order, real (:5t:lte tax :;onWS! ,:ir 
admini!>!Xative or other proceeding beforE! .lily c()un. or goverfuT,i!!::"zl i1~t!ncy. authority or body 
pending or to Buyer's knowLedge, Threatened againsl or affectine, Buyer ""hkh would prevent or 
interfere with rhe transacrions con7e~r\pla:ed by this agr~ement 
13. ludem:nific~tjon ProviSions for Buyt:r. Seller i1gr~e5 to in::h::r:,;ail): Ihc Buyer and 
8uyez's officer$, di:~ctot·:;, Olffiliates, .. gen:5, ~mplo'yees, £t\ccessors ane assi;ns from a.."d 1l5fiinSf 
the entlref)! of any chruges, c:omplllinrs, actions, suits. damages. c:aims. costs. amounts pfrid in 
settlement, taxeS, liens. expenseS or lees, LrtcJuding :Ill attorneys' fees and coutt costs, which 
result from. ari/;ing out of, relate to or a:o'e ,:;;ms~d by; 
(.:1) Al1Y m<lh"',.rial breach of lin)' of SdJer's reprl!scntazions. war.<:;''1tie:; ;,1;,d covenant:; 
contained in thi!> Agn:ement; and 
(b) Seller':; conduct of me bus:ne;s at L1t' pre:;t'.ises on Of ?~iClr to the dosing date" 
14. Indemnificatioll Pn\'isionll for SeBicr, Buyer agr!:':.":;; to Indemnify the SeHer and 
Seller's afi-:Lales. agents, et):ployees. ht"irs. JX'rson~1 representatives, successors .me assign:;, fran 
and tw.ainst tht: entirety of any charges, \!\lmpL1in\!i, "ctim~:;. ~il:i!:$. damages. claims. costs. 
amou~ts paid in sc!ttlement. ta:l.es. liens. expens6 or fe:!s, j;.cludmg a.1I u:tto:nli:ys fees and COlIrt 
! 
I 
(Ii) Any materiall:>reach of any of Buyer's re;~~,;:::!',:ati('Jns, 'J;:::TJ~ltH:lS a.."'ld COV<'!lla.'1l...S 
::ontatned in ibr~ agr~C:71e:H; and 
(0) Buyer's condllct oftl)c bu.siness ar thc: premises and after the cJil&ing rune. 
15. Other hlldtrn::nificatiollll Provision:;;, The for~goirlJ~ inch::::nnificatiotl provis:,:,,';s are in 
addit;on to. and not in de~radation of, :.In! statutory common Jaw remedy any pm)' ;:t.;ry have for 
breach ofn!?r::s~:J:;:J!ion, warrallly or C~F;U2::t, 
16. ElCP>Cr!liieS of l'tcji;at[14tion aUld Transfr;r. £xccpt ;1$ 0thcrw:se pT'ovided in this 
't~f{;t,·ment. each part}' :illalt pay the pa."1y's own expenses. tax\!s, ;;;:;:1 other costs mcidem to or 
resulting from this agreement, whether or not tilt;: tran~:tctionscont;;:mplat<.::d nez-ct,:, ilte 
consum.ma.ted. 
17. f'I;i otites. Any notice to beE;i V~:l under this a;reement shall 'be Si vcn in W'rltmg and 'br; 
delivered personally or by fegi$t~Ied or ct~ified mUcil. postage preplid. to the parry's 1;1;;1 known 
address. 
j 8. EntDre A greement. This Ilgr~~ment, inc:udil'lg the exhibits and documents reIerred to 
herein constirutes thee'r:rirc .rrgre,:::;lenr betwe~~:: rhe parties and supersedes .:l.!~y prior 
undcfstaJ:ding, ag.re{'~ients Or :;t;prc.;;em:!l!ions l>y or berween !he parties. w,';Ettn or Q;'~. that may 
have rei;,red in any way 10 the subject mat~e7 h(~rcof. This ittstrumenrmay be executed in one or 
more counterp'~r!S. each of whjch shall be dt;:(::::t'.;:a atl original, but ail of ,,'hich togl"ther <;hall 
constitute one and the same insr:ument. 
19. Suceessibn. This Agr~cment shall be binding IIp(m and inure!O the benefit of the 
parries named herein and rheir respective. ht:::r~, personal r;:.p:·~.sentative, successors and aS5iS~;:;5 
20. CoverllJing La:w, 1;;';:5 Agreeme.nt shall be go·,:;;:;ed and ccm;:wed in accordance 
with the laws of the State ofId,,,r,i,). 
21. Amendments and W21ivc~. ~o ~mcnd. ... nent ofa!1Y pfo\:isions of this ag:-eement "",ill 
be valid unless the S:J.me shaH be inwl'!ting and sigru:.d. by Lhe parries. No waiver by any pnrtyof 
;my default, misrepresentarion or brea<:h of Wil:'T;HiTy or covenant l1creunder. whether i:r::entional 
or nOi. shaH be deemed to. extend to uny prirr;, or subsequent defaulf, mi~r:e:pre:;;entation, cr breach 
of warranty or covenant he:'t .... m.der or effect in anywny any tights ariSing by virtue of any prior or 
subsequent such occurrence. 
22. Severability. Any tenn or ?l'iy;islCIO of this Agreeme:lt that is invalid or 
uH~nfoTc~able under law in any sitl11ti011 ill .iny Ct)mpe!:;!'m juri!idictio!~ shall nor affeCT the 
validity or enforceability of the rt:m;linillg term£ and provisil1flS h::r:;~of or the validity 0, 
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enfon::cability of thee offending te;r;1 or pfovisi<.lns in My other slruution or in any DdHH 
compc~ent jurisdiction. If the li:-:<:.j judgment of a ,::,,,m nf c::;:T;r:(~t(:nl jurisdiction deci<::tl:; {hat an} 
h,rrm or provision he:-eof;$ invalid or ummfofceable. the p;',irties agree that the court ma.king the 
determination 01' invalidity or lmen=~:!1":,eabiht: sh.1!1 h;:tve the pow,:;:: to refo:rr: the scope, :lUTZ!:,:;, 
or ureil of the ter.:; or provisions, to d~1e!e specific words or p1:::-';)0S, or to tepla~ any invalid 0: 
ll."lenforc:enhlc (etm or provisions with a tCl;ti or F:"oYision that is valid a~d enfNC{~:,hle and that 
comes clO'se: 1<> e)'prescing the intentions of the invalid ~r "';;7.mforceable t~rm or prot'l$i:,::,. and 
this AgreemCtll shall be enforc~3.ble a~ so modified after i.h~ expiration of r:r:v: within which 
Jadg:l.1ent ~~~> be l!.ppeai.:d. 
23. A.un.rne)'~ Feel!. The prcv(;[iJ mg party in .'l • .''l} U(;t:on TO enr,;r~:: Ihis .:!grt:'(~nH~n7 shaH bt:. 
entitled to rl.:lCQver 11$ reasollablt: ;;tlurnt': .. s ! .... ~(:s ,t'1C Cc';;l~ 
24. Attorn.:y ReprC5ent~rion. 8uyer a.'ld Seller ack.'o .... k.Jge that titis agrecme!:: has 
been prepred by attcm:::ys for the Bllyer. Sell!';! has the right te reprel;{',nlation by their O""'n 
counsel, and is not relying upon Buyer- or Buyer's cotmseJ in negotiJitl21g this aJ;I¢;;,,:~nt or in 
~xecuting this agr'.::c:nent Seller is 110t relying on Buyer Dr Buyer;:; attorneys f{)f any 
represents.tion of ll'lw Of fact nm com;1in~J in thb a,s;n;,e;:,"icnt. 
25. Contingtn~j(!s. Buyer and Sdkr ag:rte that Buyer in:~~d$ 10 de\'e!oj) the property 
sold Wider this agreement. SeHer':; property =,[zrm,jt be developed wilhont an adjacenf, ?fr;).l'eny 
knovvn as the Pf'u,rson propet'0' Buyer and SeJ:c;T agree iliat th~ PUtch.1!s.'! and salt! hetdn are 
contingent upon P','!l,erSCrn sellin£; w Suyer. 1f P~tl:rw;1 does norselJ to Buyer. then SU)'''el' has no 
oblil§;;tion to dose with SeHer. and the earnest money will bl:': returned to Buyer. The closing dare 
between Buyer ar;:J Peterson will be schc:dult::dar the SUi,1:: rime as the closing dale herein. 
The p,lt'ti\!$ acknDwledge that time is M !71.; essen,.\: in the cc;r,;:::~tivn 0:- this ~greement 
;md that failh1£ to complt:t(~ this agreemt!11( in a timely 13$hior! would be a breach of.hat time l1f 
the e:>st!nce. 
LLC 
:;. , (·.· .. '··1, 
Dated:_."~' ,.. >\ ';'.J; 
.. ,~-----'I,-.-.. 
~: -.,,\ '''~., . --\ 
"~':< ),' \. . "i I 
~_~ __ ~~ __ "''''''_'''''''~''''''' __ h_---=-····''· 
Dated: '" ... '., :' ---. .. ~,-,~--- .-<,~:~ .. ~ .... -,-: .... ~----.. -. --!.-..-~ j .' ,··r 
hnC1 C. Ciarli 
Stall: uf Ida!1\) 
On this __ {~,.2_ day (lfOctooer. 2()(F, lx't:ne :1'~. a \"tlla!';.' Publk; in and f<ir ,;aid stalL". 
p('rsollafly :!PFeared Jaramie M,H!'~':':!, known to me to h.;: a :vl:waging \~'c'mbcr (If Buku ProPl:l1i.:-s. 
u.e and the p;:;'son whosc 1,,,,'1:e is Sllb~.::rib('d to the \\ithin inSlnt',:em. <i1la acknowkJg.l:d 10 rill' til:! 
he e.'\ecnted th\.· S'lIllt'. 
In wrtne"; whereof: I I1me ht.:n;ullw ;,(:1 my hand ilnd ani>.:.;:>d ''':. C?'f~(;t;:' :;eaL the: Jay and )'::lr 
" '-:, .', r. f :/""\ .' -
L·: .. LTc .1 J """ "l jJ' ... rt .... )-) >,l./~-, .... I ~4~ ~~~_ ... '" .-".... - ~ ~ • 1A;..,),."u ",1- ~ ~._~:l~ ... .l --....4 
,,'2,Iljry Pllhli .. J/ 
Rc,;iding: ~,.l':lDI"i{:r.J 
h:;;~, L\pin;-;: H. ~-", {:&-;, 
SIate of Idalw 
Coumy of Jefferson 
On til is .J.~ :1t;, tiny of (h::tc.her, :(}07. bef{m: 111<:, a i':\)lar;. Publ k in and tbr said slare. 
persi:·,aHy appeared Rand H. Cl~lrk and .Ianl!l C. Clark. knllv>n ((l me t" be rhe pCrSl'llS whose 11:In11:'< 
are subscribed 1.0 llh: within ill:,'r~Lin~'m. and ackniJ\\!cdg;:·d 1,\ Ill': that he S;'\(;:-;rH;'d tilL' same. 
In witness wherc,)f, IlHIVC h':l'cunto scI n,> 1;;nJ arid .dTixed 111) dfficc s<::nL the dilY lind \i.'ar 
in this dflcun,,::Jlt first abo\(; wriiten, 
". 
'Ot!U') Publk 
.~ - !~~:~<; id i.ll g:. t-~·f~\,t.)-! '~:::-::: t· . .) (~:>:: !:.1....f"./~.~~.,./ 
Terrn r.\nin.:'i: 
t c·~·~? i 2,.,.() J f~ 
Exhibit "B" 
25Uku ProP",f!ies, LLC,:, limited liahility comp~ny. whose adc!r;;'Ss is P.O. Box 506. R.igby. 
ldaho, 83442, (hereafter referred to as ·'BL!)".!'···') oih:!rs to enter into this PurcilaSt: and Sale l\ !.:;-;c;ncn! 
{referr;;:d to as "this agxecmenl"} \1::i~h Angus JeffY Pi;1~rsotl and Betty Jean Pe"err;on, husband an4 
wife. whose address is 241 N<.n1h 4200 Eas:, Ri{;by, idaho. 8344::. (hcreafterrete7r;~d to as 
"S~ller") upon the foHewing lerms Arld cond:t:ans: 
the: folluwmg parceis of p!'cYi~erry identified below: 
Townshi.p 4 North, Range 39 E!l.St. Boise .\·ferician, Jefferson COWlty. Idaho 
Seclion 21: Commencing :1t the Nc:"",'1:;asr c':lrn{~r of the southe-<lst qUa:"oJ:r ol 
Section 2J, and running thence West 160 Y'tJds; rhe:;)ce South 37.5 rods; thence Ef:.St 160 
rods: Ihenc.e North 31.5 rods to the pOInt 0: b:.~~jnning. together w;th alJ \.vater and "vater 
rights. ditch and ditch ngnts, and perm;;;nent ~mp::-ovemen~s appurtcmml lfir:!::-eto. 
Seclion 21: The South 42.S rods oftne N()rth ~/. of the Southeast 114 
Excepting therefrom: Bc:gin;;~ns at lh~! southeaSt com;;';. of the North 'I: of't."e 
Southeast 1 14 of said Sec!ion 2 i and running thence West 470 feet. more or less to the 
point of i;'.:~rsectjO!l of the East bank of the South Rigby Canal; thente in a :-.forther!)' 
drredo:: along the East bank of said Cl1nallC a point 300 feet West and 42.S rods !'>iorth 
{',fthe point of beginning; thence East 300 fec!; thence Somh 42.5 rods to the point of 
beginning 
T(;~;cther wirh 85 inches of wat;', in the South Rigby and Burgess CZ:'l..~!s. 
Together Wilh (1 ;'ight of way for ingress and egrt:;s over and across the following 
des<:ribed property: B(!g:n;;)lng &1 a point that is n<ltth 42.5 rods from the Southeast comer 
of the North 'l'1 Southeast 1/4 of Section 2 i, t:len::.e West t.O the point of intersection witb 
Ihe WeSi bank of'the SOUUI Rigby Ca:.1al. said pDint being the true point of beginning; 
li1t!nce ~onheas!er!y following the meanderings of said West bank of said canal to rhe 
point of in:'!:rsecrion \vith the East line of said S::CtiOIl 21; thence J\'or-n 20 feet; thence 
Soutnwe:;;te:ly :20 feet disarjce irom and paralleling the mcandc:r:ngs of said ~'e.st bunk. of 
$aId canal to a point that is :;0 feet \V~S! of the pomt of beginning: thence East 20 feet to 
tht!' point of beginning. 
Subject to easements and rights of wuys for hishwa}'s, roads, ditche~, canals, pole. 
power a.:::.d transmission lin~s as they eX111. 
T oi$cther wirh any and all wllter rights and ditch rights 11~purteniUll to the land. 
2. PUI'ti1l8SC Price. In co:tsidera!lon of the sale of the propeny and ass.:!S under this 
agr",ement, Buye.r iihzU pay Sdk'~ ih;: sum {)f;';ir:~, Hurtdred Eighty Thc'.lsand D01;2.;5 
(S9&<J.OOCLOOJ, payabJe as f{)lIows: 
(:I) $:: r ";JUu,[rC upon e,;eCU!lon oi 1his ~~r,~,:rnenl ,r;; t!iifnC:S( rno:-,ey, :~ : (j(i(iD.(ID ",(,he 
':ja:·tK!'~I ;-r;(H)~)~ ~::.hJn be d-';2: :;Jl,tfH;,t; • :ut\l,:.d/~ ~!:~: The r;urne~l 
monel" s!t;u) be p.:tid 10 Sd~'~r 
(b) The remaining wiil be paid to Selkr at ciow;'~ At th(,~ time of closing, 
Buyer and Seller will allocate costs for the: pur;;~ast.:, \\hi<:11 will aHoc!lte $480.000,00 for the 
home and 2 Ileu:; ,md $500.000,00 for the n:rnaining prop.'n)" 
Buyer's obligation to mcl.:e sure that thi';Y lft: ~i'.~$rHt(; \'J\.th the teJ11oition of tht: prC:'i,':Tty, 
aisc. any requireml!nlS, environmental rCI:pi;·i\menr.s, and ail of the tequirlln~;,,:-,r'S lhm the Bt.:yer 
needs to make [::it its ,:\:1(;:: the::1ue 'j. 
Thus. 
closing will be on or before r).:'~::;ir"h(~r ,: L '2CiG7 
4. Title lnstmmce. SeHe~ shaJJ rl:r;;ish Buyer wit!, a $:..:,:;d;l:~: torm "oun;::;.~·· tide 
UlSOf3.!lCe p',licy COVerJ:lg the: real F:-:1P(~;t;. :;ubJecl 10 rh!$ .• g::!e:T!em m thc: amount of :be 
purchase price for the real estate, in 16rm und substance :>:ns:fa.c~Clr;: !(" Buy(:t, Buyer thaI] pay 
fer rhtl title insurance. 
5. Taxes ;!!nd A:lseS5mer.It" Seller shhll pal ali lil."<.!S and assc~;;:::-:iemS including ;'0':::1 and 
pt!r:;olull pr(lpcr:y taxes. througb ;md including the dzlte of clcsi!lg, induding, but not limited roo 
utilities. tele:;.:'i;i:;+r,e, property tax. and pef$onal prope;ry tID! Therci's;ter, after the date of closing. 
Buyet shaH be responsible for all rax;:::;and assessment::;, 
6. Dare of Possessiola. Possession of the real prop.:rty shall b~ delivered 1;) Buyer QCo:tl1 
:hc date of clori.r..~, 
7. Risk of L()s~. 7hz risk of Joss or da:nagt: 10 the rea: pr~;p,;;~ry by t1rc or (it!:.::: casual!y 
is assumed by Buyer as of th~ dale of dosm,IT. • 
8. Instruments of r,r:ansfer. The sales. 2ssignme;.ts. lmc deliveries to he made to Buyer 
pursuant ro this agreement shall be effecred by war;anly deeds, ll!1d otller instruments of transfer 
in such form as Buyer !i.ball reasonably T<.:q1.:eS! Seller shall ptepz.:'¢ tlppropri;ue forms of 
il"struments of transfer nud convey:lm::e ir. cor.formiry with this :1~reemt:n! and sh:tll sUbmir the:n 
10 BJY~l for exam::llltion in lid vance of!he dosing C41c. n\~c~h¢r · .... ·Ith all instruments required to 
be extlcuted by Buyer. At any time aft~'r lle closing date. pn request of a p:t::y the other patty will 
d<l. execute, Ilclmowledgc. and dC!iH::r all such furtb:: aCb. i.ljk\d~, and instruments us mJY be 
required to effect {his Agret.mer.t. 
9. Autbority. Each person executing th:s agre~::m~l't represent:> and Wll..'Tant.s th<lt he liLt> 
authority to do so from or in his respective captu.:i't} as an rndivicbal or as a rnan.aging member or 
direc{()r of the bl,l$ine:;s org:mization t» v;hich h(~ is;l Fit!}' to this agreement 
10. ClosIng. The closing date shall b~ no later Ulan Dct'(;:nber 21 , 2007. or as 5(·(>71 
thereafter llS practicable l!pDn E.;:-'F0'..ul and written consent of both pa:,-:jes. Closing shall take 
place at Alliuncc Ti:Je Compuny in Rigby, ldaho. or al such olher phw;: i:!S the parties shall agree. 
Buyer ""'ill P;J.l ail dosing costs. The atto:ney f,,~!.; associated wlIh preparation of [his 
transaction shall ;;;f; borne by Buyt::r for 8u)'<;r's altOf:lcy rees. {f Sell;;!" has itttof;)ey fe;:;s, thOSt~ 
attorney fees will be bome by the Seller. 
1 L Reprcsentatil}AS of'Seiter. Se!1er represent$,wn.:-::ams, and a;;';::~$ th::t the stuteiTlenlS 
C~)fjtained 1ll this paragraph z:.Tc correct and complete to the best of Selkr's knovAcdge and belief 
as of the dD.t:: of this agree.!llen! and wil! be tr;.<c and (:t);!;0Ct as of the closing date: 
(a) Sdk?: are individuals or c,;orporntc bu~ine.ss or;;:::ni::::a~io.'1s who (.\WIi the properly that is 
being transferred. 
(b) Seller has g:,',d and markembk l.Itle to aU of rhe real ant! pr:rsona.! propts~y being sold 
hereunder. n,t: rea.! and personnJ propr:;r':':; wili be lrce and clear of ull 'l:\(lngael~S. E~,:;;:j, and 
encumbr.lnces at [he time of closing So Seller can dc:lh'er 10 Buyer good and rr.a:-k!!table litl!:!. 
(c) All as'"';.l:) and propertief. char ~e bf:ing con,,::'yed ulld~r this a~;~ement are owned by 
ScHer Imd wil! be free and clear of!lE mortgllgcs. liens, and encumbrance:, ,n the time of do.,ing. 
(d) Se~ler will pay and satisfy ali mortgages, agreecer:.rs, lease or o:ber I'l:!spousibilities to 
which it IS a party at the tIme ofclosin; to allow the prOperly to be cor,vey:::d trom the St:ller w 
Buyer. 
12. Represcntnti(lfls of Buyer. St;y,,;:;, herehy l'ep:re:>cnts t(::1d warrll1ts to Sel1er that: 
{Il) Buyer is an individual or busines') organi2'..ation \ll1der the laws of [he Stat~ of Idaho, 
;.\liTh tull power and authority to ~nler lnlO ~lnd perform its obligations und'~r this agreement. 
(b) The execulion. delivery and ,?::rformancc of the agreement by Buyer have lx:e:l duly 
authoril!ed by its members. rr;;.mager.s or di:'(;t'tors. 
(c) There is no action, arbitration. suii. notice, order. real estate tax contest Dr lega!, 
:ldministrali\le or other proceeding before an}' court Or goverruncrnJ!l agency, amhority OJ body 
pending or to Buyer's knowledge. threatened against or affe.cting Buyer which would prf.~vent or 
interfere whh the transaCliGn~l contemplated by this a;reelr:~r~t. 
1.3. IndemniSitation Provisions for Buyer. Stdle.r agrees to inde:nnirj the Buyer and 
Buyeris officers, directm,L affili:m:s, agents. emplo),ees, s.ucces:$\.)r$ and assigns fm.:n and against 
1hl;l l!lllirety of an)' en:.r;;;;;;, compiai:',::;, actions, SUilS, damages, claims, (.'(}sts, arnmmts paid in 
settlement. r~xe.'l, liens, expenses or fe~s, including all altC~.t:y$' f0.~S and court costs, \.vhid: 
resl.dt fn:;;n, 3:ising cut of, reLit~ to or Me caused by: 
(a) Any ,Tg~terial !;;;-::ach of any of Seller'!; t~;;}resenratio;:", w;lr:-;Lmies and Co',;{~r;ant$ 
conlailled in this Asreement; a.nd 
(0) SeUer's conduct of the busint',:s ;It the preITlj:;~$ l)l"l or prior to tht! clD~ing dale;, 
14. Indcm!'lific~tjDn Provisions f(lr S~!l{'L Buyer agrees to Indemnify the Seller nm1 
Seller's affiliates, agents, employeeS', h~.ltS, personal repre:>ematives. successors and assigns. from 
3nd agOlinst the !:ntirety of any charges, cl.Hnplllints. ;)ctionii, 511JtS, d:unagrs, cl:Un1D. costs, 
ar;;fiunts paid in settlement. tax.es, llt!!lS. t~xpcnsc, Of re~s, illciLldillg all a.ttorncys fees and court 
costs. which result from, arising Otl! at', ,'i!!:He 10 or are::s;.;seQ bY' 
(a) Any material brea;;;h of any of1~uyer's n:presentutions, wa::-rr;:lfi~.s and co\'~,:n;m:s 
c"ntained in this agretlroont: and 
(b) Buyer's conduct of the husiness at the p";;'1'ii~t:~ from and after the closing date. 
15. Orher Indemnification Provisions. The foregoing indemnifIcation provis~.:::;:s are in 
addition to, and not ir. d(:grndariCD of.. any statutory common law r~:1v;dy any party may have for 
breach of represt!nral: 0::. warranty or contract. 
16. Expenses of )\;cgotiutiull ~ll1d Transit-t. Except as mhe,,,yjsc provided in this 
agreement. each P;J.:iy shall PlY the pany'S own t,!xpen~cs_ taxes, am.! other CO!;!:> incident t6 or 
resulting from this agreement, whelhllr 0. not the tn'l."u;actlCl!:l$ cOl'lIempL'llcd h!!reby are 
<;ou:;lImmated. 
17. ;\'otitts. Any notic!! to be g:ven under this 1l;.,;,\':er:1em shall be given in writing and be 
dd[vt.'red pers{ma!ly or by registered or ccrtil'icd mml. postap,c prepaid. to the pu:ty's last known 
addre5s. 
18. Entire Agr{~.·cnJel1t This ae;,c~m~nl. including tnt: exhibits and docwnenrs referred to 
h~rein constiuues the entire agreement berween the p:utie!i and $uperscues an,' prior 
understanding, agreements or representations by or betwe~n the parlleS, written or oral, that may 
have rdated in any .vay to the subjf~;::! matter hereof. This instrument may be executed in one or 
more cOlJnt~rparrs, each of which shall bc deemed M original. but all ofwhiciJ together shall 
constitute one and the same instrument. 
19. Succession. This Agreement shall be binding t,;;tm and inure: to tilt: benefit of the 
pArties llamd herein ar'ld their r~~pectjve. heirs. personal representative, succ.e~sors and assigns. 
Page 4 
16. Grtfcrnirlg Law. Thi:; Abn:~r:;";'fll ,;;h:liJ be gu\'~:rned J..nd cons:::";I:J in :::~';;:(;,d;.t;H':;: 
will! thr laws of the State of ld;';l.ho, 
he ~;:a~id !.£:"il:i.~$'S :,nc s{unc bz: ~:n ;li1-::i l1"t~ No \\~aiv¢r by an:' p'ar:y of' 
any derault, misrepresentation c! hreach of wam;-,:y ;)f coven;:;;;,; ;"'ereundei, whether intentional 
O~ rt01, shsll be decIT'::!u 10 extt:nd to :;m)' pnor OT subsi':pent default. misre~r;;:i;e11tat'i{)n, or br~ac:h 
of W~lfr;tr::y 01 CO\'c~",a.'1l hereunder or effect in d.:l}WUy any rights arising by yinue of 'l'::;; prior (1r 
sub:iequ~m ~uch OCCU:'Tenct. 
l2. Se\,c:-sbUlry. Any term or p~';)vislon of this Agreem<:nt that is inwtlid or 
unenforceable under Ia\\l in any situation ill :my ::c,r;:,petent juri:;dicrj,:m shaH not :lffeCl tile 
':aUdIT}' or ;;:nfi)r(;~:'lbility Ofih!! remaining lerms m:d prov:sw:F; hereofM the validity or 
e:~force3bili{y of 6ee cffe:;di.'1s tt:m1 or pronsions in a.ny mhc:r sil~aliut1 or in JIll' other 
compe1Clj, jurisd:ctioll. If ~he final judgmenl or a coun of compete!:l jurj~djcti(jn dcdar~!> that :my 
term or F,;yvisioll be:rt()J is invalid (IT unenfe:r:::abh.:. the )Xlrti;:::; ~igc,~';: thlt lh~ ;:;'iJl1 ma.king tht.! 
del;>.r;n~l1alion af :nvaJidilY or unenl::>fce.'.lbili,y Sh'1H have the powe;' 7;0 ref,'j::li the seopt"'. duration 
or area of the !:::::7T, or provisions, to dt:h!te specific wo:ds ..JT ,;:Jhra:;c4, or tQ replace any Iliv;1ild ()r 
,ll1cnforceabie term or prov1:>k'n3 ,vitr. a tc::m iJf provisiN! tbat :s '.:dld and (mft;tco:::abie. and !lUll 
comes closer to e){!'n:ssing !.he. ime;),lj:)tIS of the invalid or cd!r;,'::niorceabje· term or ;:.:-nvisiun, and 
this Agreement shali be e:H~m.~(:;1bic as $" n)odified after fIle e~"piration of tim~ within which 
judgment may be appe~led, 
2J. A.l'ttrneys fet'$. TIle pn:vailinr; party in any action to e::fotce this <'l&;:ecment shall be 
entitled to ret.:over it:; reasonable a.ttorneys fce:; and costs, 
24. Attj}r11~' ReprC1ieI,tatioD. B:J)'eT and S,;;Uer rt'~k::::n,,,ledge (,hat !hh agr~<::;;;e:::;t has 
been prep1;~.a by attorneys for the Buyet, Seikr n3s the right to f.-:!prel':!marion by t.heir 0\-"'0 
counsel, and is nol rely ing t;;xm Buyer Ct Buyer'S couns:;! in Jltgo!ia!ing this agre\!rocSlt or in 
t!xccu:ing this agreement. Selkr is not relying 0:1 Buyer ilr B\1yer'~ i:lttOt";)cy!>any 
representJtio:'l ;)f }rmr or fllC! 110! containt:J in this agreem(7,nt, 
25. CtH1ithlli!~ttlcie$' BUyer and St.'iI~r agree ::hal Buyer intends tD Cr!'veiop the proper~~: 
~old uude: this a.fr~~cment. Seiler's property CaJUlO: be dn'e)opl!d without tti'} adjacent property 
!;:nO\\ll a:; the Clark property, ;t"d sak~ here}n at::.: 
~)b.li.bi::.ti-;:,ln ~iJ c~o.se \vtth $ lnc the e'~0;:~t tT.d:;;uey v~;;.l.i be f~t~t?lc;j lz"i Thr! cloSing date 
i>elween Burer :tnd Clark ,"viH be schedllied ,'Jt the sam~ tmm as the el,}sing date herein, 
The pames ",ckn(lwledge ID:1t tim:: is (.If the eS::;tmG'('~ In th(; cCtrplelicn of this lihiJ1:lt:T"e,;t 
and that fading to t~c,rr;p!ete this agreement in J rimely fashion wOl1ld he a breach of that rime of 
(he essence. 
Dated: 
State of Idaho 
C(lunt~ of .feHer'son 
) 
j 
• ~."" •• ,~,. _.y"' • 
., ...... ji" 
l .... _._ 
On this . _______ . <lay nf;\ UgH;;!. :!007, befon: me, n ''lorar} Public: in and t()r said :>tak. 
personally appt'al'ed .laramie' \·lagel':l., knowll It' 1lH: to be ;1 Man;fg:ing fv1emha of Bllkll P;,q)ertic~. 
LLC and the pcr::;on whm;c ni}[':1'~ iS~!lh$crihc:d 10 rhl: \\ illlin inslrtlllH:llL und :1l;knt1wfcdgcd to ill,' til;)! 
he executed (he same, 
In vdlness wf;c:·~rtl'. J ha\'(; h\.'r';;';~:",:l !':c-l my hafld end ;l/'fixc(i In)' 01;;;:1: seal. 111(;' d~ty alld yCill' 
in this document fint above wriHe-lI 
., .. ~~{t£L~J. .J/' 
NOllld Publi<Y f 
. l v 
(L~::;~itring.: rA.t-t,t'" <~;~~'" .... ) C.r,!:'t!.,'"f""'l)-·o.!· 
Tt;r:n Expires: FGS' D&." ."2.L;;2. 
011 this _____ . day PI' A,ugm;t, 2007, bcfi1J'ic me. ,1 ";C!;\.')' Public in tmd 1'(,1' said Sl,m~, 
personalJyappeared Angus Jerry P¢t~rsCiIl tllld Bett:' .11.:"<111 PC1Cr~',m, known 10 H1\:.' W hI: the plTs'm:; 
whose n;.H1'(;5 are subscribed to the within instrument. and adnowbdged W HW that he: ('.xc,'utcd thl~ 
:~arnc_ 
111 witness wlK:-n;t,l( J ha .... e lten:u!lw Sct my hand 'I!ld affixnl my offj(,~ sc:aL lhe d,l), and year 
in fhis document first af:wv(: wrip>;:;l. 
~, ,#" 
<.~".<." ...... ~. ,l ,./ {: ;. f d:~~, ::.1.: 
{~mmjssionersi"C~bnsid~fl~9possible ;toning. chdng~~i:~ 
,r'- . . . ". llnpact areas':),~:;~';<;" ' ~:iIig ' ~? S,'lt.isfY:}he I\e~osoftlle come' . 
By REB~CCA SQUIRES .",. . T1W, re~~llt}V9,\~4 .1:>¢ that qn~:~<;rr; : l:Ulp.1J\rq».'ltlw~\~}l:rflP1)11~ g~lVen~.II?-~I1- : 
. il to T\leJeff.ers~n Sta.r , /'.: .1.0.' ts .. w. :91l. l.d.: . ; .~e ..\!p~{mltted il.e ar 'CitieS; ". tal reso. w.·ces;'.a,nd. t,h .. . ~ p.' ~'8. se1.v . atJo. '1 o. t .,:; 
Spec a . . .. , .; ~ncjfiy~:a~f~ "P' woul,d be the S(\\I1-. . ~gnculrnra.qanplU11il pOjJlJlatton, cei~7'<; 
... '. ' . ,',' \ :dari:! furth~~ lhl.q the cQunty. : -' , tel'S and serV1<;c,s can gro~ 0l]1 to. those ." 
Jefferson County d~velopels PlaY>.!, " :The goal, \\ccording to County ·· "reas . . ~ ' :' . . :. . . . .' 
sQ<,)J1 . ~ave to ch~ge th~ way thyy .. : ~9IDIni~sioner13rett Qlaveson. i~ to . ~u~1:!~c:;s~~~plac~)ess demarlfl pn 
builcim spme p~s of t?e county. · . " ": i\duevc;; bal~W~~ gmwth. . . ~erVwe& .• ?\ ~M$~,< .law enforce.menl, 
. At 1a1?~wyek s n~ee~g, ~he Jeffel- i . '. "I don'r\a\oof any ol:\lel' way to sclW01s;,':\i!i11s1)QrlatIon, and utJUtl.es, 
SOnSOljIlty ~?nlIDlSSIOn di~cu~sed a.\qiSGO,~lf~1~wgr4 1:\1 ill ou9Yin,g ll(,ea~ e:;,(pWn~4, C9~lI1ty Clerk Chnstll1e 
possible zonmg change . for !he .. \ Qther tlim'l a'reZO\le,"Qlaveson salc1.. 13011!tec ::' ' ' . . .' 
cOlmty. Last month, a pubhc4emmg ' :\ '.' . 'Baliuice<lgip'f(ili cO[lsists of three, . . 0,11 Uw Qt4e~ hand~ servH;es~ost~ 
was held to :o)ddress ilia pr~posed zone '. thUlgS, a.ccmdlng to Ohweson: '. c\ (or hom~8wn9rs gene~~!y t'<x;ceed Hl~ 
~h?1.lge. U~der the p!opo~~l,. l~1. zo.r\~ .+ pe.qlthY, .¢omw~r¢i~l s~qO{ ! nWt P!'9-. i t:v<.e~ ~le¥ P~y/ And, CO~U1ty Q~fi91lils 
mg m eqstem Jefferson .~QljIlty WOl~14 '1 vides a sMug taxi base; enough hous- \ S '., E-7 0 N I N G PAGE 3 ':",:' 
be reduced and refocused near City : .' , 1\. ' . . E, "" ;~1 .. , ..... . ' " ', 
;: , " 
•.•. 1!L ........ _ •.••.. __ ._ .~._.~ _ __ ._ .. _. __ . _ .• . ___ ~.-_.~_ _ _ _"._w _ . ___ _ .. ..-.-.. ~ 
Exhibit "e" 
\ ,; N EWS · 1ftt~~ 'Ej:ft~R~9,N.·'~t~,~iJ;P.~¥.~¥~B,~~'~t9'I~!~Q~7. H :r ( . . . , ........ ..... ., ., .. . .. .. "." . , ... .. 
- ZONING / from pag~ 1, .. , !, ... ;i\ 
. . ; i : .' .• ' .. \ . -':,: . .", .,,; :::,;:;-.; :; ·,;f::,::;:: \' . <,. 
agree that .r effe.rson County needs the change i.9 z~ni!1g co'ulq;sl0;V: . ' "YV y 've gt9,wn f.~~th · thap.. Ql\r ~ .:W~\l;~~i,9 ~e.~fil}gs~\1Jr yUll~l!W>" 
more commercIal growth. growth, but tl:ey r~ !lot s\lr~ that. s .. 1llfra~tnl~tll1e,~ : saY~~9ynt{at~pr-_!;;:.;:~~~,!l)~.etl~~~: ; . . , . . .. .. . . . 
"Wh:\t .l don't want to see," Olave- such a b~d thing . . " . ney Robm Dunn. . . . ·.'} ':>~TI~ery ha~ been a qlSCUSSlq~~~~i:;;.\~ 
son said, "is nothing but houses "Zo~g the county 1D 11 manner W'ater a~~d s~wer .services ~ . as :.:\I~.~g.~~lflng yei),tral sewer sys~el~I,s.:i~!}.;~1'f.~ ~~~.sW!?' 
when I enterJefferson County. We that wlll encourage balanced well as traffiC congeshon, have bee ',the county and the bene r . ., ...., . , 
want people to live here, work growth m~y slow40wn th:e cllm~nt corne a major,issue in tlle.cQunty . ) tli~y\Voulq provide to tpe 
here, and spend money here." rate of residential growth," saId ' . F0n11erly, developei:s could' use ,; .,s'aiq ·J?h'mnmg 8? ZoiVllg 
At last month's publiG hearil1g, Olaveson. "But it will q-e\lte con- a nutrient-pathogeq Sh)dy (NPS) to . .:trato(l)aNiel Jose. ' . . 
developers ,md landownefs largely ditions that wUl favor a healthier just~fy higher housing densities if ; . . · ''.TI~~ , <;(j,mIl1i~s.io!1ers 
<;lisagreed with the zoning changes. long-term growth, An approach to the study in~licated t'le soil could 'qJ,)e~t¢(Lt\lat ; "'f:la!lki\il. ( 
Many felt the reduction of R 1 managed growth that preserves handle the ll1creased number 'of .! :l)J3Q c(ll:ne:tq ~ mee~lllg . 
zones will stifle growth and take outlying properties until infra- septic systems. . ':: V;lfkt,h~ e~hlsa:tiQn to.~h~ >cWW\;!..l,~tr.' 
away landowners' abilities to gain struc~ure c&n be provid~d may ~o- Uqder the purpoS\!~ c\l\\I~ge, ~ ~~~l}Y~S' ~~1d.I.'~7'-Poa,rd 
the 1l;IOSt from their property. incidentally also pr~sf}ive . or . however, the NPS coulg. b!! ~sed to I t6.:qelp' t~s .. make betterOt;H:;lllU~ 
. Chainnan Tad Hegsted has sug- e)f.tend business opp6rtum,ties for· reqvUje larger lot siZeS,9L\t ll<;lt juS- '\ Jh\s' ;;ni~tt~~" '. We also'.· . 
gested forming a committee of many of the best develop~rs.'~ tify :smaUer ones . · ;; .h:~y.r~g :· ~·: v.enp.(jr ~4at 
volunteers. representing ~evelop- . The zoning ~hange ~s Jus,ton,e. ~hp change. also . 1~~icatvs a :qt~#~:;)!lf,§lf.steI:ris . to.: 
ers , government, planmng and of the ways Jefferson Courty Offl- cQIwern that county of (1 pals share :JY~l9.lj.W~ a.pqllt ~\l~ new ~CCl!lllll\,l 
zoning and builders to review the cials are trying to. get a h4!l,dle on witll many residents: the growing : lh~q~availllPle," ~\leSa) 
proposal. . ' ,the county's unprec\::oented, nUIf\bfr of wells and ':?~pti¢ s.ys- ,i !:,:;j:~'~Md~_s :ewloring tl, 
l.."... Olaveson fears that wonldn t growth. .:. . tems ; p.cross eastern ' Jefferson <"f~Rtt~Vse~e.tsysternsl 
k..:. worl\ because those on the com- Recently ,county C0Ill1ws~l2ne Cou~ty . , ',; ~~~::~~~Wlp.q~iilg aLe 
I ~ .. ~ntttee would look out ~or t~lebe~t ers ma~e aChauge to &n 9Ip1UfHl~e ~lg~ water tables, a growlllg ,,: 9W1~~UmprQY~ment r . mterests of those who hve 10 their ~hat. wI.ll pre.Y~nt d\'lve~op~.rs frOl!l POPUWlOll, and the clo~e proxlQ1- 0: ; }rrn~i,+~.sJP'< ,' wi!l . 
: part of the county ., . J~stlfymg ~maUer lot~ Wit\) -llld~~ lty 0f\ wells ano: septt<; systems ' r(;9~'nly! s turrelit 
\ . Cqunty COmnl1SSlOners agree Vidual septic systems , . have PIOmnt~rI 1T>,,~I,' .... -. . . . 
\ , 
January 3, 2008 
BUKU Properties, LLC 
Jaramie C. Magera 
Judd A. Ball 
P.O. Box 506 
Rigby,ID 83442 
Re: Loan Commitment 





This letter is in regards to the purchase of ground currently owned by Raoel H. Clark and Janet C. 
Clark whose address is 268 N. 4100 E., Rigby, ID 83442. Your Joan was conditionally approved as 
of November 20, 2007. One of the conditions of your loan approval is a completed appraisal 
showing adequate value for the property. As of December 10,2007, Kelley Real Estate Appraisers, 
Inc. completed an appraisal on Parcel 2 which contains 78.19 acres of bare ground. Included in the 
appraisal was an addendum of condition that stated the value was valid only if Jefferson County were 
to grandfather the property to allow it to be zoned as R -1 Residential. Further, the appraiser 
indicates that if the property were to be zoned as R-5, the property value would be decreased and the 
evaluation they completed would be null and void. In order for The Bank of Commerce to fund the 
loan as agreed, we must receive verification from Jefferson County that this property will remain 
zoned 'R -1 Resi dential. 
Please contact me at (208)552-0674 if you have questions or cuncerns regarding this matter. 
Sincerely, ,_.,_ 
~~-.,~.--,.-",/ ,'/ , /./ ,--
W'" - C/ 
Jeromy L. Hart 
AVP 
P.O. Box 1887 0 idaho Falls, Idaho 83403 0 (208) 523-2020 
Exhibit "E" 
2 ()() 7 
.E>~ 'PUJ~e~~h #6. 
PO Box 506 
652 North 4116 East 
Rigb)" fD 83442 
Telephone(208)74S-7996/F'ax (208)745-5201 
Buku Properties, LLC and Raoel ~'Lgree tha.t ""lith the recent zone 
, borh parties need additional time to reviC'\.\' the contract. Because of 
the County Commissioner's recent proposed county··wide zone change, result-
ing in this property potentially being zoned R-S. The appraiser and the bank 
deaLing'v;ith Buku Properties, LLC have legitimate: concerns with finane, 
ing. \Vc: 




t: () IT.I ~)'v C () L1 :r frC)f(} 
We will continue to talk and cooperate with each other. 
- " 
/ 
Buku Properties, LtC 
Raoe! H. Clark 
Jflflel C. Clark 
I , 
Exhibit "F" 
;:'Q~I '§;~ ~~~ #1), 
PO Box 506 
652 North 4116 East 
~"':f.l'~~~~~~1 Rigby> ID 83442 
- -~.r.~. Telephone(208)74S-7996/ Fax (208)745-5201 
December 18, 2007 
Buku Properties, LLC and A. Jerry Peterson 2l.gree that \vith the , ecent county 
zone change , both parties need additional time to review the contract. Be-
cause of the County Commissioner's recent proposed county-wide zone 
change, resulting in this property potentially being zoned R-S . The appraiser 
and the bank dealing with Buku Properties, LLC have legitimate concerns with 
financing. We agree to move our dosing date back from December 21 ) 2007, 
to March 1, 2008 , We will continue to talk and cooperate with each other. 
D d j






Angus Jerry Peterson 
Dated: 
Betty Jean Peterson 
/ i\U , I, i Ii ~ . 
DU1~N LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
Telephone: (201:lF 45· \1202 
Decembe; 19. 2()O~ 
Buku Properties, LLC 
clo Jeremy Magera 
P.O. Box 506 
Rigby, 10 83442 
ROBN D. DU~l\: 
PC;-";"'r· NC)RTH SH.". U. 
A\:fF.LL-\ :\. SHEETS 
P.O Ben; 27'7 
47~ Pka,anr C(}lmrrj Lant· 
fugb\.', Idaho 83442·U277 
",mat!: rdunn@;dllnnlawofficcs.com 
Rc: Jerry and Berry Peterson; Raoel <lnd .Tanet Clark 
Dear Mr. Magera, agent: 
Exhibit "G" 
It is my understanding that you are the managing member of Buku Properties, LLC. Our law 
finn represents Jerry and Berty Peterson along with Raoe! and Janet Clark. As you are 
aware, they both have a purchase: and sale agreement that was to be finalized with full 
payment on December 2 J, 2007. My clients expect performance on this contract and desire 
to complete the sale pursuant to the terms of the agreement. 
We believe that any alterations, changes or modifications could severely impair our clients' 
best interests and the contract in question. 
Any third parry actions by other individuals have nothing to do with the contract in question. 
A5 such, demand is: hereby made to close on Decernbt:r 21.. 1Cf07 [,0, b(1th set.:;. ofn'lY clients 
and to have the sum paid in full. 
In the event you (:hoose not to close, my clients \vould declare the contract in default. keep 
the proceeds placed as earnest money and either sue lor the balance or sue for specific 
performance. By virtue of this letter, my clients are not waiving any other remedies which 
may be available pursuant to contract or Idaho la\v. 
In the event of litigatiorl, we would seek all attorney fees, court costs along with the 
contractual arrangement for principal and interest contained therein. 
:.i~C-d~~Y' (, 
/ l ~ \ 
I 1 / ~.' j ~~ /'.,.--+ .. 
., • ' ••• ¥ •• __ .... ........ . 
Robin D. Dunn, Esq. . 
DUNN LA W OFFfCES. PLLC 
c: jerry and Bettv Peterson 
Ra,;..:i and Ja~et Clark 
The! W. Casper. Esq. 
GCllcral Counscl 
Exhibit "H" 
VIA FACSIMILE AN D 
CERTIFIED MAIL 
Robin D. Dunn . Esq. 
Dunn Law Offices, PLLC 
PO Box 277 
Rigby, Idaho 83442-0277 
June 17, 2008 
1'0 Box 51298 
Idaho Falls. Idaho 83405 
901 Pier View Drive. Sili te 20 I 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 
Tcl: 208-523-3794 
Fax : 208-227-0445 
Email : tcasrer@balfvcntun:s.com 
Re: Buku Properties, LLC - Jerry and Betty Peterson; Raoel and Janet Clark 
Dear Mr. Dunn: 
I am general counsel at Ball Ventures, LLC and often act as counsel to various Ball family 
entities induding Buku Properties, LLC ("Buyer"). I understand that you are counsel to Jerry and 
Betty Peterson and to Raoel and Janet Clark (collectively "Sellers"). 
r have reviewed the two Purchase and Sale Agreements, both originally dated August 30, 
2007, between the Buyer and the Sellers (the "Agreements"). I have also reviewed the following 
correspondence pertaining to the Agreements: (i) December 18, 2007 memoranda from the Buyer 
to the Sellers registering the Buyer's ohjection to the zoning of the property and offering to extend 
the closing date to March I, 2008; and (ii) December 19,2007 letter from you on behalf of the 
Sellers to the Buyer rejecting the Buyer's off~r to extend the closing date and demanding closing on 
December 21,2007. 
From my review of the Purchase and Sale Agreements, it is dear that (a) all but $1 0,000.00 
of the Buyer's earnest money was refundable until closing under Section 2, and (b) the Buyer's 
obligation to purchase the properties was subject to a four-month due diligence period and Buyer's 
satisfaction with the condition of the properties under Section 3. It is further evident that (i) the 
Buyer' s memoranda of December 18 constituted its objection to the condition of the properties and 
an ofTer to extend the closing date to permit the Sellers an opportunity to cure, and Oi) your letter of 
December 19 constituted a rejection of Buycr's ofter and effected a termination of the Agreements. 
Therefore, demand is hereby made f(}[ a return to the Buyer of tamest moncy in the amount 
of$342,000.00. Ifsuch sum is not promptly refunded, the Buyer will pursue its available remedies 
I 
l '<. 
Robin D. Dunn, Esq. 
June 17,2008 
Page 2 
under contract, at law or in equity. Please confirm that you are authorized to accept service of 
process on behalf of the Sellers. If the Sellers wish to pursue any legal action against the l:3uycrs, 
Charles A. f1.orner at Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.c., as litigation counsel for the Buyers, 
is authorized to accept service of process on behalf of the Buyers. 
Please let me know as soon as possible how YOllr clients intend to proceed. Thank you. 
Sincerely, 
~-- --. .-'~ .' ,.--:------''- ."/~ Ft .. J '-1\,,; 
V 
Thel \V. Casper 
c: Jaramie Magera (via email) 
Charles A. Homer, Esq. (via email) 
F:'TW(~ I 0I6·()(i2\f)"nn icttcr,2flOS061 ( •. wp<J 
Charles A. Homer, Esq. (ISB No. 1630) 
DeAnne Casperson, Esq. (ISB No. 6698) 
HOLDEN KIDWELL HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C. 
P.O. Box 50130 
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
Telephone: (208) 523-0620 
Facsimile: (208) 523-9518 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
; ',' .' ;-.., 
~ ! .. , 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRlCT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON 
BUKU PROPERTIES, LLC, an Idaho 
limited liability company, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
RAOEL H. CLARK and JANET C. 
CLARK, husband and wife; ANGUS 
JERRY PETERSON and BETTY JEAN 
PETERSON, husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
RAOEL H. CLARK and JANET C. 
CLARK, husband and wife; ANGUS 
JERRY PETERSON and BETTY JEAN 
PETERSON, husband and wife, 
Counter-Plaintiffs, 
v. 
BUKU PROPERTIES, LLC, an Idaho 
limited liability company, 
Counter-Defendants. 
1 - NOTICE OF HEARlNG 
Case No. CV-08-941 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE, that on the 9th day of November, 2009, at 3:30 p.m., or as 
soon thereafter as counsel can be heard, at the Jefferson County Courthouse in Rigby, Idaho, 
before the Honorable Gregory W. Moeller, Plaintiff Buku Properties, LLC, in the above-
entitled action will call up for hearing its Motion for Summary Judgment. 
2 - NOTICE OF HEARING 
! 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this ~y of October, 2009, I served a copy ofthe following 
described pleading or document on the attorneys listed below by hand delivering, by mailing 
or by facsimile, with the correct postage thereon, a true and correct copy thereof. 
DOCUMENT SERVED: 
ATTORNEYS SERVED: 
Robin D. Dunn 
477 Pleasant Country Lane 
P.O. Box 277 
Rigby, ID 83442 
G:\ WPDAT A\CAHI 1491 SIPldgslHearing.NOT.wpd 
3 - NOTICE OF HEARING 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
( ~irst Class Mail 
( ) jiand Delivery 
( ;; Facsimile 
( ) Overnight Mail 
Charles A. Homer, Esq. (ISB No. 1630) 
DeAnne Casperson, Esq. (ISB No. 6698) 
HOLDEN KIDWELL HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.c. 
P.O. Box 50130 
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
Telephone: (208) 523-0620 
Facsimile: (208) 523-9518 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRlCT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON 
BUKU PROPERTIES, LLC, an Idaho 
limited liability company, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
RAOEL H. CLARK and JA~T£T C. 
CLARK, husband and wife; ANGUS 
JERRY PETERSON and BETTY JEAN 
PETERSON, husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
RAOEL H. CLARK and JANET C. 
CLARK, husband and wife; ANGUS 
JERRY PETERSON and BETTY JEAN 
PETERSON, husband and wife, 
Counter-Plaintiffs, 
v. 
BUKU PROPERTIES, LLC, an Idaho 
limited liability company, 
Counter-Defendants. 
Case No. CV-08-941 
NOTICE VACATING HEARING AND 
RESETTING HEARING ON 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
I - Notice Vacating Hearing and Resetting Hearing on Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Plaintiff Buku Properties, LLC vacates the hearing 
on its Motion for Summary Judgment scheduled for November 9,2009 at 3:30 p.m. and 
rescheduled for December 14,2009 at 1 :30 p.m. at the Jefferson County Courthouse in 
Rigby, Idaho, before the Honorable GregoryW. Moeller. 
2 - Notice Vacating Hearing and Resetting Hearing on Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this lLtta'ay of October, 2009, I served a copy of the 
following described pleading or document on the attorneys listed below by hand 




Robin D. Dunn 
Amelia A. Sheets 
Dunn Law Offices 
477 Pleasant Country Lane 
P.O. Box 277 
Rigby, ID 83442 
G·IWPDATAICAH\149181PIdgsISJ.HRG Vac.NOTwpd 
NOTICE VACATING HEARING AND 
RESETTING HEARING ON PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
( 0irst Class Mail 
( ) ]Jand Delivery 
( vf Facsimile 
( ) Overnight Mail 
DeAnne Casperson, Esq. 
3 - Notice Vacating Hearing and Resetting Hearing on Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment 
DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC. 
Robin D. Dunn, Esq., ISB #2903 
Amelia A. Sheets, Esq., ISB #5899 
477 Pleasant Country Lane 
P. O. Box 277 
Rigby, ID 83442 
(208) 745-9202 (t) 
(208) 745-8160 (f) 
Attorneys for Defendants 
---
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON 
BUKU PROPERTIES, LLC an Idaho 
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RAOEL H. CLARK and JANET C. 
CLARK, husband and wife; ANGUS 
JERRY PETERSON and BETTY JEAN 
PETERSON, husband and wife, 
Counter-Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
BUKU PROPERTIES, LLC an Idaho 
Limited liability company; and 

















Case No. CV-08-941 
DENIAL OF PLAINTIFF'S 
REQUEST FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AND OBJECTION 
TO CONSIDERATION OF 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
COMES NOW, these answering co-defendants/ counter-plaintiffs, by and through 
OBJECTION-l-
the undersigned attorney, and object to the plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and 
request that summary judgment be denied based upon the affidavit(s) of these answering 
defendants filed simultaneous herewith. The basis for the denial and of the objection of 
these answering co-defendants/ counter-plaintiffs are that questions offact and of law 
preclude the entry of summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs . 
. ,) 
DATED this _,-I .-£.'1_ day of November, 2009. 
Robin D. Dunn, Esq. 
DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
j""J 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the I ;:; day of November, 2009, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing was delivered to the following person( s) by: 
__ Hand Delivery 
~ Postage-prepaid mail 
F acsimile Transmission 
DeAnne Casperson, Esq. 
P.O. Box 50130 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
Robin D. Dunn, Esq. 
DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
Courtesy Copy: Judge Gregory Moeller 
Madison County Courthouse 
P.O. Box 389 
Rexburg, ID 83440 
OBJECTION-2-
DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC. 
Robin D. Dunn, Esq., ISB #2903 
Amelia A. Sheets, Esq., ISB #5899 
477 Pleasant Country Lane 
P. O. Box 277 
Rigby, ID 83442 
(208) 745-9202 (t) 
(208) 745-8160 (f) 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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RAOEL H. CLARK and JANET C. 
CLARK, husband and wife; ANGUS 
JERRY PETERSON and BETTY JEAN 
PETERSON, husband and wife, 
Counter-Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
BUKU PROPERTIES, LLC an Idaho 
Limited liability company; and 

















MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT -1-




COMES NOW, these answering co-defendants/ counter-plaintiffs, by and through 
the undersigned attorney, and MOVE the above-entitled court for summary judgment on 
the issue of liability pursuant to 1.R.c.P., Rule 56 as follows: 
(c) Motion for Summary Judgment and Proceedings Thereon. The motion, 
affidavits and supporting brief shall be served at least twenty-eight (28) days before the time 
fixed for the hearing. If the adverse party desires to serve opposing affidavits the party must 
do so at least 14 days prior to the date of the hearing. The adverse party shall also serve an 
answering brief at least 14 days prior to the date of the hearing. The moving party may 
thereafter serve a reply brief not less than 7 days before the date of the hearing. The 
judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions 
on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A 
summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of liability 
alone although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages. Such judgment, when 
appropriate, may be rendered for or against any party to the action. The court may alter or 
shorten the time periods and requirements of this rule for good cause shown, may continue 
the hearing, and may impose costs, attorney fees and sanctions against a party or the party's 
attorney, or both. 
IRCP Rule 56, Summary judgment 
------------ Excerpt from page 155. 
DATED this 
:.......--::;; 
/5 day of November, 2009. 
/->.----" 
~C,.jG,~ 
Robin D. Dunn, Esq. 
DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT -2-
II 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
-0 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the I:; day of November, 2009, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing was delivered to the following person( s) by: 
__ Hand Delivery 




DeAnne Casperson, Esq. 
P.O. Box 50130 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
Robin D. Dunn, Esq. 
DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
Courtesy Copy: Judge Gregory Moeller 
Madison County Courthouse 
P.O. Box 389 
Rexburg, ID 83440 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT -3-
i 1 
DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC. 
Robin D. Dunn, Esq., ISB #2903 
Amelia A. Sheets, Esq., ISB #5899 
477 Pleasant Country Lane 
P. O. Box 277 
Rigby, ID 83442 
(208) 745-9202 (t) 
(208) 745-8160 (f) 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
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BUKU PROPERTIES, LLC an Idaho 
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RAOEL H. CLARK and JANET C. 
CLARK, husband and wife; ANGUS 
JERRY PETERSON and BETTY JEAN 
PETERSON, husband and wife, 
Counter-Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
BUKU PROPERTIES, LLC an Idaho 
Limited liability company; and 

















Case No. CV-08-941 
MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS 
OF MAGERA AFFIDAVIT 
MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF MAGERA AFFIDAVIT - 1 -
COMES NOW, the co-defendants/ counter-plaintiffs, by and through the 
undersigned attorney, and hereby move to strike portions of the Magera Affidavit 
(paragraphs as numbered below) for the following reasons: 
16. Speculation and hearsay; 
17. Speculation and hearsay; 
18. Speculation and hearsay; 
19. The county is not a party and is irrelevant, the newspaper article is hearsay and 
not reflective of the actual administrative proceedings; 
20. Speculation and hearsay; 
21. A) The bank's representative statements are hearsay, his opinion is irrelevant and 
the conversations are hearsay; 
B) Conversations are hearsay and the letter attached as Exhibit D is hearsay. 
24. Speculation and hearsay. Defendants did not know of the thought process of 
plaintiff. 
Other: Exhibits E and F are self-serving documents which were not agreed upon nor 
signed by defendants and should be stricken. 
'< DATED this _1..,.."-,,,,,,--_ day of November, 2009. 
Robin D. Dunn, Esq. \../ 
DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF MACERA AFFIDAVIT-2-
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 13 day of November, 2009, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing was delivered to the following person(s) by: 
__ Hand Delivery 
~ Postage-prepaid mail 
Facsimile Transmission 
DeAnne Casperson, Esq. 
P.O. Box 50130 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
Robin D. Dunn, Esq. 
DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
Courtesy Copy: Judge Gregory Moeller 
Madison County Courthouse 
P.O. Box 389 
Rexburg, ID 83440 
MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF MACERA AFFIDAVIT-3-
I 
l 
DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC. 
Robin D. Dunn, Esq., ISB #2903 
Amelia A. Sheets, Esq., ISB #5899 
477 Pleasant Country Lane 
P. O. Box 277 
Rigby, ID 83442 
(208) 745-9202 (t) 
(208) 745-8160 (f) 
Attorneys for Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON 
BUKU PROPERTIES, LLC an Idaho 










RAOEL H. CLARK and JANET C. ) 
CLARK, husband and wife; ANGUS ) 
JERRY PETERSON and BETTY JEAN ) 





RAOEL H. CLARK and JANET C. 
CLARK, husband and wife; ANGUS 
JERRY PETERSON and BETTY JEAN 
PETERSON, husband and wife, 
Counter-Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
BUKU PROPERTIES, LLC an Idaho 
Limited liability company; and 

















Case No. CV-08-941 
DEFENDANTS'MEMORANDOUM 
RE: SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
MEMORANDUM OF PLAINTIFF-l -
COMES NOW, these answering co-defendants/ counter-plaintiffs, by and through 
the undersigned attorney, and submit this memorandum in opposition to the Plaintiff's 
Motion for Summary Judgment and in support of the Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment on the issue of liability: 
LEGAL STANDARD 
This Court is required to review a motion for summary judgment by applying the 
following standard: 
Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, affidavits, 
and discovery documents on file with the court, read in the light 
most favorable to the nonmoving party, demonstrate no 
material issue of fact such that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law. The burden of proving the 
absence of material facts is upon the moving party. The 
adverse party, however, "may not rest upon the mere 
allegations or denials of his pleadings, but his response, by 
affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth 
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." In 
other words, the moving party is entitled to a judgment when 
the nonmoving party fails to make a showing sufficient to 
establish the existence of an element essential to that party's 
case on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. 
Baxter v. Craney, 135 Idaho 166, 170, 16 P.3d 263, 266 (2000) (citations omitted). The Court 
should "liberally construe the record in favor of the party opposing the motion for summary 
judgment, drawing all reasonable inferences and conclusions supported by the record in 
favor of that party. Walker v. Hollinger, 132 Idaho 172, 175, 968 P.2d 661, 664 (1998). 
Notwithstanding, the following also applies to the case herein: 
[W] hen a motion for summary judgment which has been 
properly supported with evidence indicating the absence of 
material factual issues, the burden shifts to the non-moving 
party to make a showing of the existence of a genuine material 
fact which would preclude summary judgment. This standard 
of review is not affected by the fact that both parties have filed 
motions for summary judgment. Rather, each motion must be 
MEMORANDUM OF PLAINTIFF-2-
separately considered on its own merits, with the court drawing 
all reasonable inferences against the party whose motion is 
under consideration. 
Treasure Valley Gastroenterology Specialists, P.A., v. Woocs, 135 Idaho 485, 488-489 20 P.3d 
21, 24-25 (2001). 
Idaho law is very clear on the standard used in summary judgment proceedings 
that has been cited in numerous cases. That initial standard is as follows: 
Summary judgment should be granted if no genuine issue as to any material 
fact is found to exist after the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits 
have been construed in a light most favorable to the party opposing the 
summary judgment motion. Salmon Rivers Sportsman Camps, Inc. v. Cessna 
Aircraft Co., 97 Idaho 348, 544 P.2d 306 (1975). 
Thereafter, the court follows often cited points, as follows: 
If the court determines, after a hearing on a motion for summary judgment, 
that no genuine issues of material fact exist, the court may enter judgment for 
the parties it deems entitled to prevail as a matter of law. Barlows, Inc. v. 
Bannock Cleaning Corp., 103 Idaho 310, 647 P.2d 766 (Ct. App. 1982). 
In summary judgment proceedings the facts are to be liberally construed in 
favor of the party opposing the motion, who is also to be given the benefit of 
all favorable inferences which might be reasonable drawn from the evidence. 
Smith v. Idaho State Federal Credit Union, 103 Idaho 245, 646 P.2d 1016 (Ct. 
App.1982). 
When a party moves for summary judgment, the initial burden of establishing 
the absence of a genuine issue of material fact rests with that party. Thompson 
v. City of Idaho Falls, 126 Idaho 527, 887 P.2d 1094 (Ct. App. 1994). 
If a genuine issue of material fact remains unresolved, or if the record contains 
conflicting inferences and if reasonable minds might reach different conclusions 
from the facts and inferences presented, summary judgment should not be 
granted. Sewell v. Neilsen, Monroe, Inc. 109 Idaho 192, 706 P.2d 81 (Ct. App. 
1985). 
If an action will be tried by a court without a jury, a judge is not required to 
draw inferences in favor of a party opposing a motion for summary judgment. 
Kaufman v. Fairchild, 119 Idaho 859, 810 P.2d 1145 (Ct. App. 1991). 
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Thus, the court has at least two tasks concerning a summary judgment motion. 
First, the court must determine that no material facts are in dispute. Second, the court must 
draw reasonable inferences from those facts to determine which party should be granted 
summary judgment/partial summary judgment. 
INTRODUCTION 
The defendants disagree with plaintiff's counsel's version of "Statement of Facts". A 
simplistic version of the facts is set forth hereafter. 
The parties hereto entered into real estate transactions for the sale of real property by 
each of the two party defendants (husband and wife) to the plaintiff. Those exhibits are 
attached to the affidavit of Magera as Exhibit A-Clark; and as Exhibit B-Peterson. Both 
properties were "tied" to the sale and the defendants had been neighbors and friends for 
numerous years. 
The Petersons received a substantial down payment on the real estate transaction as 
everyone knew that they were purchasing a retirement home in Idaho Falls. The money 
was needed to complete the purchase on their retirement town house and to allow them to 
begin the retirement process. The Petersons relied upon the representations of plaintiff in 
accepting the down payment. 
The Clarks received a modest down payment to sell their real property to the 
defendant and moved to Texas to begin their retirement plans. Neither set of defendants 
believed any contingencies existed, except for environmental issues or defects in the land, 
and that the contract was to be completed by a date certain for them to begin retirement 
activities. 
The real estate purchase agreements state the terms and conditions. No oral 
modifications were made by either set of defendants but multiple promises of payment were 
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made by the plaintiffs to the defendants-even subsequent to the closing date of the 
transactions. The defendants did not participate with the plaintiff's bank process nor were 
the defendants involved in any actions of the plaintiff. 
No conditions were placed upon the sale of the real property as it related in any way, 
shape or form as to the County of Jefferson and any zoning or building requirements. The 
intent of usage by plaintiff for the subject real properties was irrelevant to the defendants. 
No mutual agreement or understanding was made by the defendants as to the ultimate 
usage of the real property being purchased by the plaintiff. In fact, the only understanding 
was that the down payment to Petersons was critical to their purchase of a retirement home 
in Idaho Falls. 
It is true that the sale of both sets of defendants' property was contemplated by the 
plaintiff and a condition for both parties defendant. The defendants were aware that the 
plaintiff was in the business of development. Both set of defendants continued to be ready, 
able and willing to perform on the sale and were ready, willing and able to close subsequent 
to the closing date. Neither set of defendants signed any extensions or written documents 
referred to as Ex. E and F. to the Magera Mfidavit. 
Plaintiff instituted a lawsuit for refund. Defendants answered and counter-claimed 
for damages and! or specific performance along with other defenses and claims as set forth 
in the pleadings. 
1. The plaintiff breached the contract between the parties which was Exhibit A and B to the 
Complaint and Magera Mfidavit and, therefore, is not entitled to summary judgment on its 
cause of action in the complaint. 
The breach is very straight forward. Plaintiff failed to pay the contract price to the 
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defendants/ counter-plaintiffs on or before the date of closing. No factual dispute exists 
concerning the failure of the plaintiff to pay the defendants on or before the closing date as 
contained in the written contracts labeled as Exhibits A and B to the Magera affidavit. 
Plaintiff relies upon the following language from paragraph 3 of the written contracts 
to excuse its breach: 
Prior to closing, it is Buyer's obligation to make sure that they are fully 
satisfied with the condition of the property, also any requirements, 
environmental requirements, and all of the requirements that the Buyer needs 
to make for its due diligence purposes. 
No factual dispute exists that any claim has or will be made that the condition of the real 
property was not satisfactory. No factual dispute exists that any claim has or will be made that 
the real property in question had any environmental concerns. Thus, the plaintiff (buyer) must 
be relying on the language "and all requirements that the Buyer needs to make for its due 
diligence purposes." 
This non-artfully drafted language is so vague that it would be impossible for any court 
to know what "buyer needs for its due diligence." Paragraph 24 of the contracts is very clear that 
the buyer drafted this agreement. As the court is well aware, the court must construe the 
language against the drafter. 
(See, e.g., RESTATEMENT, supra, at § 201 (agreement interpreted in accordance with 
the meaning assigned by the more" innocent" of the parties); > Luzar v. Western Surety Co., 
107 Idaho 693, 692 P.2d 337 (1984) (where trier of fact is unable to determine the intent of the 
parties, preference is given to the meaning which operates against the party drafting the 
agreement); RESTATEMENT, supra, at § 207 (preferring an interpretation favoring the public 
interest). 
815 P.2d 469, 120 Idaho 271, USA Fertilizer, Inc. v. Idaho First Nat. Bank, (Idaho App. 
1991) 
------------ Excerpt from page 815 P.2d 474. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT, supra, at § 201 
(agreement interpreted in accordance with the meaning assigned by the more "innocent" of the 
parties); > Luzar v. Western Surety Co., 107 Idaho 693, 692 P.2d 337 (1984) (where trier offact is 
unable to determine the intent of the parties, preference is given to the meaning which operates 
against the party drafting the agreement); RESTATEMENT, supra, at § 207 (preferring an 
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interpretation favoring the public interest). 
USA FertiZizer, Inc. v. Icaho First Nat. Bank, 815 P.2d 469,120 Idaho 271, (Idaho App. 
1991). 
------------ Excerpt from page 815 P.2d 474. 
Further, the court, as a matter of law, must determine if the language is ambiguous. 
The existence of ambiguity determines the standard of review of a lower court's interpretation of 
a contract or instrument. > Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Ethington Family Trust, 137 Idaho 435, 437-
38, 50 P.3d 450, 452-53 (2002). "The initial inquiry into whether a ... legal instrument is 
ambiguous presents a legal question, over which this court exercises free review." > Chubbuck 
v. City of Pocatello, 127 Idaho 198, 201, 899 P.2d 411, 414 (1995); > Union Pac. R.R. Co., at 437-
38,50 P.3d at 452-53. "An instrument which is reasonably subject to conflicting interpretation is 
ambiguous." > Latham v. Garner, 105 Idaho 854, 858, 673 P.2d 1048, 1052 (1983). "The legal 
effect of an unambiguous written document must be decided by the trial court as a question of 
law." > Id. at 857,673 P.2d at 1051. "If, however, the instrument of conveyance is ambiguous, 
interpretation of the instrument is a matter of fact for the trier of fact." Id. 
Dr.James CooZ, D.D.S. v. Mountainview Zancowners Co-op. Ass'n,Inc., 86 P.3d 484,139 
Idaho 770, (Idaho 2004). 
------------ Excerpt from page 86 P.3d 486. 
In the instant case and believing the language to be ambiguous, it still becomes 
irrelevant for the reason that the plaintiff has relied upon the County of Jefferson's zoning as its 
only defense. It believes that the subject property could not be zoned R-l. The affidavit of 
Naysha Foster clearly rebuts this position and the issue of ambiguity becomes irrelevant. 
The subject land was to be treated as R-l purposes for this case. Thus, the only 
argument of the plaintiff fails. No other defenses or arguments are presented on the direct 
action of the plaintiff in its summary judgment motion. The plaintiff breached the contract and 
did not timely pay for the balance of the contract either at closing or subsequent thereto. 
2. The defendants/counter-plaintiffs are entitled to summary judgment on the issue ofliabiIity 
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I 
on their counterclaims. 
Since the plaintiff breached the contract, the defendants are clearly entitled to liability on 
their counterclaim for breach of contract. The only issue remains is damages and/ or specific 
performance. 
The defendants/counter-plaintiffs have been damaged monetarily in a sum to be 
established. Specific performance is an alternative for enforcement of the contract against the 
plaintiff and in favor of the defendants. 
3. Other claims in the counter-claims of the counter-plaintiffs also establish liability with the 
issues of damages to be determined at a later point. 
A. Specific Performance 
Specific performance is used as follows: 
There is no legal right to specific performance. > Suchan v. Rutherford, 90 Idaho 288, 410 P.2d 
434 (1966). Specific performance is an extraordinary remedy that can provide reliefwhen legal 
remedies are inadequate. > Hancock v. Dusenberry, 110 Idaho 147, 152, 715 P.2d 360, 365 
(Ct.App.1986) (citing J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, CONTRACTS § 16-1 (2d ed.1977». The 
inadequacy of remedies at law is presumed in an action for breach of a real estate purchase and 
sale agreement due to the perceived uniqueness of land. > Perron v. Hale, 108 Idaho 578, 701 
P.2d 198 (1985). But, specific performance is an equitable remedy and should not be granted 
when it would be unjust, oppressive, or unconscionable. Suchan. When seeking the remedy of 
specific performance: 
[a party] comes into a court of conscience asking for a remedy beyond the letter of his strict 
legal right.... To come within the equitable rule he must stand before the court prepared to 
meet its scrutiny, relying upon the fairness and equitable character of the contract. This must 
not only be his own position, but he must also show that it is not unjust or oppressive to the 
defendant to compel him to perform specifically. 
> Suchan, at 302, 410 P.2d at 442-43. The decision to grant specific performance is a 
matter within the district court's discretion. Suchan (citing> Bedal v. Johnson, 37 Idaho 359, 
218 P. 641 (1923». When making its decision the court must balance the equities between the 
parties to determine whether specific performance is appropriate. Suchan; > Barnard & Son, 
Inc. v. Akins, 109 Idaho 466, 708 P.2d 871 (1985). 
> [15] > [16] Specific performance should be granted under terms and conditions 
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reflecting the equities of the case. 
A decree of specific performance should be equitable to both the plaintiff and the defendant, 
and a court of equity, being a court of conscience, is capable of rendering a conditional decree 
in an action for specific performance, because it can insist that if a party, either plaintiff or 
defendant, seeks the assistance of such a court, he must do what good conscience demands in 
the particular case. 
71 Am.Jur.2d. Specific Performance § 222 (1973). 
In circumstances where an order for specific performance would operate to benefit the 
petitioner inequitably and unconscionably, a court of equity has discretion to refuse to order 
specific performance or where possible to condition an order for specific performance so as to 
account for the petitioner's inequitable conduct. 
> Boyd v. Head, 92 Idaho 389,393,443 P.2d 473, 477 (1968). This Court has also stated 
that "once the equitable jurisdiction of the court has attached, the court should retain 
jurisdiction to resolve all portions of the dispute between the parties and render equity to all 
parties without regard to the technical niceties of pleading and procedure." > Barnard & Son, 
Inc. v. Akins, 109 Idaho 466, 708 P.2d 871 (1985) 
1 P.3d 292,134 Idaho 264, Kessler v. Tortoise Development, Inc., (Idaho 2000) 
------------ Excerpt from page 1 P.3d 298. 
B. Breach of Contract 
Breach of contract has been established wherein the plaintiff failed to pay the 
defendants/ counter-plaintiffs. No material facts are in dispute and the court should grant the 
counter-plaintiffs liability on this issue. 
C. Unjust Enrichment 
As the court is aware, unjust enrichment is an equitable remedy, plead in the alternative, 
to a breach of contract claim. It is described as follows: 
Although defendants argue that no written agreement was executed between the parties, 
unjust enrichment does not depend upon the existence of a valid contract. > Continental 
Forest Products v. Chandler, 95 Idaho 739, 518 P.2d 1201 (1974). 
The essence of the quasi-contractual theory of unjust enrichment is that the defendant 
has received a benefit which would be inequitable to retain at least without compensating the 
plaintiff to the extent that retention is unjust. > Continental Forest Products v. Chandler, supra; 
> Bair v. Barron, 97 Idaho 26, 539 P.2d 578 (1975). Cf. > Bastian v. Gifford, 98 Idaho 324, 563 
P.2d 48 (1977). No intention is shown to make a gift and it is clear that Hertz's intention was to 
improve the premises and thus generate more business from which he would profit. The 
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Fiscuses approved the work of Hertz from its outset with knowledge of the expenditure of the 
money and time involved. 
567 P.2d 1, 98 Idaho 456, Hertz v. Fiscus, (Idaho 1977) 
------------ Excerpt from page 567 P .2d 2. 
D. Estoppel 
-The plaintiff should be estopped from asserting rights contrary to the representations 
made to the counter-plaintiffs. Estoppel ties into the detrimental reliance theory. Estoppel is 
defined as follows: 
Equitable estoppel requires 
(1) a false representation or concealment of a material fact made with actual or 
constructive knowledge of the truth; 
(2) that the party asserting estoppel did not and could not have discovered the truth; 
(3) an intent that the misrepresentation or concealment be relied upon; and 
(4) that the party asserting estoppel relied on the misrepresentation or concealment to 
his or her prejudice. 
> Twin Falls Clinic & Hosp. Bldg. Corp. v. Hamill, 103 Idaho 19, 22,644 P.2d 341, 344 
(1982). Quasi estoppel is distinguished from equitable estoppel "in that no concealment or 
misrepresentation of existing facts on the one side, no ignorance or reliance on the other, is a 
necessary ingredient." > Evans v. Idaho State Tax Comm., 97 Idaho 148, 150, 540 P.2d 810, 812 
(1975). The doctrine of quasi estoppel applies when it would be unconscionable to allow a party 
to assert a right which is inconsistent with a prior position. > Mitchell v. Zilog, Inc., 125 Idaho 
709, 715, 874 P.2d 520, 526 (1994). 
The hearing officer upheld IDHW's collection of the overpayment because he found that 
Willig had not proved the necessary elements of either equitable or quasi estoppel. As 
discussed above, to establish equitable estoppel a party must prove prejudicial reliance on the 
misrepresentation. Although the children are receiving less AFDC benefits than they otherwise 
would, the hearing officer nonetheless concluded that Willig had not demonstrated the 
prejudice necessary to establish equitable estoppel. 
> [6J To sustain a finding of prejudice in these circumstances it is necessary to show 
more than the mere obligation to repay the overpayment. In> Brand S Corp. v. King, 102 Idaho 
731,734,639 P.2d 429, 432 (1981), the Court explained that to demonstrate prejudice the parties 
asserting equitable estoppel must have "changed their position as a result of the alleged 
representation and suffered a detriment as a result thereof." 
899 P.2d 969, 127 Idaho 259, Willig v. State, Dept. of Health & Welfare, (Idaho 1995) 
------------ Excerpt from page 899 P.2d 971. 
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E. Detrimental Reliance 
Allowing promissory estoppel as a substitute for consideration is permitted in 
those situations where injustice would otherwise result. The reason for the doctrine also defines 
its limits. In order to allege the defense of promissory estoppel, it must be shown: (1) the 
detriment suffered in reliance was substantial in an economic sense; (2) the substantial loss to 
the promisee acting in reliance was or should have been foreseeable by the promisor; and (3) 
the promisee must have acted reasonably in justifiable reliance on the promise as made. 
Simpson, Contracts § 42 (1954). 
See also, Restatement of Contracts, § 90. 
388 P.2d 1002, 86 Idaho 531, Mohr v. Shultz, (Idaho 1964) 
------------ Excerpt from pages 388 P.2d 1008-388 P.2d 1009. 
F. Consumer Protection 
An act or practice is unfair if it is shown to possess a tendency or capacity to deceive 
consumers. "The law is settled that a finding of 'tendency and capacity to mislead' is sufficient 
and that actual deception need not be shown." > Vacu-Matic Carburetor Co. v. Federal Trade 
Commission, 157 F.2d 711, 713 (7th Cir. 1946), cert. denied> 331 U.S. 806,67 S.Ct. 1188,91 L.Ed. 
1827 (1947). Likewise, proof of intention to deceive[101 Idaho 454] is not required for finding 
that an act is unfair or deceptive. > Federal Trade Commission v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 317 F.2d 
669 (2d Cir. 1963). See> Trans World Accounts, Inc. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 594 F.2d 212 
(9th Cir. 1979); > Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 379 F.2d 666 (7th Cir. 
1967); > State v. Ralph Williams' North West Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 87 Wash.2d 298, 553 P.2d 
423 (1976); > Testo v. Dunmire Oldsmobile, Inc., 16 Wash.App. 39, 554 P.2d 349 (1976). Actual 
damage to the public need not be shown to establish a trade practice as unfair or deceptive if it is 
shown that the practice possesses a tendency or capacity to deceive. > Resort Car Rental 
System, Inc. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 518 F.2d 962 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied sub nom. > 
McKenzie v. U. S., 423 U.S. 827,96 S.Ct. 41,46 L.Ed.2d 42 (1975). 
The Supreme Court of the United States has interpreted the impact of the Federal 
Trade Commission Act in 1934 as follows: 
"Competition may be unfair within the meaning of this statute (the Federal Trade 
Commission Act) and within the scope of the discretionary powers conferred on the 
Commission, though the practice condemned does not amount to fraud as understood in courts 
oflaw. Indeed there is a kind offraud, as courts of equity have long perceived, in clinging to a 
benefit which is the product of misrepresentation, however innocently made." > Federal Trade 
Comm'n v. AlgomaLumber Co., 291 U.S. 67, 81,54 S.Ct. 315, 321, 78 L.Ed. 655 (1934). 
The effect of the Federal Trade Commission Act on the customs of the 
marketplace has been stated as follows: 
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"The fact that a false statement may be obviously false to those who are trained and 
experienced does not change its character, nor take away its power to deceive others less 
experienced. There is no duty resting upon a citizen to suspect the honesty of those with whom 
he transacts business. Laws are made to protect the trusting as well as the suspicious. The best 
element of business has long since decided that honesty should govern competitive enterprises, 
and that the rule of caveat emptor should not be relied upon to reward fraud and deception." > 
Federal Trade Comm'n v. Standard Education Society, 302 U.S. 112, 116, 58 S.Ct. 113, 115, 82 
L.Ed. 141 (1937). 
In> State v. Ralph Williams' North West Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 82 Wash. 265, 
510 P.2d 233 (1973), the Washington Supreme Court discussed> R.e.W. 19.86.080 which is very 
similar to> I.e. s 48-607: 
[101 Idaho 455] 
"The court may make such additional orders or judgments as may be necessary to 
restore to any person in interest any moneys or property, real or personal, which may have been 
acquired by means of any act herein prohibited or declared to be unlawful." 
The Washington Supreme Court noted that restitutio nary relief was adjunct to the 
court's general broad and flexible equitable power to compel a wrongdoer to restore the status 
quo extant prior to his illegal acts. 
"Suits for injunctive relief and restitution enforce the laws of the particular jurisdiction in 
the public interest by restoring the status quo. Restitution orders are appropriate and necessary 
as a part of equitable relief .... The recovery of that which has been illegally acquired and which 
has given rise to the necessity for the injunctive relief not only restores the property to the party 
but insures future compliance where it is assured a wrongdoer is compelled to restore illegal 
gains." > 510 P.2d at 241, citations omitted. 
In> People v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 9 Cal.3d 283, 107 Cal.Rptr. 
192, 507 P.2d 1400 (1973), the California Supreme Court similarly interpreted its unfair trade 
practice statutes to permit the trial court to require the defendants to make or offer to make 
restitution to consumers falling victim to deceptive or unfair trade practices. At the time the 
complaint was filed> Section 17535 of the California Business & Professions Code provided that 
false or misleading advertising "may be enjoined," but the statute did not expressly authorize 
the trial court to order restitution. The California court, noting that the statute did not restrict 
the court's general equity jurisdiction, held that 
"(i)n the absence of such a restriction a court of equity may exercise the full range of its 
inherent powers in order to accomplish complete justice between the parties, restoring if 
necessary the status quo ante as nearly as may be achieved." > 107 Cal.Rptr. at 194, 507 P.2d at 
1402. 
The Supreme Court of the United States in other statutory contexts has, without 
specific statutory authority, upheld the power offederal courts to grant restitution as an ancillary 
remedy in the exercise of the courts' general equity powers to afford complete relief. See, e. g., > 
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Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 80 S.Ct. 332, 4 L.Ed.2d 323 (1960); > 
United States v. Moore, 340 U.S. 616, 71 S.Ct. 524, 95 L.Ed. 582 (1951); > Porter V. Warner 
Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 66 S.Ct. 1086, 90 L.Ed. 1332 (1946). In > Securities Exchange 
Comm'n v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir.1971), cert. denied, > 404 U.S. 1005, 92 
S.Ct. 561,30 L.Ed.2d 558 (1971), reh. den., > 404 U.S. 1064,92 S.Ct. 734,30 L.Ed.2d 753 (1972), it 
was held that the Securities Exchange Commission Act's failure to authorize equitable relief 
ancillary to the injunctive relief specifically authorized in the statute did not preclude the district 
court's granting of restitutionary relief: "(T)he SEC may seek other than injunctive relief in order 
to effectuate the purposes of the Act, so long as such relief is remedial relief and is not a penalty 
assessment." > 446 F .2d at 1308. It is our opinion that restitutionary relief is appropriate in an 
action brought by the Attorney General under the Idaho Consumer Protection Act where such 
reliefwould be required to reestablish the status quo ante which existed prior to the defendant's 
deceptive or unfair acts. 
Restitution is not an automatic or mandatory remedy for violations of the Idaho 
Consumer Protection Act; it is one the courts may invoke. However, the district court's 
discretion to award restitutionary relief should be exercised with a view toward the purposes of 
the act. The Idaho Consumer Protection Act indicates a legislative intent to deter deceptive or 
unfair trade practices and to provide relief for consumers exposed to proscribed practices. 
Businesses faced only with the possibility of a prospective injunctive order would have little 
incentive to avoid commercial practices of dubious legality. Only a substantial likelihood that 
defendants who have engaged in unfair or deceptive trade practices will be subject to 
restitutionary orders will [101 Idaho 456] 
deter many with a mind to engage in sharp practices. 
"We do not deter indulgence in fraudulent practices if we permit wrongdoers to retain 
the considerable benefits of their unlawful conduct. 
"As one court has stated, 'The injunction against future violations, while of some 
deterrent force, is only a partial remedy since it does not correct the consequences of past 
conduct. To permit the (retention of even) a portion of the illicit profits, would impair the full 
impact of the deterrent force that is essential if adequate enforcement (of the law) is to be 
achieved. One requirement of such enforcement is a basic policy that those who have engaged 
in proscribed conduct surrender all profits flowing therefrom.' (Fns. omitted.) (> S.E.e. v. 
Golconda Mining Co., (S.D.N.Y.1971) 327 F.Supp. 257, 259-60 ... )" > Fletcherv. Security Pacific 
Nat. Bank, 23 Ca1.3d 442, 153 Cal.Rptr. 28, 33, 591 P.2d 51, 57 (Cal.1979). 
Cf. > Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405,95 S.Ct. 2362, 45 L.Ed.2d 280 
(1975) (district court's discretion to award back pay under equal employment opportunity 
provisions of Civil Rights Act of 1964 must be exercised to promote the statutory purpose of 
eliminating discrimination and remedying injury suffered through past discrimination; absence 
of employer's bad faith not sufficient reason to deny back pay award). See> Head v. Timkin 
Roller Bearing Co., 486 F.2d 870 (6th Cir. 1973). 
615 P.2d 116, 101 Idaho 447, State ex reI. Kidwell v. Master Distributors, Inc., 
(Idaho 1980) 
------------ Excerpt from pages 615 P.2d 122-615 P.2d 125. 
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The Act is designed to prevent fraudulent practices to consumers and applies both 
through the attorney general and through a private lawsuit. The plaintiff has lead the 
defendants/ counter-plaintiffs down a path that has caused harm and damage to their retirement 
programs. In good faith, both the Clarks and Petersons have relied upon the plaintiff to their 
detriment. 
Consumer Protection is designed to aid against fraudulent practices or deceptive 
practices. 
CONCLUSION 
The summary judgment matters are two-fold. Plaintiff's request for summary 
judgment should be denied based upon the affidavits before the court. Counter-plaintiffs 
request for summary judgment should be requested on the basis of liability. Damages to 
counter-plaintiffs would need to be established by the fact-finder. 
DATED this ) J day of November, 2009. 
= 
Robin D. Dunn, Esq. 
DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
----, 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the --.L:L day of November, 2009 a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing was delivered to the following persons( s) by: 
Hand Delivery 
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/) 
~ Postage-prepaid mail 
Facsimile Transmission 
DeAnne Casperson, Esq. 
P.O. Box 50130 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
~ Robin D. Dunn, Esq. 
DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
Courtesy Copy: Judge Gregory Moeller 
Madison County Courthouse 
P.O. Box 389 
Rexburg, ID 83440 
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DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC. 
Robin D. Dunn, Esq., ISB #2903 
Amelia A. Sheets, Esq., ISB #5899 
477 Pleasant Country Lane 
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P. O. Box 277 . [ ~ FE::: S !~; : ~ G ,~') U : (;" '{ , I D ;\ Hi) 
Rigby, ID 83442 
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Attorneys for Defendants / Counter-plaintiffs 
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Case No. CV-08-941 
AFFIDAVIT OF JERRY AND 
BETTY PETERSON IN SUPPORT 
OF DEFENDANTS' POSITIONS 
RE: SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
AFFIDAVIT OF PETERSONS RE: SUMMARY JUDGMENT-l-
J 
/ j , 
} 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
ss. 
COUNTY OF JEFFERSON ) 
Jerry and Betty Peterson, being duly sworn upon oath, state as follows: 
1. They are husband and wife and co-defendants/ counter-plaintiffs in the above 
captioned matter. 
2. This affidavit is prepared in opposition to the summary judgment request of the 
plaintiff and in support of the summary judgment request of the defendants/ counter-
plaintiffs. 
3. This affidavit is prepared with the assistance of their legal counsel and made upon 
personal knowledge and belief of the undersigned affiants. 
4. These affiants entered into a written contract with the plaintiff which is attached to 
the affidavit of Mager a and labeled Exhibit B. 
5. This written contract was for the sale of real property in Jefferson County, Idaho as 
described in the complaint on file and in the contract. The written contract was 
performed in conjunction with the sale of real property of co-defendants/ counter-
plaintiffs, Raoel and Janet Clark. The Clarks have been neighbors and friends of the 
undersigned affiants for numerous years. The plaintiff desired to purchase both the 
real properties of the undersigned and of the Clarks. The Clarks written contract is 
attached to the affidavit of Magera and labeled Exhibit A. The contracts mirror one 
another in most material respects. 
6. The written contract of the Clarks was signed on August 30, 2007; the written 
contract of the undersigned (Petersons) was also signed on August 30, 2007. 
7. Both parties received earnest money with the Clarks being $25,000; and the earnest 
money of the undersigned being $327,000.00. 
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8. Buyer (Plaintiff) was made aware that the undersigned affiants desired the 
$327,000.00 to purchase a retirement townhome in Idaho Falls, Idaho. Buyer was 
comfortable with this position and knew of the intended use by your affiants. 
9. Both contracts that are the subject of this lawsuit provided in paragraph 3 of the 
contracts the following language: 
Prior to closing, it is Buyer's obligation to make sure that they are fully 
satisfied with the condition of the property, also any requirements, 
environmental requirements, and all of the requirements that the Buyer needs 
to make for its due diligence purposes. 
10. Your affiants have never been made aware of any problems with the condition of the 
real property or of any environmental concerns. The plaintiff did not further define 
due diligence in any manner in the written contract which was prepared by the 
plaintiff's attorney. 
11. At the time of signing the contract, the real properties were both zoned R-l and 
remained zoned R-l up to and including the closing date of the contracts. 
12. The purpose of the purchase by the buyers was never communicated to the 
undersigned affiants nor did the contract state any potential use of the real property 
being purchased by buyers. Both properties were historically used as farm 
operations. Your affiants did know, however, that plaintiffs were in the business of 
land speculation and development. Moreover, the sale of the real property by written 
contract never contained any language of speculative purposes or of development. 
13. In paragraph 6 of the Magera affidavit he states: "and any requirements for Buku's 
purposes." The undersigned disagree with this assertion as the contract does not 
state as such nor were your affiants ever informed of "any requirements." 
14. Needless-to-say, Jefferson County never changed the zoning requirements during 
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the time between signing of the agreement and of the closing date. The real 
properties were zoned R-l and remained zoned R-l at the time the contract called for 
closing. 
15. Paragraph 18 of the Magera affidavit is not accurate. The undersigned never 
"mutually understood" nor did the undersigned care about the plaintiffs potential 
use of the real property. The written contract does not contain language agreed to by 
the undersigned of any "use of the real property." In fact, the undersigned were lead 
to believe all was well and the initial deposit of $327,000.00 was specifically made to 
allow the transition to retirement for the undersigned. 
16. Your affiants did not participate nor have any knowledge of the plaintiffs 
involvement with any lending institutions. The financial background of the plaintiff 
was never an issue of participation by your affiants nor was it any of their concern. 
Jaramie Magera did, however, telephone your affiants on 12/12/07 and confirmed 
that the bank loan was approved. Your affiants believed Buku, LLC, to be financially 
solvent. The $327,000.00 payment reassured your affiants of the financial viability of 
the plaintiff. 
17. In December of2007 (12/12/07) during the telephone conversation with your 
affiants, Magera informed that the County may be re-zoning property. The response 
issued by your affiant, Jerry Peterson was, "what does that have to do with us, I sold 
you a house and a farm". Magera stated: "I would rather take a $350,000.00 loss 
than a 2 million dollar loss." 
18. The plaintiff exercised dominion and control over the real properties contained in the 
written contracts of the defendants/counter-plaintiffs. The real property of the 
undersigned was listed with a realtor to sell the real property and, in particular, the 
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J "I" 
residential home on the real property. That listing continued late into the 2008 year 
and was listed with ERA with listing agent Kipp Archibald. The listing continued 
through-out 2008 as the realtor signs were still present as of August 4, 2008. The 
house was shown by the realtors for plaintiffs as late as June 27, 2008. Your affiants 
observed the Clark property being used by the plaintiffs through the 2008 farming 
season; as was your affiants' property being listed and shown by realtors during the 
same time period. 
19. Magera further telephoned in December of 2007 and indicated he had a buyer for the 
house and would we, the undersigned, take an early pay-off because the property was 
to sell. That event did not transpire. On January 3, 2008, Kipp Archibald, plaintiff's 
realtor and agent, telephoned and asked if the house sold did we want it applied to 
the plaintiff's contract. 
20. In March of 2008, Plaintiff and Magera's agent, Brad Foster, telephoned and 
indicated that he was supposed to operate the farm for the season. 
21. On March 31, 2008 Magera, plaintiff's agent, telephoned saying he had good news as 
follows: "The County Commissioners had grand-fathered in 1 acre lots and the bank 
ok'd the loan. We need to get together and talk." He was informed by your affiant, 
Jerry Peterson, that a meeting would be set up with the undersigned's attorney. Your 
affiants never did hear back from J aramie Magera. 
22. Plaintiffs continually informed the undersigned affiants, subsequent to the closing 
date, that the contract would be fulfilled and that payment would be forthcoming. 
Plaintiff actually arranged for a meeting with your affiants and their counsel 
subsequent to the closing date to develop a payment plan for conclusion of the 
written contract. Plaintiff did not participate or provide any other meeting date. 
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23. On August 6, 2008, Kipp Archibald, agent for plaintiffs, telephoned and indicated 
plaintiff still wanted the property and was working with its lending institution. 
24. On November 12, 2008, the realtor lock-box of Kipp Archibald was still on the home 
(real property contained in Exhibit B) of your affiants. 
25. Your affiants have remained ready, willing and able to sell the real property that is 
the subject of this lawsuit. 
26. Your affiants allege that the plaintiff breached the written contract by non-
performance of the payment on the closing date and by continued exercise of 
dominion and control over the subject real property until as late as November, 2008. 
27. Your affiants have been damaged monetarily in the remaining sum of the contract 
and other miscellaneous costs and billings, including but not limited to, lost 
revenues on farming practices, lost interest, expenses of upkeep and utilities, tax 
assessments, attorney fees and costs. 
28. Your affiants believe and allege that the plaintiff is liable for damages and/or is 
requested to perform on the contract (Specific Performance). 
DATED this _q __ day of November, 2009. 
J t(rry Peters n 
Betty Person 
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SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 0 day of November, 2008. 
Notary P4gJ. c \ 
Residing at: ('(til/1M' 
Commission: d-r -0::;- ~ i 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
-? 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the / J day of November, 2009, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing was delivered to the following person(s) by: 
__ Hand Delivery 
-X- Postage-prepaid mail 
Facsimile Transmission 
DeAnne Casperson, Esq. 
P.O. Box 50130 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
Robin D. Dunn, Esq. 
DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
Courtesy Copy: Judge Gregory Moeller 
Madison County Courthouse 
P.O. Box 389 
Rexburg, ID 83440 
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DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC. 
Robin D. Dunn, Esq., ISB #2903 
Amelia A. Sheets, Esq., ISB #5899 
477 Pleasant Country Lane 
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Rigby, ID 83442 
(208) 745-9202 (t) 
(208) 745-8160 (f) 
Attorneys for Defendants / Counter-plaintiffs 
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AFFIDAVIT OF FOSTER RE: SUMMARY JUDGMENT-l-
Case No. CV-08-941 
AFFIDAVIT OF NAYSHA 
FOSTER, PLANNING AND 
ZONING COORDINATOR 
RE: SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
ss. 
COUNTY OF JEFFERSON ) 
Naysha Foster, being duly sworn upon oath, state as follows: 
1. They she is employed with Jefferson County, Idaho as its Planning and Zoning 
Administrator. 
2. That she was employed in such capacity prior to August of2007. 
3. That she has checked the zoning and mapping for the real property owned by Raoel 
and Janet Clark, husband and wife. She has also checked the zoning and mapping 
for the real property owned by Jerry and Betty Peterson, husband and wife. Both 
properties are contained in Township 4 North, Range 39, East Boise Meridian, 
Jefferson County, Idaho, Section 21. The property of the Clarks was approximately 
80 acres; and the property of the Petersons was approximately 70 plus acres. 
4. In August of 2007 both properties were zoned R-1. On December 31, 2007, both 
properties were zoned R-1. 
5. Any applications for Planning and Zoning action rely upon the zoning as of the date 
of application. Any zone would be treated as it was mapped at the date of 
application for Planning and Zoning action. 
6. Jaramie Magera request plat development by way of a Sketch Plan on the properties 
described above. Both properties would be and come under the definition of R-l 
zoning. His application was dated December 10, 2007. A copy of the cover from the 
file is incorporated herein by reference as Exhibit 1 identifying the date of December 
10,2007. Further, minutes of the County of Jefferson Planning and Zoning discussed 
the sketch plan prior to any zone changes. These minutes are attached and 
incorporated herein as Exhibit 2 and are for the meeting of March 6, 2008. 
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7. The real property of this land would be "grandfathered" as R-l zoning. Attached is a 
copy of a letter from the Jefferson County Commissioners confirming this position 
and is attached as Exhibit 3 indicating that this land would be treated as R-l zoned 
land for the purpose of application. Exhibits 3 is incorporated herein by reference as 
though fully set forth. 
8. If the subdivision were approved, it would be designated R-l for zoning purposes. 
DATED this q day of November, 2009. 
Naysh ster 
Notary Public 
Residing at: R..l G lrl'l ,:r. D 
Commission: (0 J f> 1// 0 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
,r, 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ~ day of November, 2009, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing was delivered to the following person(s) by: 
__ Hand Delivery 
~ Postage-prepaid mail 
Facsimile Transmission 
Robin D. Dunn, Esq. 
DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
DeAnne Casperson, Esq. 
AFFIDAVIT OF FOSTER RE: SUMMARY JUDGMENT-3-
P.O. Box 50130 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
Courtesy Copy: Judge Gregory Moeller 
Madison County Courthouse 
P.O. Box 389 
Rexburg, ID 83440 
AFFIDAVIT OF FOSTER RE: SUMMARY JUDGMENT-4-
I 
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EXHIBIT---,--
Developer / Jaramie Magera / Thompson Engineering 
Engineering Firm 
From: Naysha Foster, Planning and Zoning Administrator 
Date: Friday, February 01,2008 
Re: A large scale development 
Subdivision Name: Jaramie Magera / Clark-Peterson property 
General Location: 4200/4100 E 250 N 
Items discussed in the pre-application meeting for the above-mentioned subdivision on 
D/\TE: December 10,2007 
Lots Count: 124 Building Lots and 2 Common Lots. 
Lot Size: 1 acre building lots 
Open Space: 6 acres 
Landscaping: Will need to provide a landscaping plan. 
Prepared By: J 2/1/20083:13:50 PM 
Walkpaths: Will have walkpaths. 
Wetlands: N/ A 
Wildlife: N/A 
Road access/State Hwy access: There will be an access on 4100 E and 4200 E. 
Th~re will also be a stub road to Clark's property north of the East portion of the 
Subdivision. 
Fire protection: 
Irrigation plan/water rights: 
Traffic Concerns: 
Present land use: Ag 
Test holes/water depth: 
Other: leaning to community services. 
Prepared By: 2/1/20083 : 13:50 PM 
EXHIBIT_d-~_ 
JEFFERSON COUNTY 
PLANNING AND ZONING MEETING 
March 6, 2008 7:00 PM 
Planning and Zoning Commission Present: Michael Clark Chairman, 
Clyde Gillespie, Ed Mortensen, Craig Bingham, Lance Moss, Evy Gilstrap and Holly 
Hancock. 
Staff Present: Naysha Foster, Planning & Zoning Administrator 
Sketch Meeting 
Niressa Shepard, Planning & Zoning Administrative Assistant 
Kristi Schneider, Planning & Zoning Administrative Assistant 
Cobblestone Creek Subdivision- Kevin Thompson, Thompson Engineering presented 
the plat located approximately West of 3700 East on US Hwy 48. The applicant is 
proposing this subdivision under a clustering permit. The development will equate into 5 
acre lots. Total acreage is 36.74 with 7 lots total. The applicant proposed a zone change 
on this property that was denied. Now they are going back through this with the allowed 
usage that will have 5 acre lots next to the school. It will have a walk path to the school. 
Will tie into the neighboring property on the North side for future access. 
The Commission discussed the following: 
1. Concern with the property next to the school. Kevin Thompson indicated that it is 
owned by the school. 
2. The applicant does not own the land on the east side going to 3700 E. 
3. Ray Keating - Will need to do test holes and monitor ground water. Concerns 
with lot 2 block 2. 
4. Kevin Thompson - there is a drainage ditch that runs through the property. 
5. Jim Deuel- how wide is the road? Kevin Thompson stated that it will meet county 
specs. The road will be a 60 foot right-of-way. Will you have fire protection and 
irrigation plan? Kevin Thompson indicated that there will be none as of now. 
6. Holly Hancock- How will you water the lots on the west side of the road. 
7. Kevin Thompson- This is only sketch so I will have to talk with the developer, 
but they will possibly have to run a ditch along the front of the properties. They 
will have something figured out for the preliminary plat. 
8. Evy Gilstrap- would like to see the first two (2) lots along the Hwy screened with 
some kind of fencing. Needs to be attractive. 
9. Kevin Thompson- They have left a 40 foot setback for this, to either have 
burming, trees, or landscaping. 
I 
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10. Clyde Gillespie- Concerns on how the clustering pennit was done. 
11. Kevin Thompson- The property is split into four different fields, so this is how 
the developer wanted it. The lay of the land is not flat. 
12. Ray Keating - Concerns with high ground water. 
13. Luke Hicks- Stated that they have an approved feed lot to the west of this 
property, but his main concern is the levy ditch that runs along the west side of 
this property. Concerned with the maintance of the levy ditch. Also the drain is a 
recognized wetland. 
Clark & Peterson Subdivision- Kevin Thompson, Thompson Engineering presented the 
plat located approximately 4200/4100 E 250 N. It is on the North and East side of 
Sweetwater Subdivision. They propose with the two developments to centralize the parks 
between the two developments. Proposing one acre lots. Mr. Thompson indicated that he 
has heard that Mr. Call's property along 4100 E will be annexed into the city. So keep in 
mind that we are proposing individual wells and sewer, but if this annexation goes 
through then we would like to propose central sewer and water hooked into the city of 
Rigby. The developer proposes to connect to neighboring properties. 
The Commission discussed the following: 
1. Clyde Gillespie- When you have this many lots, they need to have adequate 
sewer systems not just septic tanks. 
2. Kevin Thompson- We will follow whatever the ordinance says. 
3. Will have irrigation plan. 
4. Jim Deuel would like to see water for fire protection plan. 
5. Evy Gilstrap- Where is the fifth common area lot? Kevin Thompson indicated 
that it is lot 10. Lot 37 is a buffer lot for a neighbor. 
6. Evy Gilstrap- doesn't like where the parks are located and the road going 
through them. Doesn't seem conveniently located for kids. 
7. Kevin Thompson- We had to obtain land from the property owner in Sweetwater 
to make this road, so this was a way to buffer that owner. 
8. Ed Mortensen- I would per see the majority of the traffic going through this park 
to access 4100 E. This might be a public hazard with kids running through there. 
9. Evy Gilstrap- I can see where they are trying to make it best for everyone, but 
sometimes for the better good you might have to sacrifice a lot or two to make it a 
descent looking subdivision in the long tenn. 
10. Kevin Thompson- The developer might have the option in the future to buy the 
property that is NE to the development. So then he would dedicate the park in the 
comer of that property to have one big park. 
11. Evy Gilstrap- Walkpaths. 
12. Ray Keating- Concerns with how rocky the ground is in this area, and concerns 
with lots 11 & 12 of block 1 when they put the septic in. Concern with the ground 
water. 
13. Kevin Thompson- The developer wants to hook up to the city so he is not in any 
hurry. 
14. Jim Archibald- (Attorney for Jeremy Magera) Wants to clarify on the utilities. 
They are negotiating with city and the school district to bring the city utilities out 
I I 
f 
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to the new school that will be on the comer of 4100 E and 300 N. So with that 
Jeremy Megera hopes to bring the city utilities down 4100 E to hook up that way 
or if the Call's property gets annexed then run city sewer and water across the 
road to hook up. One of Jeremy Megera's goals here is to provide central sewer 
and water, but he does hope to hook up to the city with this subdivision. 
15. Evy Gilstrap- Would like Road and Bridge input on this to see if this works 
especially if they go denser. 
16. Concern with ditch. 
Ridge Point Division 1- Perry 'Wani- Kevin Thompson, Thompson Engineering 
presented the plat approximately located off of 500 Nand 4200 E the Labelle area. The 
golf course is about 2 miles to the west of this property. This was approved last year and 
some of you may remember that we would have a dead end road connecting to the future 
development. What we are proposing is to come off of 500 N and tie into the Deer 
Hollow Estates. With these two subdivisions together they will create a looping system. 
This area is zoned R-1 right now. We are proposing one acre lots. Individual wells and 
sewer. We have the Long Island Canal about 400 feet along lots 16 & 17. For future 
access we tied into the Reed's property. 
The board discussed the following: 
1. Craig Bingham- Where is your green area? 
2. Kevin Thompson- We have park that is located by the Deer Hollow Estates road. 
It is about Y2 acre. 
3. Ed Mortensen- The zoning on the property. 
4. Concern with the new zone change. 
5. Comprehensive Plan 
6. A checklist from the Comprehensive Plan for the goals and policies. 
7. We are a recommending body. 
8. Ed Mortensen- Looks like a good area for 2 acre lots. 
9. Clyde Gillespie- Sewers a concern. 
10. Monitoring wells. 
11. Ray Keating- High ground water. 
Michael Clark called the Jefferson County Planning and Zoning Meeting to order. 
Holly Hancock led the audience in the pledge of allegiance. 
Evy Gilstrap made a motion to postpone approval of the February 6, 2008 minutes. 
Craig Bingham seconded the motion. Motion carried unanimously. 
Michael Clark stated that the Zone Map Amendment for Shane and Elizabeth 
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NOV/10/2009/TUE 08:37 AM 
DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC. 
Robin D. Dunn, Esq., ISB #2903 
Amelia A. Sheets, Esq., ISB #5899 
477 Pleasant Country Lane 
P. O. Box 277 
Rigby, ID 83442 
(208) 745-9202 (t) 
(208) 745-8160 (f) 
Attorneys for Defendants / Counter-plaintiffs 
FAX N D. P. 002 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRlCT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON 
BUKU PROPERTIES, LLC an Idaho 










RAOEL H. CLARK and JANET C. ) 
CLARK, husband and wife; ANGUS ) 
JERRY PETERSON and BETTY JEAN ) 





RADEL H. CLARK and JANET C. 
CLARK, husband and wife; ANGUS 
JERRY PETERSON and BETTY JEAN 
PETERSON, husband and wife, 
Counter-Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
BUKU PROPERTIES, LLC an Idaho 
Limited liability company; and 

















AFFIDAVIT OF CLARK RE: SUMMARY JUDGMENT-l-
Case No. CV-08-941 
AFFIDAVIT OF RAOEL 
Cl.A.R.K IN SUPPORT 
OF DEFENDANTS' POSITIONS 
RE: SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
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NOV/10/2009/TUE 08:37 AM FAX N D. P. 003 
STATE OF TEXAS ) 
66. 
COUNTYOF ________ _ ) 
RaoeJ Clark, being duly sworn upon oath) states as follows: 
1. He is one of the co-defendants/counte.t:-pl.aintiffs in the above captioned matter. His 
wife is Janet Clark. 
2. This affidavit is prepared in opposition to the summary judgment request of the 
plaintiff and in support of the summary judgment request of the defendants/ counter-
plaintiffs. 
3. This affidavit is prepared with the assistance of his legal counsel and made upon 
personal knowledge and belief of the U11dersigned affiant. 
4. The undersigned and his wife entered into a written contract with the plaintiff which . 
is attached to the affidavit of Mager a and labeled Exhibit A. 
5. This written contract was for the sale ofreal property in Jefferson County, Idaho as 
described in the complaint on file and in the contract. The written contract was 
performed in conjunction with the sale of real property of co-defendants/ counter-
plaintiffs, Jerry and Betry Peterson. The Petersons have been neighbors and friends 
of the undersigned affiant for numerous yeats. The plaintiff desired to pucchase both 
the real properties of the undersigned and oithe Petersons. The Petersons written 
contract is attached to the affidavit of Magera and labeled Exhibit B. The contracts 
mirror one another in most material respects. 
6. The written contracts of all parties were signed on August 30, 2007. 
7. Both patties received earnest money with the undersigned (Clarks) being $25,000; 
and the earnest money of the Petersons being $327,000.00. 
8. Both contracts provided in paragraph 3 of the contracts the following language: 
AFFIDAVIT OF CLARK RE: SUMMARY JUDGMENT-2-
NOV/IO/2009/TUE 08:37 AM FAX No, p, 004 
Prior to closing, it is Buyer's obligation to make sure that they are fully 
satisfied with the condition of the property, also any requirements, 
~nyitQrunental requirements, and all of the requirements that the Buyer needs 
to make for its due dm~e purposes. 
9. Your affiants have never been made aware of any problems with the condition of the 
real property or of any environmental concerns. 'The plaintiff did not further define 
due diligence in any manner in the written contract of the undersigned. 
10. At the time of signing the contract the real properties were both zoned R-l and 
remained zoned R-l up to and including the closing date of the contracts. 
11. 'The purpose of the purchase by the buyers was never comml11'licated to the 
undersigned affiant nor did the contract state any potential use of the real property 
being purchased by buyers. Both properties were historically used as farm 
operations. Your affiant did know, however, that plaintiff was in the business ofland 
speculation and development. Moreover, the sale of the real property by written 
contract never contained any language of speculative purposes or of development. 
12. In paragraph 6 of the Magera affidavit he states: "and any requirements for Buku's 
purposes." The undersigned disagrees with this assertion as the contract does not 
state as such nor was your affiant ever informed of "any requirements." 
13. Needless-ro-say, Jefferson County never changed the zoning requirements during 
the time between signing of the agreement and of the closing date. The real 
properties were zoned It-1 and remained zoned R"l at the time the contract called for 
closing. 
14. Paragraph 18 of the Magera affidavit is not accurate. The undersigned never 
"mutually understood" nor did the undersigned care about the plaintifFs potential 
use of the real property. The written contract does not contain language agreed to by 
AFFIDAVIT OF CLARK RE: SUMMARY JUDGMENT -3~ 
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the undersigned of any "use of the real property." In fact, the undersigned was lead 
to believe all was well and continued to beJieve the same after the closing date had 
passed. 
15. Your affiant did not participate nor have any knowledge of the plaintiffs involvement 
with any lending institutions. The financial background of the plaintiffs was never 
an issue of participation by your affiant nor was it any of his concern. 
16. The plaintiff exercised dominion and control over the real properties contained in 
the written contracts of the defendants/counter-plaintiffs. The real property of the 
undersigned was used for farming by buyer throughout the 2008 farm year. 
17. Brad Foster, agent of Magera and of the plaintiff, farmed the real ptOperty in the 
2008 year. 
18. Plaintiff continually infottned the undersigned affiant, subsequent to the dosing 
date, that the contract would be fulf'tlled and that payment would be forthcoming. 
19. Your affiant and his wife have remained ready, willing and able to sell the real 
property that is the subject of this lawsuit. 
20. Your affiant alleges that the plaintiff breached the written contract by non-
performance of the payment on the closing date and by continued exercise of 
dominion and control over the subject real property until as late as November, 2008. 
21. Your affiant has been damaged monetarily in the remaining sum of the contract and 
other miscellaneous costs and billings, including but not limited to, lost revenues on 
farming practices, lost interest, expenses of upkeep and utilities, tax assessments, 
attorney fees and costs. 
22. Your affiant believes and alleges that the plaintiff is liable for damages and/or is 
requested to perform on the contract (Specific Performance). 
AFFIDAVIT OF CLARK RE; SUMMARY JUDGMENT-4-
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DATED this '\ \ -\ \ day of November) 2009. 
Raoel Clark 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWO~for.e me ~ay of November, 2008. 
ROCIO FLORES J/"<\1 /~ ;0 A' 1, tr'tf'?'~ 
Notary Public ~ u v ~ \. 
STATE OF TEXAS Not~ry Public I 
Residing at: 
Commission: 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the Ll. day of November, 2009, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing was delivered to the following person( s) by: 
~_ Hand Delivery 
-.lL Postage-prepaid mail 
Facsimile Transmission 
DeAnne Casperson, Esq. 
P.O. Box 50130 
Idaho Falls) ID 83405 
Robin D. Durm, Esq. 
DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
Courtesy Copy: Judge Gregory Moeller 
Madison County Courthouse 
P.O. Box 389 
Rexburg, ID 83440 
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DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC. 
Robin D. Dunn, Esq., ISB #2903 
Amelia A. Sheets, Esq., ISB #5899 
477 Pleasant Country Lane 
P. O. Box 277 
Rigby, ID 83442 
(208) 745-9202 (t) 
(208) 745-8160 (f) 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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RAOEL H. CLARK and JANET C. 
CLARK, husband and wife; ANGUS 
JERRY PETERSON and BETTY JEAN 
PETERSON, husband and wife, 
Counter-Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
BUKU PROPERTIES, LLC an Idaho 
Limited liability company; and 





















MOTION TO STRIKE 
COMES NOW, the co-defendants/ counter-plaintiffs, by and through the 
HEARING NOTICE-l -
/ 
undersigned attorney, and hereby give notice of hearing on the Defendants/counter-
plaintiffs' Summary Judgment Request and upon the Motion to Strike Portions of the 
Magera Mfidavit. 
Said hearing is scheduled at the same time scheduled for the Summary Judgment 
Motion of the Plaintiff at the Jefferson County Courthouse, Rigby, Idaho at the hour of 1:30 
p.m. on the 14th day of December, 2009 before the above-entitled court. 
DATED this 13 day of November, 2009. 
Robin D. Dunn, Esq. 
DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
') 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the).5 day of November, 2009, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing was delivered to the following person( s) by: 
__ Hand Delivery 
~ Postage-prepaid mail 
Facsimile Transmission 
DeAnne Casperson, Esq. 
P.O. Box 50130 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
Robin D. Dunn, Psq. = 
DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
Courtesy Copy: Judge Gregory Moeller 
Madison County Courthouse 
P.O. Box 389 
Rexburg, ID 83440 
HEARING NOTICE-2-
I 
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Charles A. Homer, Esq. (ISB No. 1630) 
DeAnne Casperson, Esq. (ISB No. 6698) 
HOLDEN KIDWELL HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C. 
P.O. Box 50130 




•• ..1 , ' 
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
Telephone: (208) 523-0620 
Facsimile: (208) 523-9518 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE SEVENTH runrCIAL DISTRlCT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON 




RAOEL H. CLARK and JANET C. CLARK, 
husband and wife; ANGUS JERRY 
PETERSON and BETTY JEAN PETERSON, 
husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
RAOEL H. CLARK. and JANET C. CLARK, 
husband and wife; ANGUS JERRY 
PETERSON and BETTY JEAN PETERSON, 
husband and wife, 
Counter-Plaintiffs, 
v. 
BUKU PROPERTIES, LLC, an Idaho limited 
liability company, 
Counter-Defendants. 
Case No. CV-08-941 
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
1 - REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
! 
T-874 P,Q04/026 F-l00 
COMES NOW Buleu Propenies. LLC ("Buku"), by and through its counsel of record, 
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, PLLC, and submits this Reply Memorandum in Support 
of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment. 
I. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Because Plaintiff has already provided a thorough statement of facts to the Court in 
irs Memorandum in Support ofSumrnary Judgment, Plaintiffwill not repeat those arguments. 
Plaintiffwill simply address the additional factual allegations set forth by Defendants Raoel 
and Janet Clark and Jerry and Betty Peterson (collectively "Defendants") in their Denial of 
Plaintiff's Request for Summary Judgment and Objection to Consideration of Summary 
Judgment and associated affidavits.' 
Defendants state that both Petersol1s and Clarks received down payments on the real 
estate transactions because both parties were using the down payments to begin their 
retirements. Whatever plans Defendants made for use of the earnest money deposit were not 
of Bulcu's concern. Neither the Purchase and Sale Agreement with the Clarks nor the 
Purchase and Sale Agreement with the Petersons (collectively the "Agreements") make any 
I Defendants also filed Defendants' Request for Summary Judgment, but have not 
noticed it for hearing. Consequently, the only motions noticed for hearing on December 14, 
2009, is Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and Defendants' Motion to Strike. In 
response to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendants appear to argue only 
questions offact. However, for pwposes of their own Summary JUdgment, Defendants claim 
there are no material facts in dispute. 
2 - REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
mention of Defendants ' intentions regarding use of the earnest money deposit. Additionally. 
the Agreements contain a merger clause, stating: . 
This agreement, including the exhibits and documents referred to herein 
constitutes the entire agreement between the parties and supercedes any prior 
understanding, agreements or representations by or between the parties. written 
or oral, that may have related in any way to the subject matter hereof. 
(MageraAffidavit, Ex. A, ~ 18; Ex. B, ~ 18). Thus, any facts related to Defendants' use of 
the earnest money or plans they had at the time of execution for use of the earnest money 
should not be considered in interpreting the Agreements. 
Further, Defendants' assertion on page 5 of their Memorandum Re: Summary 
Judgment that "[n]o conditions were placed upon the sale of the real property as it related in 
any way. shape or fonn as to the County of Jefferson and any zoning or building 
requirements" is inaccurate and incorrect. Paragraph 3 of the Purchase and Sale Agreement 
states in pertinent part: 
Prior to closing, it is Buyer's obligation to make sure that they are fuUy 
satisfied with the condition of the property, also any requirements, 
environmental requirements, and all of the requirements that the Buyer needs 
to make for its due diligence purposes. Buyer will have four months to 
perform the due diligence inspections to satisfY Buyer's interests and concerns 
regarding the purchase. Thus. closing will be on or before December 21, 
2007. 
(Magera Affidavit, Ex. A, ~ 3; Ex. B, ~ 3). This paragraph ponders whatever requirements 
the Buyer (i.e., Buku) found necessary to satisfy its concerns for due diligence purposes, and 
can, and did for Buku's purposes, include the zoning of the property. Thus, Defendants' 
statement that no conditions were placed upon the sale of the property as related to zoning 
3 • REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
1-~{4 P.006/026 F-l00 
requirements should not be considered by the Court, due to the fact that it misstates the 
language of the Agreements. 
II. ARGUMENT 
A. The language of the Agreements is unambiguous, the Agreements should be 
enforced as written, and Buku is entitled to a refund of its earnest money 
pursuant to the plain language of the Agreements. 
Defendants contend that the language in the Agreements related to Buku's due 
diligence rights is "so vague as to be impossible for any court to know what 'buyer needs for 
its due diligence'" (Defendants' Memorandum Re: Summary Judgment, p. 6) and that the 
contract must be construed against Plaintiff as the drafter. Defendants cite USA Fertilizer, 
Inc. v. Idaho First National Bank, 815 P.2d 469, 474, 120 Idaho 271 eet. App. 1991) in 
support: of their argument. However, USA Fertilizer addresses a situation in which the 
contractual language was found to be ambiguous. ld. Here, the language in question is not 
ambiguous. Paragraph 3 of the Agreements, in pertinent part, states: 
Prior to closing, it is Buyer's obligation to make sure that they are fully 
satisfied wifu the condition of fue property, also any requirements, 
environmental requirements, and all of the requirements that the Buyer needs 
to make for its due diligence purposes. Buyer will have four months to 
perfonn the due diligence inspections to satisfy Buyer's interests and concerns 
regarding the purchase. 
(Magera Affidavit, Ex. A., 3; Ex. B. '3). While the phrase "all of the requirements that 
Buyer needs to make for its due diligence purposes" may not specifically state what the 
Buyer's requirements are, nothing about the statement is ambiguous. The language covers 
all requirements the Buyer may have for its due diligence purposes, whatever those may be. 
This unambiguously encompasses concerns about zoning and financing. Undoubtedly, the 
4· REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
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provision was broadly written to encompass a variety of concerns. Defendants' objection to 
such language after the fact, however, does not make the language ambiguous. 
Further, the Agreements are unambiguous with regard to the disposition of earnest 
money if the sate of the properties did not close. The Agreement with Clarks states; 
[I]n consideration of the sale of the property and assets under this agreement, 
Buyer shall pay Seller the sum of One Million Forty Four Thousand Seventy 
Five Dollars and Eighteen Cents ($1,044,075.18) payable as follows: 
(a) $25,000.00 upon execution of this agreement as earnest money all of 
such earnest money shall be refundable until closing. 
(Magera Affidavit, Ex. A, ,2). Likewise, the Agreement with the Petersons states: 
In consideration of the sale of the property and assets under this agreement, 
Buyer shall pay to Seller the sum of Nine Hundred Eighty Thousand Dollars 
($980,000.00) payable as follows: 
(a) $327,000.00 upon execution of this agreement as earnest money, 
$10,000.00 of the earnest money shall be non-refundable, the balance 
fully refundable 1llltil closing. 
(Magera Affidavit, Ex. B, ~ 2). The contractual1anguage regarding the disposition of 
earnest money is clear: if the sale fails to close, Buku is entitled to a return of its earnest 
money. 
"lfthe language ofa contract is unambiguous. then its meaning and legal effect must 
be determined from its words." Cristo Viene Pentecostal Church v. Paz, 144 Idaho 304, 308, 
160 P.3d 743, 747 (2007). Thus, because the language of the Agreements is Ullanlbiguous, 
the Agreements should be enforced based upon the clear meaning and legal effect of the 
language of the contract, and Buku is entitled to a refund of its $25,000.00 earnest money 
deposit to Petersons, and a refund of $317,000.00 of its earnest money deposit to Clarks. 
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Defendants also argue that "[i]n the instant case and believing the language to be 
ambiguous, it still becomes irrelevant for the reason that the plaintiff has relied upon the 
County of Jefferson's zoning as its only defense." (Defendants) Memorandum Re: Summary 
Judgment, p. 7). Defendants then go on to state that "[i]t [Plaintiff] believes that the subject 
property could not be zoned R-l. The affidavit ofN aysha F oster clearly rebuts this position 
and the issue of ambiguity becomes irrelevant." (Defendants' Memorandum Re: Summary 
Judgment, p. 7). First, in response to Defendants' arguments, Buku notified Defendants of 
its concerns with the zoning ofthe property and fmancing, because of the zoning, pursuant 
to its due diligence, and offered to extend the closing date from December 21,2007 to March 
I, 2008, in order to allow time for Defendants to cure. (Magera Affidavit, Ex. F). In a letter 
from their counsel dated December 19,2007, Defendants refused to cure the zoning defect 
and rejected Bulru's offer to extend the closing date. (Magera Affidavit, Ex. G). 
Defendants' refusal to cure terminated the Agreements and entitled Buku to a rerum of the 
earnest money. The exhibits to Naysha Foster's affidavit, which allegedly rebut Buku's 
position, are dated well after Plaintiff requested Defendants cure the zoning issues with the 
properties, and well after the Agreements were tenninated by the letter from Defendants' 
counsel on December 19,2007. Thus, Naysha Foster's testimony and the exhibits to her 
affidavit are irrelevant to the issue of whether the properties would be zoned R-1 or R~5 
during the relevant time or grandfathered to allow a higher density zoning. 
Further, and alternatively, if Naysha Foster's testimony has any relevance at all, it is 
that it evidences even more strongly that at the time Buku requested Defendants provide 
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assurance that the property would remain zoned R-l, there was uncertainty as to the future 
zoning of the properties. The application included as Exhibit 1 to Naysha Foster's affidavit 
is dated February 1, 2008, a month and a half after the termination of the Agreements. 
(Affidavit of Foster Re: Summary Judgment, Ex. 1). The minutes of the Jefferson County 
Planning and Zoning meeting are dated March 6, 2008, two and a half months after the 
termination of the Agreements. (Affidavit of Foster Re: Summary Judgment, Ex. 2), Finally, 
the letter from Jefferson County Planning and Zoning which claims that the development of 
the properties, if approved, would be grandfathered in as R-l, was dated March 26, 2008, 
nearly three months after the Agreements terminated. (Affidavit of Foster Re: Summary 
Judgment, Ex. 3). Thus, the zoning of the properties was not resolved roughly three months 
after the Agreements terminated. 
Additionally, and perhaps more importantly, Buku could have tenninated the 
Agreements ifit was unable to "satisfy its interests and concerns regarding the purchase." 
(Magera Affidavit, Ex. A. ~ 3; Ex. B, ~ 3). Buku's interests and concerns could include any 
issue Buku had with the property for any reason. Thus, whether the property was or was not 
zoned R-l at the time in question is ultimately irrelevant. Buku was able to walk away from 
the Agreements for any reason that kept Buku from satisfying its interests and concems 
regarding tile property, based upon the clear and unambiguous language of paragraph 3 of 
the Agreements. Buku timely identified a legitimate concern that Defendants refused to cure 
and the sale never closed. Plaintiffis entitled the refund onts earnest money. 
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by Defendant for summary judgment.2 
Defendants assert entitlement to summary judgment against Buku on a number of 
issues, including breach of contract, specific perfonnance, unjust enrichment, estoppel, 
detrimental reliance, and violation of the Consumer Protection Act. However, Defendants 
are not entitled to summary judgment on any of these claims. 
1. Buku did not breach the Agreements. Rather, Buku's satisfaction was a 
condition precedent to the closing of the Agreements and the Agreements 
terminated as a result of Defendants' failure to cure. 
Defendants state that "[s]ince the plaintiff breached the contract, the defendants are 
clearly entitled to liability on their counterclaim for breach of contract." (Defendants' 
Memorandum Re: Summary Judgment, p. 8). Defendants argue that Plaintiff breached the 
Agreements because Buku failed to pay the contract price on Or before the date of closing. 
(Memorandum Re: Summary Judgment, p. 5-6). However, this argument ignores the due 
diligence clause in paragraph 3 of the Agreements providing iliat Buku had four months to 
perfoITI1 the due diligence inspections to satisfy Buku's interests and concerns regarding the 
purchase. (Magera Aff., Ex. A, ~ 3; Ex. B, ,3). IfBuku was unsatisfied, Buku could choose 
not to close, and was entitled to the return of its earnest money, pursuant to the Agreements. 
(Magera Aff., Ex. A" 2(a)' 3; Ex. B" 2(a)' 3). 
Buku's satisfaction with the properties upon completion of its due diligence was a 
condition precedent to the closing of the sales. As the Idaho Supreme Court has stated: 
2 Although Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment has not been noticed for 
hearing, Plaintiff has responded in the event the Court desires to address both motions. 
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A condition precedent is an event not certain to occur, but which must OCCUf, 
before performance under a comract becomes due. Steiner v. Ziegler Tamura 
Ltd., Co .• 138 Idaho 238, 242, 61 P.3d 595, 599 (2000) (citing World Wide 
Lease, Inc. V. Woodwoth, 111 Idaho 880, 887, 728 P.2d 769, 776 (Ct.App. 
1986). A conditio11 precedent may be expressed in the parties' agreement. Id. 
When there is a failure of a condition precedent through no fault of the parties, 
no liability Of duty to perform arises under the contract. Id. Where a party is 
the cause of the failure of a condition precedent, he cannot take advantage of 
the failure. Fish v. Fleishman, 87 Idaho 126, 133, 391 P.2d 344, 348 (1964) 
(citing 3A CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, § 767 (1960)) ("One who unjustly 
prevents the performance or the happening of a condition of his own 
promissory duty thereby eliminates it as such a condition. He will not be 
permitted to take advantage of his own wrong, and to escape from liability for 
not rendering his promised performance by preventing the happening of a 
condition on which was promised.")) Where a party has control over the 
happening of a condition precedent he must make a Idaho reasonable effort 
to cause the condition to happen. Schleurer v. Nelson, 74 Idaho 396, 399, 263 
P.2d 386, 387 (1953); see also Wade Baker & Sons Farms v. Corp. of 
Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 136 Idaho 
922.42 P.3d 715 (Ct.App. 2002). 
Dengler v. Hazel Blessinger Family Trust, 141 Idaho 123, 128, 106 P.3d 449,455 (2005). 
In the case that a condition precedent does not occur. the contract is terminated at the option 
of the obligor. As Farnsworth on Contracts § 8.3 Effects of Nonoccurrence ofa Condition 
(2004) notes: 
Allowing the obligor to suspend perfonnance follows from the very 
definition of a condition. If a home purchaser conditions the duty to close the 
deal on the bank's approval of the purchaser's mortgage application, the 
purchaser is under no duty to take the deed and pay for the house if the bank 
has not approved the application. The purchaser may choose to suspend 
performance.on the ground that the condition has not occurred. 
Allowing the obligor to treat its duty as discharged follows because 
ordinarily the suspension cannot last indefinitely. There is usually some period 
oftime within which the condition must occur if it is to occur at all. This may 
be stared in a provision of the agreement or it may be a reasonable time under 
an implied term. Once the period has passed, it is too late for the condition to 
occur, and the party whose duty was originally conditional may choose to treat 
that duty as discharged - as no longer enforceable. If the bank does not 
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approve the purchaser' s mortgage application within the appropriate period of 
time, the purchaser may treat the duty to take the deed and pay for the house 
as discharged. lfthe purchaser does so, the home owner's duty to tender a 
deed to the house is also discharged. The purchaser is entitled to restitution of 
any down payment or part payment. 
In this case, Buku's satisfaction with the properties upon completion of its due diligence was 
a condition precedent. When Buku became aware Jefferson County was in the process of re-
zoning the area in which the properties were located, Buku made Defendants aware of its 
concern and specifically requested that Defendants cure or extend the closing date in order 
to provide Defendants time to cure. Thus, Defendants were given an opportunity to cure the 
failure of the condition precedent of Buku's satisfaction. Defendants, however, refused to 
cure. Defendants' refusal to cure resulted in the failure of Plaintiff s condition precedent 
of satisfaction, and after the date for closing passed without such closing, all of Plaintiffs 
contractual duties were discharged, the Agreements were tenninated, and Buku was entitled 
to a refund of its earnest money. 
Thus, there was no breach of contract on the part ofBuku because it timely identified 
a problem during its due diligence period which Defendants refused to cure or provide time 
to address, and the Agreements terminated as a result of Defendants ' failure to cure before 
closing. Defendants breached the Agreements by failing to return the earnest money after 
Buku made demand for those funds. 
2. Defendants are not entitled to specific performance of the Agreements. 
As Defendants noted in their Memorandum Re: Summary Judgment, "specific 
perfonnance is an equitable remedy and should not be granted when it would be unjust, 
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oppressive, or tIDconscionable." Suchan v. Rutherford, 90 Idaho 288,30 1,410 P .2d 434, 442 
(1966). Buku has complied with every aspect of the Agreements. Buku provided 
Defendants with notice of the zoning issues it had with the property. (Magera Aff., Ex. F). 
Defendants refused to cure and refused to agree to an extension of the closing date, despite 
Buku's offer to extend the closing date. (Magera Aff., Ex. F) Thus, the Agreements 
tenninated. Pursuant to the Agreements, Buku is entitled to a refund of its earnest money. 
Therefore, specific performance of the contract requires that the earnest money be returned 
to Buku. Any other form of specific performance as related to the Agreements would be 
unjust, oppressive and/or unconscionable due to Defendants' refusal to cure when requested 
by Buku or e:h'Iend the closing date. 
3. Defendants are not entitled summary judgment on the issue of unjust 
enrichment 
Defendants provide no argument as to why they would be entitled to summary 
judgment on the issue of unjust enrichment. They merely provide a few case law quotes and 
then provide no explanation of their applicability, or how Buku was allegedly unjustly 
enriched. As Buku provided in its Memorandum in Support of Motion for Sununary 
Judgment, "[t]he elements of unjust enrichment are that (1) a benefit is conferred on the 
defendant[s] by the Plaintiff, (2) the Defendant[s] appreciate[] the benefit; and (3) it would 
be inequitable for the defendant to accept the benefit without payment for the value of the 
benefit." Teton Peaks investmrmt Co., LLC v. Ohme, 146 Idaho 394. 195 P.3d 1207, 1211 
(2008). Buku is unsure what, ifany benefit, Defendants have conferred upon Buku. Rather, 
Buku conferred a benefit upon Defendants through the earnest money deposits. Defendants 
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have retained a sum of$342~OOO.OO between the two ofthem, and have used those funds for 
their own purposes, all the while aware of the fact that if the Agreements did not close, 
Defendants were required to return those funds. Thus, it is Defendants, not Buku, which 
have been unjustly enriched, and Buku is entitled a return of the earnest money, due to the 
fact that the sale of the properties did not close. 
4. Defendants cannot satisfy the elements of equitable estoppel or 
promissory estoppel/detrimental reliance, and are therefore not entitled 
to summary judgment on those issues. 
Defendants set forth case law regarding the doctrines of equitable estoppel and, 
presumably, promissory estoppel/detrimental reliance, but provide no explanation as to how 
that law applies to their situation. As Buku pointed out in its Memorandum in Support of 
Motion for Summary JUdgment, the elements of equitable estoppel are (1) a false 
representation or concealment of a material fact with actual or constructive knowledge of the 
truth, (2) the party asserting the estoppel did not know or could not discovery the truth, (3) 
the false representation or concealment was made with the intent that it be relied upon, and 
(4) the person to whom the representation was made or from whom the facts were concealed 
relied and acted upon the representation or concealment to his prejudice. See Winn v. 
Campbell, 145 Idaho 727, 732, 184 P.3d 852,857 (2008). Buku does not know what false 
representations or concealment of material facts Defendants are alleging. Buku engaged in 
no false representations or concealment of material facts regarding the Agreements. Buku 
made Defendants well aware of 111e issues it had with the zoning of the properties. (See 
Magera Affidavit, Ex. F). Defendants have filed to carry their burden of demonstrating they 
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are entitled to summary judgment and have completely failed to establish why sunnnary 
judgment should not be granted to Plaintiff on this issue. Consequently, Defendants cannot 
satisfy the necessary elements for equitable estoppel. 
Further, Defendants cannot meet the required elements of promissory estoppel. 
Promissory estoppel requires that (1) one party's reliance on a promise creates a substantial 
economic detriment, (2) the reliance was or should have been foreseeable, and (3) the 
reliance was reasonable and justified. See Gillespie v. Mountain Park Estates, LLC, 13 8 
Idaho 27,29, 56P.3d 1277, 1279 (2002). Buku assumes that Defendants' alleged reliance 
was reliance upon the closing of the sale of the properties. While Defendants may have used 
the earnest money funds for their own retirement purposes, including the Clarks' alleged 
purchase of a retirement home (Defendants' Memorandum Re: Summary Judgment, p. 4), 
it was unreasonable for Defendants to do so before the closing ofthe sale. Defendants were 
well aware that the Agreements contemplated that the sale would not close and that 
Defendants would be required to rerum the earnest money to Buku. In fact, generally, 
earnest monies are held in escrow and only disbursed upon closing. Defendants' use of the 
earnest money prior to closing was unreasonable and irresponsible. Thus, because 
Defendants reliance upon the closing of the sale of the properties was unreasonable, 
Defendants cannot satisfy the necessary elements for promissory estoppel/detrimental 
reliance. 
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5. Buku did not engage in consumer protection violations, and neither the 
Idaho Consumer Protection Act nor the Federal Trade Commission Act 
of 1934 apply to the Agreements. 
Although Defendants do not state how they allege Buku has violated either the Idaho 
Consumer Protection Act or the Federal Trade Commission Act, such argument would be 
irrelevant as neither the Idaho Consumer Protection Act nor the Federal Trade Commission 
Act apply to the transaction contemplated by the Agreements. In their Counterclaim, 
Defendants assert that, "[t]he counter .. defendants used unconscionable methods and acts to 
induce the counter-plaintiffs to sell and continue to keep their real properlY open for sale to 
the counter-defendants." As Buku stated in its Memorandum Re: Summary Judgment, this 
allegation apparently refers to Idaho Code § 48.603C, which states: 
(l) Any unconscionable method, act or practice in the conduct of any trade or 
commerce violates the provisions of this chapter whether it occurs before, 
during or after the conduct of the trade or commerce. 
Idaho Code § 48-602(2) deflnes "trade" or "commerce" for the purposes of the Idaho 
Consumer Protection Act to mean "the advertising, offering for sale~ selling, leasing, renting, 
collecting debts arising out of the sale or lease of goods or services or distributing goods or 
services! either to or from locations within the state of Idaho, or directly or indirectly 
affecting the people ofthis state." In this transaction, Buku was not selling or leasing any 
goods or services. Buku was the buyer in the transaction and this transaction involved real 
property, not goods or services. Therefore, the Idaho Consumer Protection Act does not 
apply. 
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Funher, because Defendants present case law referring to the Federal Trade 
Commission Act, Buku assumes that Defendants are attempting to assert a cause of action 
under that act as well. Plaintiff objects to Defendants' attempt to assert a federal cause of 
action not plainly appearing in its counterclaim. Consequently, if Defendants are asserting 
such a claim, Plaintiff reserves the right to remove this action to federal court based on 
original jurisdiction. 
The Federal Trade Commission Act (the "Act") prohibits "unfair methods of 
competition in or affecting commerce." See 15 U. S. C. § 45 (1). The Act defllles "commerce" 
as: 
... commerce among the several States or with foreign nations, or in any 
Territory of the United States or in the District of Columbia, or between any 
such Territory and another, or between any such Territory and any State or 
foreign nation. or between the District of Columbia and any State or Territory 
or foreign nation. 
15 U.S.C. § 44. The Act does not apply to the situation at hand for a multitude of reasons, 
the most obvious of which is thaI the transaction contemplated by the Agreements involves 
no interstate or inter-territorial commerce as required in the Act's definition of "commerce. " 
Rather, the parties were all Idaho residents at the time, and the real property in question is 
located in the State of Idaho. Consequently, Defendants have no cause of action under the 
Federal Trade Commission Act against Buku. 
C. Defendants' Counsel is a witness in this action. 
Defendants' counsel should have known since early in this case that, due to the 
significant role of the Jefferson County Planning and Zoning Commission in this matter, he 
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would likely have a conflict of interest due to his position as Jefferson County prosecutor. 
Now, in Defendants' response to Buku's Motion for Summary Judgment~ Defendants' 
counsel has included as a primary piece of evidence a letter from Jefferson County Planning 
and Zoning. This letter was signed by Defendants' counsel in his capacity as Jefferson 
County Prosecutor. (Affidavit of Foster Re: Summary Judgment, Ex. 3). Defendants' 
counsel is a material witness in this case and is the person who can speak to the zoning 
issues. Consequently, if Plaintiff is not entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law 
based upon the plain language of the Agreements, it seems apparent that Defendants) counsel 
cannot continue in this representative capacity based on his role as a material witness. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, Buku respectfully requests that this Court grant Buku' s 
Motion for Summary Judgment and dismiss all claims set forth by Defendants. 
Dated this ± day of December, 2009 
p.oLDeAnne Casperson, Esq. o HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, p .L.L.C. 
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COMES NOW Buku Properties, LLC ("Buku~'), by and through its counsel of record, 
Holden, Kidwell. Hahn & Crapo, PLLC, and submits this Memorandum in Opposition to 
Defendants' Motion to Strike. 
I. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Bulru submitted its Motion for Summary Judgment on October 6, 2009. In support 
of its Motion for Summary Judgment, Buku submitted the Affidavit of Jaramie Magera 
("Magera Affidavit"). Defendants Raoel and Janet Clark and Jerry and Betty Peterson 
(collectively "Defendants") have now objected to portions of the Magera Affidavit. Buku 
provides the following in response to Defendants' objections. 
II. ARGUMENT 
Defendant sets fOM several portions of the Magera Affidavit which it requests the 
Coun to strike. Defendants' objections are vague and not well explained and the vast 
majority of Defendants' objections are that the named paragraphs are "speculation and 
hearsay." However, as addressed below, the bases for those objections as provided by 
Defendants are not applicable to the statements addressed by Defendants, and Defendants' 
motion to strike should be denied. 
Defendants' first objection to the Magera Affidavit is that paragraph 16 contains 
speculation and is hearsay. Buku is unsure how the statement in paragraph 16 that "[a]t the 
time the parties entered into each respective Purchase and Sale Agreement, both the Peterson 
property and the Clark property were zoned as Residential .. ] ("R-llI), which would allow a 
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minimum density of one acre lots" is speculative or is hearsay. It is a statement of fact, 
admitted by Defendants~ as to the zoning of the Peterson property and Clark property during 
the time stated. Therefore, paragraph 16 should not be stricken. 
Defendants' next objection is that paragraph 17 contains speculation and hearsay. 
Paragraph 17 states, "Buku intended to purchase the properties for a residential development. 
Buku's development plan was based on being able to sell lots of at least as small as one acre. 
Buleu obtained a financial commitment for the purchase of the properties from the Bank of 
Commerce based on its development plan of approximately one-acre lots." These statements 
are not speculative. They articulate the details of Buku's intent for development of the 
properties and the related financing Buku obtained. Furthermore, these statements are not 
hearsay. Magera, as the agent for Buku! may testify as to Buku's intent and actions. 
Defendants also object to paragraph 18 on the grounds that it contains speculation and 
hearsay. Paragraph 18 states: "[A]tthetime ofemeringinto the respective Purchase and Sale 
Agreements, all parties mutually understood that the purchase of both properties was subject 
to Buku being able to develop the property with the density of development accorded to a R-
I zone, i.e., one-acre lots." Buku may testifY as to Defendants' understanding of the details 
of the agreement based upon its interactions with Defendants. Such testimony is admissible 
as an admission by a party-opponent. See Idaho Rule of Evidence 80 1 (d)(2). Additionally, 
Buku's testimony is not specUlative. It is a conclusion drawn by Buku based upon its 
interactions with Defendants. Therefore, there is nothing in the Idaho Rules of Evidence that 
prohibits Jaramie Magera's testimony in paragraph 18 of the Magera Affidavit. 
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Additionally, Defendants object to paragraph 19 on the grounds that "[t ]he county is 
not a pany and is irrelevant, the newspaper article is hearsay and not reflective of the actual 
administrative proceedings." First, any actions taken by the county regarding zoning are 
e>..1rernely relevant because Ulose actions affected Buku's ability to develop the properties 
and obtain fmancing. Additionally, the newspaper article, which Defendants claim is 
hearsay, was provided to Buku by Defendants themselves during discovery. Further. the 
newspaper article is not asserted for the truth of its content, but only for purposes of 
documentation that Buku had a legitimate concern over the zoning. 
Defendants also object to paragraph 20 on the grounds that it contains speculation and 
hearsay. Paragraph 20 states: 
Upon performing its due diligence investigation concerning the properties, 
Plaintiff discovered the Jefferson County Planning and Zoning Commission! s 
plans to change the zoning categorization ofthe Clark and Peterson properties. 
The development could not go forward as planned unless Jefferson County 
"grandfathered" the development to exempt it from the zoning ordinances. 
Both the Clarks and Petersons were aware of the problem because we all 
attended the zoning meeting. 
(MageraAffidavit, ,20). This paragraph does not contain speculation. Magera merely states 
the facts as they occurred. Magera, as agent for Buku, learned that Jefferson County was 
planning to change the zoning ordinances to decrease the allowable density oflots and Buku 
would be unable to go forward with developing the properties unless the properties were 
grandfathered in under the ordinance. Additionally, Magera' s statement that" [b ]oth Clarks 
and Petersons were aware of the problem because we all attended the zoning meeting," is not 
speculation or hearsay. Magera witnessed the Clarks and Petersons at the meetings, as is 
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indicated by his testimony. The zoning changes were discussed at those meetings. Therefore, 
it is not speculative for Magera to testify that Clarks and Petersons were aware of the zoning 
changes and that this would create problems with Buku's plans for development of the 
properties. 
Next, Defendants object to paragraph 21 on the grounds that "[t]he bank's 
representative statements are hearsay, his opinion is irrelevant, and the conversations are 
hearsay" and that "[c]onversations are hearsay and the letter attached as Exhibit D is 
hearsay." Although Magera's statements regarding his mid-December telephone 
conversation with J eromy Hart from the Bank of Commerce may qualify as hearsay, the 
contents of that conversation were reiterated in the January 2008 lener from Jeromy Han 
attached to the Magera Affidavit as Exhibit D. Contrary to Defendants ~ contention, the letter 
is not hearsay. It simply summarizes tile loan approval process by the Bank of Commerce 
up to the date of the letter, and informs Buku that the Bank must receive verification from 
Jefferson County that the properties will remain zoned R-l residential. Therefore, the letter 
is not hearsay, and is admissible. Further, Magera can testify that Buku could not obtain 
financing with the zoning change and that he received this information from the bank. 
Finally, Defendants object to paragraph 24, stating that it contains speculation and 
hearsay. Paragraph 24 states: "Buku continued to try and resolve the matter, but considered 
the Agreements terminated as a result of the Clarks and Peterson's refusal to cure the zoning 
defect as identified by Buku during its due diligence period." There is nothing speculative 
about this statement. It clealy states that Buku considered the Agreements terminated due 
5. MEMORANDUM TN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE 
1-~r4 P,025/026 F-l00 
Defendants' failure to cure the defect identified by Buku. Furthert nothing in paragraph 24 
is hearsay, It contains no statement of any other party. Therefore, the statements in 
paragraph 24 are admissible. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Buku respectfully requests that the Court deny Defendants' 
Motion to Strike Portions of Magera Affidavit. 
Dated this'1*day of December, 2009. _ 
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December 14,2009, at 2:39 P.M., this motion to strike came on for hearing before the 
Honorable Gregory W. Moeller, District Judge, sitting in open court at Rigby, Idaho. 
Mr. David Marlow, Court Reporter, and Ms. Nancy Andersen, Deputy Court Clerk, were 
present. 
Ms. Deanne Casperson appeared on behalf of the plaintiff. 
Mr. Robin Dunn appeared on behalf of the defendants. 
Mr. Dunn presented argument in support of the motion to strike. 
Ms. Casperson presented argument in objection to motion to strike. 
Mr. Dunn responds. 
The Court will take the matter under advisement. 
Ms. Casperson presented argument on motion for summary judgment. 
Mr. Dunn presented argument objecting to summary judgment. 
Ms. Casperson responds. 
The Court will take the matter under advisement. 
MINUTE ENTRY - I I 
Court was thus adjourned. 
c: Deanne Casperson, Esq. 
Robin Dunn, Esq. 
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I. THE FACTS 
Case No. CV-08-941 
MEMORANDUM 
DECISION 
Buku Properties, LLC has filed a verified complaint which seeks the 
return of earnest money deposits on a terminated sale of two properties: one 
owned by Raoel and Janet Clark ("Clark Property") and the other owned by 
Angus and Jerry Peterson ("Peterson Property"). Buku entered into separate 
purchase and sale agreements with the Clarks ("Clark Agreement") and 
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Parkinsons ("Parkinson Agreement"). Both agreements were signed on August 
30,2007. 
At issue in this case are provisions from the Agreements pertaining to the 
earnest money paid by Buku. On October 23,2007 Buku and the Clarks amended 
their purchase and sale agreement to reflect the oral agreement between the 
parties regarding the previously tendered $25,000 earnest money. 1 Under 
Peterson Agreement, Buku tendered $327,000 in earnest money. The contract 
provided that all but $10,000 was fully refundable until closing. The $327,000 
was tendered on August 30, 2007.2 
Both Purchase and Sale Agreements afforded Buku four months, from 
August 30 until December 30, to perform its due diligence inspections "to satisfy 
[Buku's] interests and concerns regarding the purchase.,,3 During the four month 
period, Buku learned of a proposed zoning change which might affect the Clark 
and Peterson properties. The change could potentially decrease the value of the 
properties. It is undisputed that at time of entering into both Purchase and Sale 
Agreements, the Clark Property and the Peterson Property were zoned 
Residential-l ("R -1 "). 
Both parties acknowledge that between August 30, 2007 and December 
18, 2007, issues arose regarding the Jefferson County Planning and Zoning 
Commission's possible plans to change the zoning categorization of the Clark 
Property and Peterson Property. While the parties strongly dispute the relevance 
and import of the zoning to the Agreements, they acknowledge that the zoning of 
the properties was discussed. Several letters and notices between the parties and 
their counsel were exchanged prior to the closing date and have been submitted to 
the Court. 
Buku's dealings with the Defendants and their property continued after 
January 2008. The Affidavit of Raoel Clark states, "The real property of the 
1 Magerra Aff., Ex. A, ~ 2 (Oct. 6, 2009). 
2 rd. at Ex. B, ~ 2. 
3 rd. at Ex. A, ~ 3; Ex.B, ~ 3. 
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(Clarks] was used for farming by buyer throughout the 2008 farm year.,,4 
Promises were made by Buku, subsequent to closing, that "the contract would be 
fulfilled and that payment would be forthcoming."s The Clark affidavit also 
alleges that Buku maintained control over the property until November 2008.6 
The Affidavit of Jerry and Betty Peterson state similar positions. 
Additionally, the Petersons allege that Buku's real estate agent listed the Peterson 
Property for sale, posted for sale signs on the property, and had a lock box on the 
home until November 2008.7 The Petersons' affidavit also states that there were 
ongoing negotiations between the parties throughout 2008 on matters concerning 
sale of the property and zoning issues. 
Buku has filed a motion for summary judgment and the Court has heard 
oral argument. This decision addresses Buku's motion. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the moving party must 
show that there is no genuine issue of any material fact and that it is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. 8 The moving party bears the burden to prove the 
absence of material facts. To meet this burden the moving party must challenge 
in its motion and establish through evidence that no issue of any material fact 
exists for an element of the nonmoving party's case.9 If the moving party fails to 
challenge an element or fails to present evidence establishing the absence of a 
genuine issue of material fact on that element, the burden does not shift to the 
4 Aff. of Raoel Clark in Support of Defendants' Positions Re: SummaI)' Judgment, ~16 (Nov. 13, 
2009). 
5 Id. at ~18. 
6 rd. at ~20. 
7 Aff. of Jeny and Betty Peterson in Support of Defendants' Positions Re: Summary Judgment, ~~ 
18,24 (Nov. 13,2009). 
8 LR.C.P. 56(c). 




nonmoving party and the nonmoving party is not required to respond with 
. 'd 10 supportmg eVI ence. 
In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court must liberally 
construe the facts in the existing record, and draw all reasonable inferences in 
favor of the nonmoving party. 1 1 Summary judgment must be denied if reasonable 
persons could reach differing conclusions or draw conflicting inferences from the 
evidence presented. 
III. DISCUSSION 
1. Defendants' motion to suppress portions offhe Magera Affidavit is 
denied. 
In support ofBuku's summary judgment motion, it submitted the affidavit 
of laramie Magera. Defendants have moved to strike the following paragraphs 
and exhibits from that affidavit: Paragraphs 16, 17, 18, 19,20,21,24; and 
Exhibits C, D, E, and F. 
laramie Magera was Buku's manager at the time of the events at issue in 
this case. He was involved in negotiating the Agreements with Defendants and 
arranging for financing to purchase the properties. He also attended planning and 
zoning meetings regarding the zoning of the Clark and Peterson properties. 
Defendants object to Paragraphs 16, 17, 18,20 and 24 because they claim 
these paragraphs contain "speculation and hearsay." Having the paragraphs, the 
Court finds that each involves matters that Mr. Magera would be expected to 
know in his capacity as Buku's manager. The Court notes that Mr. Magera's 
affidavit merely states the facts as Mr. Magera perceives them; his affidavit only 
reflects his opinion and belief. Any reference by Mr. Magera to Defendants' 
thoughts or motives are understood by the Court as only Mr. Magera's personal 
10 Thomson v. Idaho Ins. Agency, Inc., 126 Idaho 527, 530, 887 P.2d 1034, 1038 (1994). 
II Bear Island Water Ass 'n. v. Brown, 125 Idaho 717, 874 P.2d 528 (1994). 
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understanding of the Defendants' intentions, nothing more. The Court can sort 
through these speculative statements and disregard them as appropriate. 
Defendants' motion is denied as to those paragraphs, but any speculative 
statements about the thoughts and intentions of others will be given little, if any, 
weight. 
Defendants' also object to a newspaper article attached as Exhibit C to the 
Magera Affidavit on hearsay grounds. The Magera Affidavit cites Exhibit C in 
Paragraph 19 of his affidavit. It appears to the COUli from both the affidavit and 
the parties oral argument that the Exhibit is being proffered not to establish the 
truth of the matter asserted, but rather, merely to show that the zoning of the 
properties was a matter going on at the time of the article. 12 Defendants' 
objection to Exhibit C is denied. 
Paragraph 21 deals with conversations between Mr. Magera and the Bank 
of Commerce where Buku was to receive financing to purchase the properties. 
Mr. Magera's affidavit states that the bank "would not fund the loan if the zoning 
was changed because the value ofthe properties would be substantially less." 
Exhibit D to Mr. Magera's affidavit is a letter from the bank to Mr. Magera 
stating concerns about the financing. To the extent that Paragraph 21 and Exhibit 
D are offered to establish the truth of the matter asserted (i.e., the ban1e's thinking 
or positions), the paragraph and exhibit are stricken as hearsay. To the extent they 
are offered only to establish Mr. Magera's knowledge about Buku's position with 
the bank and Buku's receipt of a letter from the bank, Defendants' objection is 
overruled. 
As to Exhibits E and F (unsigned offers by Buku to Defendants offering to 
extend the closing date) the Court sees no reason to strike them at this point. 
Certainly the Court notes that neither the Clarks nor Petersons signed the offers. 
Defendants' concerns go more to the weight of the evidence, and not their 
12 See also Idaho Rule of Evidence 902(6). 
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admissibility. However, the Exhibits could be admissible to establish other facts, 
such as notice. Therefore, the motion to strike these exhibits is denied. 
2. The Agreements are neither ambiguous nor indefinite "when applying 
the instrument[sJ to the facts as they exist." 
Buku seeks summary judgment in its favor and return of earnest money it 
paid to the Clarks and the Petersons. According to Buku, there are no issues of 
fact as to the terms of the Clark and Peterson Agreements or Buku's entitlement 
to recover under the Agreements. The Court agrees with Buku that the terms of 
the Agreements are unambiguous; however, the Court finds that there are issues 
of fact regarding Buku's entitlement to recover under the contracts. First, the 
Court will address the language of the contracts. 
Both Buku and Defendants cite Paragraph 3 of the respective Agreements. 
Both Agreements contain the same language. 
Prior to closing, it is Buyer's obligation to make sure that they are 
fully satisfied with the condition of the property, also any 
requirements, environmental requirements, and all of the 
requirements that the Buyer needs to make for its due diligence 
purposes. Buyer will have four months to perform the due 
diligence inspections to satisfy Buyer's interests and concerns 
regarding the purchase. 13 
It is the last phrase that Defendants claim is ambiguous or indefinite-Buku had 
four months to perform due diligence inspections "to satisfy [Buku's] interests 
and concerns regarding the purchase." According to Defendants, Buku's 
"interests and concerns" could be so broad as to include anything. According to 
the Defendants, such open language makes the clause so ambiguous or indefinite 
as to be unenforceable. 
13 Magera Aff., Ex. A, ~ 3; Ex.A, ~ 3; Ex.B ~ 3. 
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It is well settled that "ambiguous earnest money agreements will not 
support an award of specific performance or damages.,,14 A good summary of the 
law pertaining to ambiguity in contracts is contained in the 2007 Idaho Supreme 
Court case of Swanson v. Beco Const. Co., Inc. ls The Court explains that 
ambiguities in a contract can be either patent or latent. "Idaho courts look solely 
to the face of a written agreement to determine whether it is [patently] 
ambiguous.,,16 "A latent ambiguity is not evident on the face of the instrument 
alone, but becomes apparent when applying the instrument to the facts as they 
exist. ,,17 
To determine whether a contract is patently ambiguous, a cOUli reads the 
contract's words or phrases given their established definitions in common use or 
settled legal meanings. For a contract term to be ambiguous, there must be at 
least two different reasonable interpretations of the term, or it must be 
nonsensical. I8 The Idaho Supreme Court clarified, 
A party's subjective, undisclosed interpretation of a word or phrase 
cannot make the contract ambiguous. If it could, then all contracts 
would be rendered ambiguous merely by a party asserting a 
misunderstanding of the meaning of one or more of the words 
used. The voluntary failure to read a contract does not excuse a 
party's performance. 19 
After applying the law as stated by the Supreme Court, this Court finds that 
neither the Clark nor the Peterson Agreement is so ambiguous or indefinite as to 
render the Agreement unenforceable. 
The Contracts are not patently ambiguous. The language at issue-
"[Buku] will have four months to perform the due diligence inspections to satisfy 
14 Hilbert v. Hough, 132 Idaho 203,969 P.2d 836 (Idaho App., 1998) (citing several Idaho 
Supreme Court cases). 
15 Swanson v. Beco Canst. Co., Inc., 145 Idaho 59, 175 P.3d 748 (2007). 
16 Id. (quoting Wardv. Puregro Co., 128 Idaho 366, 369, 913 P.2d 582, 585 (1996); Accord, 
Valley Bank v. Christensen, 119 Idaho 496, 808 P.2d 415 (1991 )). 
17 Swanson v. Beco Canst. Co. (quoting In re Estate of Kirk, 127 Idaho 817, 824, 907 P.2d 794, 




Buyer's interests and concerns regarding the purchase"-is straightforward and 
clear. That Buku's "interests and concerns" could potentially be quite broad is 
true, but Defendants do not claim the terms have "at least two different reasonable 
interpretations." Nor do Defendants claim the terms are "nonsensical." The 
Court finds no patent ambiguity. 
The Court further finds that the terms have no latent ambiguity. When 
applying the Agreements "to the facts as they exist," the Court finds the 
Agreements unambiguous. Buku was given four months to conduct due diligence 
concerning the properties. Potential zoning changes and their impact on financing 
are precisely the type of issues typically dealt with during the due diligence phase 
of a real estate transaction. In short, under the facts of this case, it is reasonable 
that Buku would look into potential zoning problems, and that uncertainty 
regarding the properties' zoning would affect its "interests and concerns." There 
is no latent ambiguity in the contract. 
The Court finds that the wording above is unambiguous and not so 
indefinite as to make the contract illusory. "If the language of a contract is 
unambiguous, then its meaning and legal effect must be determined from its 
words.,,2o However, despite the Court's finding that the written contract is 
unambiguous, the Court cannot grant summary judgment in Buku's favor at this 
time. As will be explained below, there are issues of fact in the record, when 
construed in a light most favorable to Defendants, that suggest Buku may not be 
entitled to recover under the unambiguous contracts. 
3. There are issues of fact as to the parties' relations after the closing 
date. 
The written contracts between the parties are unambiguous and definite; 
however, issues of fact remain as to Buku's entitlement to the earnest money 
under the contracts. The behavior of the parties after the December 2007 closing 
20 Cristo Viene Pentecostal Church v. Paz, 144 Idaho 304, 308,160 P.3d 743, 747 (2007). 
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date persuades the Court that the "agreement" between the parties may not have 
ended after the closing date. After the failed closing, the parties' behavior 
suggests that an arrangement possibly still existed between the parties for the sale 
and purchase of the property. It is unclear what that arrangement was or what it 
means. Nevertheless, it seems clear to the Court that the parties' behavior 
subsequent to closing could be due to a later agreement that might affect Buku's 
entitlement to earnest money under the earlier Agreements. 
The Clark and Peterson affidavits explain that Buku was involved in 
farming the property throughout 2008. The Clark affidavit states, "The real 
property ofthe [Clarks] was used for farming by buyer throughout the 2008 farm 
year.,,21 The affidavit continues stating that promises were made by Buku, 
subsequent to closing and that Buku's control over the Clark Property continued 
until November 2008.22 Raoel Clark also states that throughout 2008, not only 
were there negotiations concerning the property, but that Buku communicated that 
"the contract [presumably the Purchase and Sale Agreement] would be fulfilled 
and that payment would be forthcoming.,,23 All of these statements suggest that 
an agreement existed between Buku and the Clarks subsequent to the December 
2007 closing date. Before the Court decides Buku's entitlement to earnest money 
under the Clark Agreement, the Court must understand the entire arrangement 
between the parties. 
Summary judgment is similarly premature on the Peterson Agreement. 
Buku and the Petersons had an arrangement similar to the arrangement between 
Buku and the Clarks. The Petersons affidavit alleges that Buku's real estate agent 
listed the Peterson Property, posted signs on the property, and had a lock box on 
the home as late as November 2008.24 Additionally, the Petersons' affidavit states 
that there were ongoing negotiations between the parties throughout 2008 on 
matters concerning the sale of the property and zoning issues. Certainly some 
21 Aff. ofRaoel Clark ~16. 
22 Id. at ~20. 
23 Id. at ~18. 
24 Aff. of Jerry and Betty Peterson, ~~ 18,24. 
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kind of arrangement existed between Buku and the Petersons after December 
2007. 
It would be premature for the Court to rule that a written contract with a 
December 2007 closing date is the final word when so much of the parties' 
"agreement" occurred during the eleven months after the scheduled closing. 
Before the Court enforces the terms of the parties earlier written agreement, the 
Court must be satisfied as to the arrangement of the parties after the closing date. 
Even if the earlier agreements are unambiguous, there is a genuine issue of 
material fact as to what the parties intended while Buku possessed the property 
from December 30, 2007 until November 2008. 
Based on the material issues of fact stated above, the Court finds that 
summary judgment is premature. Although Clarks' and Petersons' pleadings and 
summary judgment brief are unclear as to how the legal and equitable principles 
they cite apply to these facts, the Court still finds that Defendants' have raised 
sufficient issues of fact to preclude summary judgment at this point. Summary 
judgment is denied as to all ofBuku's claims and all of Defendants' 
counterclaims, with one exception which the Court will address next. 
4. Summary judgment is granted in Buku's favor as to Defendants' 
counterclaim involving the Idaho Consumer Protection Act. 
The Defendants filed a counterclaim alleging that Buku violaTed the Idaho 
Consumer Protection Act. The Court grants summary judgment in Buku' s favor 
as to that claim. 
The statute Defendants rely upon was intended to protect consumers. 
Section 48-601 states, "The purpose of this act is to protect both consumers and 
businesses against unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts and 
practices in the conduct of trade or commerce .... " The next section of the Act 
defines "trade" and "commerce" as "the advertising, offering for sale, selling, 
leasing, renting, collecting debts arising out of the sale or lease of goods or 
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services or distributing goods or services .... " The Act is clearly inapplicable to 
the facts in this case. 
Defendants' brief states, "The Act is designated to prevent fraudulent 
practices to consumers and applies both through the attorney general and through 
a private lawsuit. The plaintiff has lead the defendants/counter-plaintiffs down a 
path that has caused harm and damage to their retirement programs.,,25 
Defendants ignore the fact that the Clarks and Petersons are sellers of the real 
property at issue, and they cite no authority to support the position'that the Act 
provides a remedy for a seller of real property. Therefore, Buku is entitled to 
summary judgment on this counterclaim as a matter of law. 
5. Counsel for Defendants could be disqualified as attorney for 
Defendants on conflict of interest grounds ifhe is listed as a material 
witness in the trial of this case. 
Buku argues in its Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion 
for Summary Judgment that Defendants' counsel, Mr. Robin D. Dunn, has a 
conflict of interest in that he is both a witness and an advocate in this case. In 
addition to representing Defendants, Mr. Dunn also represents Jefferson County. 
Jefferson County is not party to this suit; however, actions by Jefferson County 
Planning and Zoning appear to be an important issue in the case. Mr. Dunn has 
submitted a March 26, 2008 letter to the Court signed by him in his capacity as 
Jefferson County's Prosecuting Attorney.26 The letter appears to address a 
potential material issue in this case-the zoning status of the Clark and Peterson 
properties. 
An attorney's job is to submit legal arguments on behalf of his client; he is 
an advocate. A witness is an individual who submits evidence concerning the 
material facts in the case. Conflicts of interest arise when one acts both as an 
advocate for a position and as a witness to factual information supporting that 
25 Defendants' Memorandum Re: Summary Judgment, p. 14 (Nov. 13,2009). 
26 Aff. of Foster Re: Summary Judgment, Ex. 3 (Nov. 13,2009). 
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posItron. An attorney can be either an advocate or a witness, but normally he 
cannot be both. 27 Idaho Rule of Professional Conduct 3.7 states in pertinent part: 
(a) A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in which the 
lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness unless: 
(1) the testimony relates to an uncontested issue; 
(2) the testimony relates to the nature and value of 
legal services rendered in the case; or 
(3) disqualification of the lawyer would work 
substantial hardship on the client. 
It would be premature for the Court to disqualify Defendants' counsel now 
because he has not been listed as a trial witness by either side. If Mr. Dunn is 
listed as a trial witness by Defendants, the Court will take up the issue again, if 
necessary. However, ifMr. Dunn is listed as a trial witness by Buku, a hearing 
will be necessary to ascertain whether or not Mr. Dunn's testimony is necessary 
and/or material to Buku's case. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Buku's Motion for Summary Judgment is 
DENIED on all grounds except for Defendants' counterclaim regarding the Idaho 
Consumer Protection Act. Defendants' motion to strike is DENIED. 
So Ordered. ~ 
DATED this;2.7 day of January, 2010. 
~ 
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NOTICE OF TAKING 
DEPOSITION DUCES TECUM 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that ROBIN D. DUNN, ESQ., attorney for defendants, 
RAOEL H. CLARK, JANET C. CLARK, JERRY PETESON and BETTY JEAN 
PETERSON, shall take the deposition upon oral examination, pursuant to the Idaho Rule 
of Civil Procedure ofJARAMIE MAGERA, commencing at 9:30 o'clock a.m. on the 17th day 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON 
BUKU PROPERTIES, LLC. an Idaho 
limited liability company. 
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v. 
RAOEL H. CLARK and JANET C. 
CLARK, husband and wife; ANGUS 
JERRY PETERSON and BETTY JEAN 
PETERSON, husband and wife, 
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completed, at which place and time you are invited to appear and take part in such deposition. 
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Case No. CV-08-941 
DEFENDANTS' OBJECTION 
TO ''NOTICE OF DEPOSITION 
OF RAOEL H. CLARK" AND 
REQUEST FOR PERMISSION TO 
TAKE TESTIMONY VIA TELEPHONE 
COMES NOW, Robin D. Dunn, Esq., attorney for Raoel H. Clark, and objects to 
that Notice of Deposition of Raoel H. Clark for the following reasons: 
1. The plaintiff is aware that Raoel H. Clark does not reside in the State of 
Idaho. He resides in Texas with his wife during their retirement years. 
Raoel H. Clark makes periodic visits to Idaho and cannot be available at 
the time indicated in the Notice of Deposition of Raoel H. Clark scheduled 
for March 17, 2010 at Dunn Law Offices, PLLC in Rigby, Idaho. 
2. Other depositions have been sought and scheduled on that date after the 
defendants scheduled the deposition of agents for the plaintiff. As an 
accommodation, the undersigned indicated that Jerry Peterson could be 
deposed on said date and requested that telephonic deposition be set for 
Raoel H. Clark. The plaintiffs have objected to that matter and the 
defendants ask for permission of the above-entided Court to set this matter 
by telephonic deposition. 
3. This matter needs to be heard as soon as possible, preferably 
telephonically, with the Court in Chambers in Madison County, Idaho to 
determine the procedure as Raoel H. Clark is not available on the date set 
by plaintiff. 
DATED this i day of March, 2010. 
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Case No. CV-08-941 
NOTICE OF TELEPHONIC 
HEARING 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE, that on the 12th day of March, 2010, at 10:00 a.m., 
or as soon thereafter as counsel can be heard, telephonically, before the Honorable 
I.NOTICE OF HEARING 
Honorable Greg Moeller, counsel for Defendants, Raoel H. Clark, Janet C. Clark, 
Angus Jerry Peterson and Betty Jean Peterson, Robin D. Dunn, Esq., Dunn Law 
Offices, in the above-entided action will call up for hearing their Objection to «Notice 
of Deposition of Raoel H. Clark" and Request for Permission to Take Testimony Via 
Telephone. 
DATED this _9'---_ day of March, 2010. 
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Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
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DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
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P.O. Box 389 
Rexburg, ID 83440 
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March 12,2010, at 10:00 A.M., the defendant's Objection to "Notice of Deposition of 
Raoel H. Clark" and Request for Permission to Take Testimony Via Telephone carne on for 
hearing before the Honorable Gregory W. Moeller, Djstrict Judge, sitting in open court at 
Madison, Idaho. 
The parties stipulated to proceedjng without a court reporter present. 
Ms. Angie Wood, Deputy Court Clerk, was present. 
Ms. DeAnne Casperson appeared telephonically on behalf of the plaintiff 
, I\V"I .'..--. ...... ."",....,., ""....,"".\1.., .. U\JUUU\J ...... \01 \rn.I/J11nn. I' ,VIV 11."t"t/~I. 1 1 ,"+';)/I"IV. (vVUVVVIQ..:;> r- '" 
Mr. Robin Dunn appeared telephonically on behalf of the defendant. 
Counsel indicated that they had reached a resolution. 
Mr. Dunn withdrew his Objection. 
LTjz?tJ.¥ Court was thus adjourned. 
GREGORY W. MOELLER 
District Judge 
\\\ \\\ 111111111/1' 
~\.\ Ill'!, 
~~ ~ .Ly I'~ .t y<. ••...• fJo ~~ ....C(- g" ;.-: ~ J... 'itJ:". V ~ 
.:::: '" ,. ~'.. ~ 
::_, ... \ '1>".""-;::. 
::::0;0 Ot U ::: 
=..J;'~ ~:;= 
~4-~.~ ~J'- == 
-:;::. ,., '. 0 "'I '" .:::: ~ V -•. ':J • " .:::-~"/. ........ "'-... 
~o .. ····· .. .--v~ ~/I. r, r H it. ':0.,0$:' 
'/11/ \\--
11111/ III \ \ \\\\\ 
c: Robin D. Dunn, Esq. 
DeAnne Casperson, Esq. 
Charles A. Homer., Esq. (ISB No. 1630) 
DeAnne Casperson, Esq. (ISB No. 6698) 
HOLDEN KIDWELL HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C. 
P.O. Box 50130 
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
Telephone: (208) 523-0620 
Facsimile: (208) 523-9518 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
'r 
f{! / F 
'i. 
IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON 
BUKU PROPERTIES, LLC, an Idaho 
limited liability company, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
RAOEL H. CLARK and JANET C. 
CLARK, husband and wife; ANGUS 
JERRY PETERSON and BETIY JEAN 
PETERSON, husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
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NOTICE OF VACATING 
DEPOSITION OF RAOEL H. CLARK 
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COMES NOW PlaintiffBuku Properties, LLC, and its counsel of record, and hereby 
gives notice that the deposition on oral examination of Defendant Raoel H. Clark scheduled 
for the 17th day of March, 20ID at 11 :30 a.m. is hereby vacated. 
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( ) !Jflnd Delivery 
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( ) Overnight Mail 
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Charles A. Homer, Esq. (ISB No. 1630) 
DeAnne Casperson, Esq. (ISB No. 6698) 
HOLDEN KIDWELL HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C. 
P.O. Box 50130 
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
Telephone: (208) 523-0620 
Facsimile: (208) 523-9518 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON 
BUKU PROPERTIES, LLC, an Idaho 
limited liability company, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
RAOEL H. CLARK and JANET C. 
CLARK, husband and wife; ANGUS 
JERRY PETERSON and BETTY JEAN 
PETERSON, husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
RAOEL H. CLARK and JANET C. 
CLARK, husband and wife; ANGUS 
JERRY PETERSON and BETTY JEAN 
PETERSON, husband and wife, 
Counter-Plaintiffs, 
v. 
BUKU PROPERTIES, LLC, an Idaho 
limited liability company, 
Counter-Defendants. 
Case No. CV-08-941 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION 
TO DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION TO 
"NOTICE OF DEPOSITION OF 
RAOEL H. CLARK" AND REQUEST 
FOR PERMISSION TO TAKE 
TESTIMONY VIA TELEPHONE 
COME NOW Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant Buku Properties, LLC and Counter-
Defendant Jaramie Magera (collectively "Counter-Defendants"), by and through their 
counsel of record Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C., and submit this Memorandum 
in Opposition to Defendant's Objection to "Notice of Deposition of Raoel H. Clark" and 
Request for Permission to Take Testimony via Telephone. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The parties agreed upon dates for the depositions of Mr. Magera, Mr. Clark, and Mr. 
Peterson. On February 17, 2010, counsel received a letter from Mr. Clark's counsel, 
indicating his deposition might have to be taken telephonically because he lives out of state. 
(Casperson Aff., ,. 2). On March 3, 2010, counsel for Counter-Defendants responded, 
indicating Mr. Clark needed to appear at the deposition so he could be asked questions about 
documents relevant to this matter. (Casperson Aff., .,-r 3). On March 3, 2010, Counter-
Defendants also served the Notice of Deposition ofRaoel H. Clark on Mr. Clark's counsel. 
Such deposition notice stated that Counter-Defendants' counsel would take the deposition. 
ofRaoel H. Clark on Wednesday, rVfarch 17,2010, at 11 :30 a.m. at Dunn Law offices located 
in Rigby, Idaho. On March 9,2010, counsel for Mr. Clark filed an Objection to "Notice· of 
Deposition ofRaoel H. Clark" and Request for Permission to Take Testimony Via Telephone 
("Objection"). In his objection, Mr. Dunn asserted that Mr. Clark resides in Texas and that 
although he makes periodic visits to Idaho, he cannot be available at the time and place 
indicated in the deposition notice. Mr. Dunn then requested that Mr. Clark be permitted to 
provide deposition testimony via telephone. Counter-Defendants now object to Mr. Dunn's 
request that Mr. Clark be able to provide deposition testimony telephonically, and ask that 
this Court order Mr. Clark to appear in person, in Jefferson County, for his deposition on a 
mutually agreeable date on which both Mr. Clark and Mr. Peterson's depositions can be 
taken. 
II. ARGUMENT 
A. Mr. Clark bas not demonstrated undue burden or expense would result from 
being required to appear for his deposition in Jefferson County. 
Although Idaho law does not provide much guidance regarding where persons must 
be made available for their depositions. federal cases have addressed this issue. For example, 
in Clayton v. Volociti, Inc., the District of Kansas Court noted, "As a general rule, the 
plaintiffs must make themselves available for examination in the district in which they 
brought suit. Since the plaintiff has selected the forum, he or she will not be heard to 
complain about having to appear there for a deposition. This rule is not followed if the 
plaintiff can show good cause for not being required to come to the district where the action 
is pending." Clayton v. Voloeiti, Inc., 2009 WL 1033738, *2 (D. Kan. 2009); see also 
Detweiler Bros., Inc. v. John Graham & Co., 412 F.Supp. 416,422 (E.D.Wash. 1976). In 
Clayton. the plaintiffs sought a protective order requiring that plaintiffs be deposed where 
they resided, as opposed to being deposed in Kansas City, the jurisdiction in which they filed 
suit. Clayton, 2009 WL 1033738 at *2. Plai.ntiffs asserted that they should not be required 
to travel to Kansas City to be deposed because of undue burden and expense. Id In support 
of this contention, the plaintiffs submitted affidavits attesting to why traveling to Kansas City 
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would impose undue burden and expense, generally stating that the cost of travel, hotel 
expenses, and car rental, along with lost wages, was more than they could bear. ld. Two of 
the named plaintiffs included statements regarding medical reasons for their inability to 
travel, which were unaccompanied by doctor's notes. ld. at *4. The Kansas Court noted that 
in order to meet the requirements for a protective order under Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(c)(1), the 
plaintiffs had to show not merely an ordinary burden of expense and loss, but "undue burden 
or expense." ld. Ultimately, the Kansas Court denied the plaintiffs' request for a protective 
order, finding that plaintiffs did not meet that burden. ld. Importantly, the Kansas Court 
noted "[ d]epositions usually involve some burden to all participants. They often involve 
expense for transportation, sometimes overnight lodging, and often some loss of income. 
Such expense and loss constitute part of the ordinary burden ofJitigatiol1 that each party must 
bear. Only in unusual circumstances would the Court shift the ordinary burden oflitigation 
to the opposing party." ld. at *3. 
In th~ case at hand, Mr. Clark is a counter-plaintiff and is requesting specific 
performance regarding the purchase of the Property. The forum for the dispute is Jefferson 
County, Idaho, as the property at issue is located there. The fact that Mr. Clark hsa since 
moved to Texas and only makes periodic trips to Idaho is insufficient to show good cause or 
demonstrate an undue burden that he cannot appear in person. Simply living in a far-away 
location is not enough, especially considering that he resided in Idaho during the relevant 
portions of this litigation and seeks to have the Court order Buku to purchase the property. 
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Additionally, Mr. Clark himselfhas not provided an affidavit indicating any undue burden 
beyond that of the ordinary burden of litigation that would entitle him to avoid having his 
deposition taken in the location where the suit is filed and the property is located. Mr. Clark 
filed suit as a Counter-Plaintiff in Jefferson County, Idaho. He must make himself available 
for examination in Jefferson County. 
B. Deposition by Telephone Would Be an Insufficient Metbod of Deposition and 
Mr. Clark Has Failed to Demonstrate the Extreme Hardship Necessary to Order 
Deposition by Telephone. 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b)(7) provides that ''[t]he parties may stipulate in 
writing or the court may upon motion order that a deposition may be taken by telephone." 
IdahoR. Civ. P. 30(b)(7). As the Kansas Court in Clayton noted of the identical federal rule, 
"[ w ]hile Rule 3 OCb)( 4) permits the taking of depositions by telephone, nothing in the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure requires the Court to order that depositions be taken 
telephonically." Id at *5. Moreover, as noted in Clayton, 
[R ]emote depositions are most often used for relatively brief examinations that 
do not involve numerous documents. Depositions by telephone. particularly 
of parties, deprive the opposing party of the opportunity to evaluate the 
nonverbal responses and demeanor of the witness and deny the opportunity for 
face-to-face confrontation. They create difficulty when the testimony requires 
the deponent to examine numerous, lengthy, or complex documents. Given 
these legitimate disadvantages of telephonic depositions, the party seeking 
such procedure must make a specific showing of hardship, tied to an 
individual's circumstances. 
ld. "Absent a specific showing of hardship tied to an individual's circumstances, a general 
order requiring that the depositions of out-of-town plaintiffs be taken telephonically is not 
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warranted." Williams v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 2006 WL 1867471, *3 (citing United 
States v. Rock Springs Vista Dev., 185 F.R.D. 603, 603-04 (D. Nev. 1999); Clem v. Allied 
Van Lines Int'! Corp., 102 F.R.D. 938, 940 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). 
Mr. Clark has made no specific showing of hardship regarding his circumstances to 
justify an order for telephonic deposition. He has submitted no affidavit, and has presented 
no evidence that being required to attend his deposition in person would result in any burden 
beyond that of normal litigation. Additionally, this case is a contract dispute and involves 
numerous documents about which Counter-Defendants' counsel will need to question Mr. 
Clark. A telephonic deposition would make questioning Mr. Clark about these documents 
incredibly difficult. Therefore, given that Mr. Clark has made no specific showing of 
hardship necessitating that his deposition be taken telephonically, and given that Mr. Clark 
will need to be questioned about numerous documents during the course of his deposition, 
the Court should deny Mr. Clark' s request that he be deposed telephonically and should order 
that he must appear in person in Jefferson County to be deposed. Plaintiff has no objection 
to rescheduling both depositions on a date in the near future for Mr. Clark's convenience. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Counter-Defendants request that the Court deny 
Defendant/Counter-PlaintiffRaoeI H. Clark's request that he be deposed telephonically, and 
order Mr. Clark to appear in person in Jefferson County for his deposition. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this ll~fMarch, 2010, I served a copy of the following 
described pleading or document on the attorneys listed below by hand delivering. by mailing 
or by facsimile, with the correct postage thereon, a true and correct copy thereof. 
DOCUMENT SERVED: 
ATTORNEYS SERVED: 
Robin D. Dunn 
477 Pleasant Country Lane 
P.O. Box 277 
Rigby, ID 83442 
G:IWfOA'l'A\CAH\149131PIdg$\TelephOne.Oepo.OI'P,wpd 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION TO "NOTICE OF 
DEPOSITION OF RAOEL H. CLARK" AND 
REQUEST FOR PERMISSION TO TAKE 
TESTIMONY VIA TELEPHONE 
( ~rst Class Mail 
( ) Hand Delivery 
( ~csimile 
( ) Overnight Mail 
DeAnne Casperson, sq. 
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Charles A. Homer, Esq. (ISB No. 1630) 
DeAnne Casperson, Esq. (ISB No. 6698) 
HOLDEN KIDWELL HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C. 
P.O. Box 50130 
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
Telephone: (208) 523-0620 
Facsimile: (208) 523-9518 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRlCT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON 
BUKU PROPERTIES, LLC, an Idaho 
limited liability company, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
RAOEL H. CLARK and JANET C. 
CLARK, husband and wife; ANGUS 
JERRY PETERSON and BETTY JEAN 
PETERSON, husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
RAOEL H. CLARK and JANET C. 
CLARK, husband and wife; ANGUS 
JERRY PETERSON and BETTY JEAN 
PETERSON, husband and wife, 
Counter-Plaintiffs, 
v. 
BUKU PROPERTIES, LLC, an Idaho 
limited liability company, 
Counter-Defendants. 
Case No. CV-08-941 
AFFIDAVIT OF DEANNE 
CASPERSON IN SUPPORT OF 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION 
TO DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION TO 
"NOTICE OF DEPOSITION OF 
RAOEL H. CLARK" AND REQUEST 
FOR PERMISSION TO TAKE 
TESTIMONY VIA TELEPHONE 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
)ss. 
County of Bonneville ) 
DeAnne Casperson, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and states as follows: 
1. I am an attorney with the firm of Holden. Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C., and 
an attorney of record on behalf of Buku Properites, LLC. I sUbmit this Affidavit 
based upon my own personal knowledge unless otherwise stated, and in support of 
the Counter-Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Objection to 
"Notice of Deposition ofRaod H. Clark" and Request for Permission to Take 
Testimony via Telephone. 
2. On February 17,2010, I received a letter from Raoel H. Clark's counsel, indicating 
his deposition might have to be taken telephonically because he lives out of state. 
A true and correct copy of such correspondence is attached hereto as Exhibit "A." 
3. On March 3, 2010, I responded to:MI. Clark's counsel's February 17,2010, letter 
indicating that Mr. Clark needed to appear at the deposition so he can be asked 
questions about documents relevant to this matter. A true and correct copy of such 
correspondence is attached hereto as Exhibit "B." 
2 AFFIDAVIT OF DEANNE CASPERSON IN SUPPORT OF MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION TO "NOTICE OF DEPOSITION OF RAOEL H. CLARK" AND 
REQUEST FOR PERMISSION TO TAKE TESTIMONY VIA TELEPHONE 
______ ( ___ .............. "-'...J':"" 
.~ 
Dated this ~ day of March, 2010. 
~/Cn~ 
DeAnne Ca<s;rson V 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this ~ay of March, 2010. 
~¥~~ ... N~ Publi for Idaho 
. R~sidingat: \~ ~ 
My commission expires:·, J I. 20 \ q 
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DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION TO "NOTICE OF DEPOSITION OF MOEL H. CLARK" AND 
REQUEST FOR PERMISSION TO TAKE TESTIMONY VIA TELEPHONE 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this ~~~ of March, 2010, I served a copy of the 
following described pleading or document on the attorneys listed below by hand 




Robin D. Dunn 
477 Pleasant Country Lane 
P.O. Box 277 
Rigby, ID 83442 
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AFFIDAVIT OF DEANNE CASPERSON IN 
SUPPORT OF MEMORANDUM IN 
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION 
TO "NOTICE OF DEPOSITION OF RAOEL H. 
CLARK" AND REQUEST FOR PERMISSION TO 
TAKE TESTIMONY VIA TELEPHONE 
( v{First Class Mail 
( ) jI and Delivery 
( 0 Facsimile 
( ) Overnight Mail 
~~~., 
DeAnne Casperson, ESCif 
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DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION TO "NOTICE OF DEPOSITION OF RAOEL H. CLARK" AND 
REQUEST FOR PERMISSION TO TAKE TESTIMONY VIA TELEPHONE 
Telephone: (208)745-9202 
February 17, 2010 
DeAnne Casperson, Esq. 
P.O. Box 50130 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
l~N LAW OFFICES, 
ROBIN D. DUNN 
A1v.lELlA A. SHEETS 
P.O. Box 277 
477 Pleasant Country Lane 
Rigby, Xdaho 83442-0277 
email: rdunn@dunnlawoffices.com 
Re: Buku Properties, LLC v. Peterson/Clark 
Jefferson. County Case No. CV-OB-941 
Dear DeAnne: 
- ____ ... '""' ................. , ..... o.J .......... .L u-.. ..... 
Enclosed please find a copy of the Notice of Taking Deposition of Jaramie Magera 
regarding the above matter. I understand you want to depose my clients as well. 
However, you will probably have to depose Mr. Clark telephonically because he lives out 
of state. There should not be a problem in deposing Mr. Peterson in person. 
If there are questions, please call. 
kin rel)(, " ....... -- .. -~ ) /.,.-... ~........... . .... -----r, L-·-..... ~"'--J .' ---~ 
Robin D. Dunn, Esq. . 







Hahn & Crapo P.L.L.C. 
LAW OFFIOES 
DeAnne Casperson 
Lic<:med in Id&lIO, Mi.souri L ld Kall$U 
E-mail!dca$perfon@holdel1log.al .com 
l Ol l) • 
" " ' U h'flp / ') 
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n " ' , '.j . J (j 
.' EF rfR ~ j/'; ,,' i ," ", , 
VIA FACSIMILE 
- v Ti c' 0 ' , '-' lJ iJ ' ' ," 'uN""' " March 3, 2010 ' I Y, 'D'~Ho 
Robin D. DUM 
DUNN LAW OFFICES, PA 
P.O. Box 277 
. Rigby, ID 83442 
1000 Riverwalk O cive, Suit" lOO 
1'0 Bo>: 5013Q 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 8340S 
iel: (208) 52;-0620 
Fox: (2.08) 523·9518 
w\Vw. holdcn l.~.""rn 
Re: Buku Properties, LLC v. Raoel II Clark and Janet C Clark, et al. 
Jefferson County Case No. CV-2008-941 
Dear Robin: 
In scheduling the deposition of your client, Mr. Clark, you have indicated that this 
deposition can only be scheduled telephonically. As you are aware, Rule 30 of the Idaho 
Rules of Civil Procedure allow us to take the deposition of a party. Pursuant to Rule 
30(b)(7), <'the parties may stipulate in writing or. the court may upon motion order that a 
deposition may be taken by telephone." For purposes of this Rule and Rules 28(a), 37 (a)( 1), 
37(b)(l) and Rule 45(f)(1), a deposition taken by telephone is taken in the state, territory or 
insular possession and at the place where the deponent is to answer questions propounded 
to the deponent. We have neither stipulated in writing nor have you sought protection from 
the Court in order to have Mr. Clark's deposition taken by telephone. In addition, because 
the arrangements for a court reporter would have to made in Texas, it would require my 
client to incur additional costs_ 
Mr. Clark is a party to this action. He has been well aware of this pending action. \A' e 
believe that he is required to appear in order to be able to ask him questions and have him 
review documents associated with this case. We do not believe that this can be adequately 
done over the phone. Consequently, we are hereby demanding that Mr. Clark physically 
appear at his deposition. Ifhe fails to do so, we will seek sanctions against him. 
If you have any questions or conunents, please contact m.e. 
Enclosures 
c: Buku Properties. LLC 
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HOLDEN KIDWELL HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C. 
P.O. Box 50130 
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON 
BUKU PROPERTIES, LLC, an Idaho 
limited liability company, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
RAOEL H. CLARK and JANET C. 
CLARK, husband and wife; ANOUS 
JERRY PETERSON and BETTY JEAN 
PETERSON, husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
RAOEL H. CLARK and JANET C. 
CLARK, husband and wife; ANGUS 
JERRY PETERSON and BETTY JEAN 
PETERSON, husband and wife, 
Counter-Plaintiffs, 
v. 
BUKU PROPERTIES, LLC, an Idaho 
limited liability company, 
Counter-Defendants. 
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AMENDED NOTICE OF 
DEPOSITION OF ANGUS JERRY 
PETERSON 
f 
YOU WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE That PlaintiffBuku Properties. LLC, and its 
counsel of record, will take the deposition of Defendant Angus Jeny Peterson, pursuant to 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 26 and 30(a), before a duly authorized court reporter and 
notary public, on Tuesday, April 13, 2010, at 1 :30 p.m., at the offices of Dunn Law offices, 
477 Pleasant Country Lane, Rigby, Idaho, and will continue from time to time until 
completed, at which place and time you are invited to appear and take part in such deposition. 
Date: 411 I ;Jol, 0 
DeAnne Casperson 
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, p .L.L.C. 
2 AMENDED NOTICE OF DEPOSITION OF ANGUS JERRY:PETERSON 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certifY that on this '~day of April, 2010, I served a copy of the following 
described pleading or document on the attorneys listed below by hand delivering, by mailing 
or by facsimile, with the conoect postage thereon, a true and correct copy thereof. 
DOCUMENT SERVED: 
ATTORNEYS SERVED: 
Robin D. Dunn 
477 Pleasant Country Lane 
P.O. Box 277 
Rigby, ID 83442 
T &T Reporting 
525 Park Avenue 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
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AMENDED NOTICE OF DEPOSITION OF ANGUS 
JERRY PETERSON 
( v(First Class Mail 
( ) Hand Delivery 
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( ) First Class Mail 
( ) IjJJnd Delivery 
( vfFacsimile 
( ) Overnight Mail 
l:d-fL .-,.~C~~~ 
DeAnne Cisperson, Esq. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON 
BUKU PROPERTIES, LLC, an Idaho 
limited liability company, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
RAOEL H. CLARK and JANET C. 
CLARK, husband and wife; ANGUS 
JERRY PETERSON and BErry JEAN 
PETERSON, husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
RAOEL H. CLARK and JANET C. 
CLARK., husband and wife; ANGUS 
JERRY PETERSON and BErry JEAN 
PETERSON, husband and wife, 
Counter-Plaintiffs. 
v. 
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Case No. CV-08-941 
AMENDED NOTICE OF 
DEPOSITION OF RAOEL H. CLARK 
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YOU WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE That Plaintiff Buku Properties, LLC, and its 
counsel of record, will take the deposition of Defendant Raoel H. Clarks pursuant to Idaho 
Rules of Civil Procedure 26 and 30(a), before a duly authorized court reporter and notary 
public, on Tuesday, Apri113, 2010, at 10:00 a.m., at the offices of Dunn Law offices} 477 
Pleasant Country Lane, Rigby, Idaho, and will continue from time to time until completed, 
at which place and time you are invited to appear and take part in such deposition. 
Date: LIt ( Idol V 
DeAnne Casperson 
HOLDENj KIDWELL, lW1N & CRAPO, P.L.L.C. 
2 AMENDED NOTICE OF DEPOSITION OF RAOEL H. CLARK 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this k -rday of April, 2010, I served a copy of the following 
described pleading or document on the attorneys listed below by hand delivering, by mailing 
or by facsimile, with the correct postage thereon, a true and correct copy thereof. 
DOCUMENT SERVED: 
ATTORNEYS SERVED: 
Robin D. Dunn 
477 Pleasant Country Lane 
P.D. Box 277 
Rigby,ID 83442 
T &T Reporting 
525 Park Avenue 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
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( ) ljand Delivery 
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( ) Overnight Mail 
3 AMENDED NOTICE OF DEPOSITION OF RAO:EL H. CLARK 
